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FRANCE 


AND  THE 


AMERICAN    REVOLUTION 


1763-1778 


A  thesis  presented  to  the  Faculty  of  Cornell  University  for  the 
degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  June,  1895. 


BY 


LAURA  CHARLOTTE  SHELDON 

M 


ANDRUS    &    CHURCH 

ITHACA,  N.  Y. 

IQOO 


sr 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 
FORECASTS  OF  REVOLUTION __ 


CHAPTER  II. 
AID  FOR  AMERICA__ 


3 

CHAPTER  HI. 
THE  BEGINNING  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 30 

CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  DEMAND  FOR  RECOGNITION 46 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  TREATY..  60 


'J65951 


PREFACE. 


In  this  study  of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the 
Franco-American  alliance  of  1778,  without  hoping  to  attain 
minuteness  of  analysis,  I  have  tried  to  show  the  principal 
motives  of  France,  and  to  suggest  how  they  were  modified 
by  the  influence  of  Spain.  In  dealing  with  the  American 
side  of  the  story,  [Tio  attempt  has  been  made  to  do  more  than 
hint  at  the  political  complications  which,  beginning  in  this 
early  period,  produced  their  most  important  results  in  the 
later  stages  of  the  war. 

The  most  helpful  documents  easily  accessible  for  the 
study  of  this  topic  are  :  on  the  American  side,  Wharton's 
Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  the  Journals  of 
Congress,  and  the  writings  of  the  statesmen  concerned  ;  on 
the  French,  Mr.  B.  F.  Stevens'  great  collection  of  Fac 
similes,  and  the  original  material  contained  in  M.  Doniol's 
important  but  biased  history.  These  may  be  supplemented 
by  the  manuscript  collections  of  Mr.  Jared  Sparks  and  Mr. 
George  Bancroft.  The  letters  published  by  DeWitt  in  his 
study  of  Jefferson  may  also  be  found  among  the  Sparks 
manuscripts.  The  Spanish  documents  have  been  consulted 
in  English  and  French  translations. 

I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  Mr.  Thomas 
J.  Kiernan  of  the  Harvard  library,  Mr.  Wilberforce  Eames 
of  the  Lenox  Library,  and  Mr.  Robbins  Little,  formerly  of 
the  Astor  Library,  for  their  kindness  in  giving  me  access  to 
valuable  collections ;  and  also  to  thank  the  officers  of  the 
Cornell  Library  for  favors  continued  during  the  revision  of 
this  thesis. 

LAURA  C.  SHELDON. 


.  I. 

FORECASTS   OF  REVOLUTION. 


The  agreement  made  between  France  and  the  United 
States  in  1778,  though  a  welcome  relief  to  struggling  patriots 
in  America  and  a  source  of  joy  to  Republican  enthusiasts  in 
France,  did  not,  in  either  country,  lack  critics  to  condemn  it 
as  an  unnatural  alliance.  In  view  of  the  wars  which  had 
sundered  Frenchmen  and  Englishmen  for  nearly  a  century, 
the  feeling  was  inevitable  ;  yet  those  who  deliberately  called 
this  union  of  enemies  a  natural  alliance  had  wiser  political 
insight.  They  saw  that  the  transfer  of  Canada  to  England 
in  1763  had  opened  the  way  for  a  friendship  between  English 
America  and  France. 

Early  in  the  series  of  contests,  here  and  there  an  onlooker 
had  dimly  seen  that  the  relation  between  England  and  her 
thirteen  Colonies  depended  on  whether  France  or  England 
held  Canada.  Two  opposite  predictions  were  made  :  one, 
that  England,  if  she  should  conquer  Canada,  would  follow 
up  the  victory  by  tightening  her  grasp  on  her  own  Colonies  ; 
the  other,  that  she  would  soon  lose  them  altogether.  Toward 
the  close  of  Queen  Anne's  War,  an  enterprising  French 
officer  formed  a  plan  for  winning  the  English  Colonists  to  the 
side  of  France:  namely,  to  persuade  them  that  the  troops 
which  England  was  sending  to  their  shores  were  designed,  not 
for  the  conquest  of  their  enemy,  but  for  their  own  subjuga 
tion  ;  and  that,  if  New  France  should  fall  into  the  hands  of 
England,  their  liberties  would  be  destroyed.  The  French 
colonial  minister  approved  of  the  scheme.  "  It  is  much  to 
be  wished,"  he  wrote,  "  that  the  Council  at  Boston  could  be 
informed  of  the  designs  of  the  English  Court,  and  shown 
how  important  it  is  for  that  province  to  remain  in  the  state 
of  a  republic.  The  King  would  even  approve  our  helping 
it  to  do  so."  In  furtherance  of  this  policy,  an  emissary  was 
sent  to  Boston  in  1711,  to  treat  with  the  Colonies  as  an  inde- 


2  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

pendent  people  and  arrange  a  mutual  cessation  of  hostilities, 
on  condition itiifct  they  should  jrive  England  no  more  aid; 
but  when  he  arrived  on  the  enemy's  coast,  his  vessel  was 
seized,  and  ih&jirjifesipii  came  to.  an  ignominious  end.1 

At  about  this  time  another  Frenchman,  with  wiser  fore 
sight,  was  predicting  the  actual  results  of  the  British  policy. 
"  Old  England,"  he  said,  alluding  to  the  possible  conquest 
of  Canada  and  its  influence  on  the  thirteen  Colonies,  "  will 
not  imagine  that  these  various  provinces  will  then  unite, 
shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  English  monarchy,  and  erect  them 
selves  into  a  democracy."  2  A  generation  later,  in  1748,  the 
Swedish  traveller,  Kalm,  believed  that  the  presence  of  the 
French  in  Canada  was  the  main  security  for  England's  re 
tention  of  her  Colonies.3  Before  the  close  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  French  and  English  statesmen  alike  were  pre 
dicting  that  the  transfer  of  Canada  to  England  would  be 
followed  by  the  revolt  of  the  British  Provinces  ;  for  their  in 
habitants,  released  from  constant  dread  of  a  hostile  neighbor 
and  no  longer  in  need  of  support  from  England,  would  be 
free  to  nurse  their  grievances  against  her.  The  Count  de 
Vergennes,  who  was  to  direct  the  foreign  affairs  of  France 
during  the  American  Revolution,  foretold  the  crisis  in  which 
he  afterward  found  his  opportunity.  "  England,"  he  said,. 
"  will  ere  long  repent  of  having  removed  the  only  check  that 
could  keep  her  colonies  in  awe.  They  stand  no  longer  in 
need  of  her  protection.  She  will  call  on  them  to  contribute 
toward  supporting  the  burdens  they  have  helped  to  bring  on 
her,  and  they  will  answer  by  striking  off  all  dependence."  4 

In  1763,  the  long  contest  for  empire  ended  in  the  triumph 
of  England  and  the  expulsion  of  France  from  the  North 
American  continent.  With  her  chief  colonial  possessions 
torn  away,  her  army  weakened,  and  her  navy  almost 
destroyed,  France  suddenly  found  herself  in  the  position  of 
a  minor  power.  Her  humiliation  brought  with  it  not  even 

1  Parkman,  A  Half-Century  of  Conflict,  I,  pp.  150  if. 

2  Ibid.   I,  p.    155.     Quoted  from   an  anonymous  memorial  of  1710, 
1711. 

8Lecky,  England  jn  the  Eighteenth  Century,  III,  p.  291. 
4  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  p.  564. 


Forecasts  of  Revolution.  3 

the  poor  comfort  of  security  :  for  England  was.  in  the  eyes 
of  the  French  Ministry,  a  treacherous  opponent,  disposed  to 
take  every  advantage  of  a  conquered  enemy  ;  ready,  for 
any  hope  of  gain,  to  reopen  the  war,  under  her  own  prece 
dent,  without  the  formality  of  a  declaration.  If  Choiseul, 
at  this  time  the  most  influential  minister  of  France,  not  only 
tried  to  strengthen  his  country  by  forming  alliances  and 
building  up  a  new  navy,  but  watched  for  an  opportunity  to 
strike  an  underhand  blow  at  England  through  her  Colonies ; 
if  Vergennes,  a  few  years  later,  built  up  for  her  discomfiture 
a  consistent  policy  of  deception,  their  excuse  must  be  sought 
in  the  desperate  plight  of  France  and  in  previous  wanderings 
from  the  path  of  international  virtue  on  the  part  of  England. 
"  Power  can  never  render  honorable  that  which  is  not  hon 
orable,"— so  wrote  a  contemporary  of  these  men — "  and  in 
politics,  everything  which  is  not  avowed,  everything  which 
is  not  clothed  with  a  public  character,  is  intrigue.  .  .  . 
Separate  morals  from  politics,  and  politics  have  no  longer 
any  support,  but  lose  themselves  in  a  bottomless  abyss." 
Choiseul  and  Vergennes  employed  their  powrer  without  too 
keen  an  eye  to  international  honor  ;  used  means,  to  avow 
which  would  have  been  insanity  ;  and,  in  their  dealings 
with  England,  sunk  moral  considerations  to  a  fathomless 
depth. 

The  treaty  of  1763  was  a  disgrace,  to  be  wiped  out. 
Choiseul  lost  no  time  and  took  no  chances.  He  laid  plans 
to  thwart  the  policy  of  England  in  India,  in  the  Mediter 
ranean,  in  the  Eastern  islands  ;  he  kept  strict  watch  over  the 
diplomacy  of  Europe.  "  There  was  not  a  single  point," 
says  the  biographer  of  one  of  his  secret  emissaries,  "  where 
the  wary  and  alert  minister  had  not  his  agents,  spies,  and 
instruments  for  the  aggrandizement  of  France  and  the 
injury  of  England."  From  time  to  time,  his  animosity 
broke  out  freely  in  his  official  correspondence.  ' '  We  are  in 
no  haste,  as  you  may  well  imagine,"  he  wrote  in  1767  to  a 
member  of  the  embassy  at  London,  "  to  see  a  firm  ministry 

1  Se*gur,  L,e  Politique  de  Tous  les  Cabinets  de  1'Europe,  I,  p.  119, 
note  ;  p.  113,  note. 

2  Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  p.  43. 


4  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

established  in  England.  I  hope  that  the  anarchy  will  not 
soon  cease.  Would  that  it  might  last  a  century."  A  year 
later,  he  expressed  a  wish  that  the  popular  tumult  on  behalf 
of  Wilkes  might  increase.  "  A  rumor  is  abroad  here,"  he 
said,  "  that  on  the  fifteenth  there  wasja  sort  of  action  in  the 
city  of  London,  in  which  many  people  perished.  I  dare  not 
flatter  myself  that  this  report  is  true.  The  English  never 
destroy  one  another  so  fast  as  we  could  wish." 

That  he  might  the  more  safely  hasten  their  destruction, 
Choiseul  fortified  his  country  by  diplomacy.  He  adhered 
to  the  sharply  criticized  Austrian  alliance  ;  chiefly,  it  is 
said,  to  secure  neutrality  on  the  continent  in  case  of  war 
with  England,  and  thus  to  avoid  the  disadvantage  of  a 
double  conflict  with  the  navy  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
armies  of  her  allies. 3  Before  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  he  had  strengthened  the  natural  bond  between  France 
and  Spain  by  the  Third  Family  Compact.  This  agreement 
assured  France  of  at  least  one  ally  in  case  her  minister 
should  succeed  in  bringing  on  the  war  which  he  desired. 
Meanwhile,  further  negotiation,  working  on  the  easily  ex 
cited  passions  for  revenge  and  acquisition,  aroused  the 
Spaniard  to  eagerness  for  war.  Choiseul  was  "  as  sure  of 
Spain,"  we  are  told,  "  as  if  he  had  been  the  prime  minister 
of  Charles  III."  4 

Choiseul  tried  to  bring  about  a  rupture  with  England  in 
1765.  Three  years  later  he  made  a  second  attempt,  but  his 
colleagues  in  the  Council  overruled  him.  Papers  drawn  up 
by  his  order  are  still  extant,  minutely  describing  the 
English  coast,  with  a  view  to  its  facilities  for  landing  an 
army  of  invasion.5  The  fact  that  no  use  was  made  of  this 
information  argues  prudence  on  the  part  of  the  King  and 
his  advisers,  rather  than  any  sentiment  of  forbearance 
toward  England.  Not  only  the  publicly  recognized  Council 

1  Choiseul  to  Durand,  Aug.  4,  1767.     De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  420. 

2  Choiseul  to  du  Chatelet,  May  23,  1768.     Ibid.  p.  438. 

3  Se"gur,  Le  Politique  de  Tous  les  Cabinets,  I,  p.  88,  note.     Cape- 
figue,  lyouis  XVI,  II,  p.  22.     Flassan,  Diplomatic  Fran£aise,  VI,  p.  53. 

*Lacretelle,  Histoire  de  France,  IV,  p.  191. 

5  Mahon,  History  of  England  from  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  to  the  Peace 
of  Versailles,  V,  Appendix,  pp.  xix,  xxii. 


Forecasts  of  Revolution.  5 

but  the  secret  cabinet  of  Louis  XV  were  intent  on  prospects 
of  war.  A  plan  for  the  invasion  of  England  was  the  only 
paper  spared  when  the  secret  correspondence  was  consigned 
to  the  flames  by  order  of  Louis  XVI,  at  the  opening  of  his 
reign.1 

At  the  very  time  when  England  was  adjusting  her  un 
stable  peace  with  France,  the  British  Ministry  were  pre 
paring  measures  that  could  not  fail  to  embroil  them  with 
the  American  Colonies  and  give  France  an  opportunity  for 
mischief.  Seven  months  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
of  1763,  the  proper  commissioners  were  instructed  to  pre 
pare  a  bill  imposing  a  stamp  duty  on  the  Colonists.  This 
bill  was  laid  aside  for  a  year,  but  in  the  meantime  laws 
were  passed  to  extend  the  Navigation  Acts  and  modify 
American  imposts.2  The  news  of  these  measures  roused  in 
tense  excitement  in  the  Provinces.  Tidings  of  the  discon 
tent  reached  France,  and  Choiseul  promptly  sent  his  first 
secret  agent  to  America. 

This  emissary,  sent  out  in  1764,  was  M.  de  Pontleroy,  a 
lieutenant  in  the  French  navy.3  On  his  return  to  Europe 
in  1766,  he  made  his  report  to  M.  Durand,  then  chief  clerk 
of  the  French  embassy  in  London.  The  report  comprised 
an  account  of  the  products,  occupations,  and  industrial  and 
military  resources  of  the  Provinces,  the  state  of  their  de 
fences,  the  character  and  the  political  aspirations  of  their  in 
habitants.  Durand,  in  forwarding  this  information  to  Choi 
seul,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Colonies  were  too  opu 
lent,  ambitious,  and  conscious  of  their  strength,  to  remain 
in  obedience,  but  that  a  revolution  ending  in  American 
independence  wrould  be  a  disadvantage  to  France  ;  because 
the  Colonies  in  question,  producing,  as  they  did,  all  the 
necessaries  of  life,  could  absorb  at  will  their  southern  neigh 
bors,  the  producers  of  sugar,  coffee,  and  cotton.  In  a  word, 
the  independence  of  America  would  endanger  French  rule 
in  the  West  Indies.  Durand  was  a  conservative.  He  held 

1  Vergennes  and  du  Muy  to  Louis  XVI,  Feb.  (?)  1775  ;  Segur,  L,e 
Politique,  I,  p..  106. 

2  Bancroft,  III,  pp.  55,  73. 

3De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  407,  note. 


6  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

to  the  old  policy  of  war  against  all  the  English.  He  spoke 
of  the  importance  of  injuring  British  commerce,  and  advised 
that  Pontleroy's  instructions  for  a  second  mission  be  framed 
with  that  object.1 

Choiseul,  replying  briefly,  put  aside  Durand's  scheme  for 
attacking  the  commerce  of  England.  He  said  that  M.  de 
Pontleroy  would  be  instructed,  on  his  second  tour  through 
the  Colonies,  simply  to  verify  his  former  report.  "Our 
ideas  on  America,  whether  military  or  political,"  said  he, 
"  are  infinitely  changed  within  thirty  years." 

A  few  months  after  this  discussion,  Benjamin  Franklin's 
published  replies  to  the  Parliamentary  inquiry  on  the  sub 
ject  of  the  Stamp  Act  supplied  the  French  Ministry  with 
another  source  of  information  on  American  affairs.  M. 
Durand,  who  was  acting  as  minister  plenipotentiary  at  this 
time,  zealously  cultivated  Franklin's  acquaintance,  ques 
tioning  him  about  America,  asking  for  all  his  political  writ 
ings,  and  offering  him  various  social  attentions.  Franklin 
suspected  a  hidden  motive  for  these  civilities.  "  I  fancy," 
he  wrote  to  his  son,  "  that  intriguing  nation  would  like  very 
well  to  meddle  on  occasion,  and  blow  up  the  coals  between 
Great  Britain  and  her  Colonies,  but  I  hope  we  shall  give 
them  no  opportunity." 

Durand  gathered  from  Franklin's  report,  that  the  opposite 
commercial  interests  of  England  and  America  were  tending 
to  produce  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  ;  but  lie  thought  that 
England,  foreseeing  the  trouble,  would  take  measures  to 
ward  it  off.  He  believed  that  the  revolution  would  be 
gradual  and  would  lead,  not  to  a  separation  of  the  Colonies 
from  the  mother  country,  but  to  a  union  such  as  that  of 
Scotland  with  the  crown  of  Great  Britain.  On  this  point, 
too,  Choiseul  was  of  a  different  opinion.  He  thought  that 
England  could  hold  her  Colonies  only  by  absolute  control  of 
their  commerce  ;  while,  if  she  tried  to  maintain  this  control 

'Durand  to  Choiseul,  Aug.  3,  7,  20,  22,  24,  1766.  De  Witt,  Jeffer 
son,  pp.  407,  410,  412,  413,  415. 

2  Choiseul  to  Durand,  Aug.  n,  Sept.  15,  1766.      Ibid.  pp.  412,  417. 

3  To  William  Franklin,  Aug.  28,  1767.     Works,  IV,  p.  32. 


Forecasts  of  Revolution.  7 

by  imposts,  the  Colonies  would  rebel,  and  she  would  be  un 
able  to  subdue  them.1 

Choiseul  believed,  then,  that  a  revolution  in  America  was 
approaching.  It  is  clear,  from  his  instructions  to  his  next 
colonial  agent,  that  he  did  not  fear  American  independence, 
and  that  he  was  inclined  to  aid  the  Colonies  The  projected 
second  voyage  of  M.  de  Pontleroy  seems  never  to  have  taken 
place;  but  on  the  fourth  of  October,  1767,  the  Baron  de 
Kalb,  an  officer  in  the  French  service,  who  had  been  secretly 
gathering  American  news  in  Holland,  set  sail  for  Philadel 
phia.  Choiseul  instructed  him  to  find  out  what  the  Ameri 
can  people  intended  ro  do,  and  what  it  was  advisable  to  send 
them — for  instance,  whether  they  required  engineers  and 
cavalry  officers  ; — and  also  to  enquire  into  their  facilities  for 
procuring  munitions  and  supplies,  the  strength  of  their  de 
termination  to  escape  from  English  rule,  their  military 
resources  and  local  advantages,  the  plan  of  their  revolt,  and 
the  names  of  the  leaders  who  would  probably  take  com 
mand.2 

Through  the  year  1768,  during  his  stay  in  America  and 
after  his  return,  de  Kalb  made  frequent  reports.  He  found 
the  country  in  a  ferment.  The  excitement  caused  by  the 
Stamp  Act  had  hardly  had  time  to  die  out  after  the  repeal, 
before  new  taxes  caused  fresh  irritation.  The  people  were 
entering  into  non-importation  agreements  and  setting  up 
manufactories  for  themselves.  De  Kalb  thought  that  if 
the  Colonies  had  any  easy  means  of  communication  or  if 
they  were  united  in  their  interests,  they  would  soon  become 
independent.  Even  as  it  was,  this  result  would  come  in 
time.  If  not  produced  by  British  oppression,  it  would 
follow  from  the  natural  growth  of  population  ;  for  the 
country  was  too  large  to  be  governed  from  a  distance.  But 
the  people  showed  no  inclination  to  call  on  foreign  powers 
for  help.  In  fact,  such  aid  would  be  an  object  of  greater 
suspicion  to  them  than  the  encroachments  of  England. 

1  Durand   to   Choiseul,    Aug.    n,    30,    Sept.    3,    1767.     Choiseul   to 
Durand,  Aug.  24.     De  Witt,  Jefferson,  pp.  420,  427,  428,  425. 

2  Kapp,   Life  of  Kalb,   p.   46.      Colleville,    Les  Missions  Secretes, 
p.  20. 


8  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

Even  if  they  should  ask  assistance,  de  Kalb  thought  it 
would  be  unwise  to  grant  it  until  they  had  declared  their 
independence,  formed  a  confederation,  invited  all  nations  to 
share  their  commerce,  and  established  an  army  and  a  navy. 
Premature  advances,  he  thought,  would  only  reconcile  the 
Colonies  to  England  and  unite  the  two  countries  for  an 
attack  on  the  French  territories  in  America.1 

While  de  Kalb  was  carrying  on  his  researches  abroad  and 
making  his  reports,  the  discussion  at  home  continued.  The 
new  ambassador  at  London,  the  Count  du  Chatelet,  showed 
keen  interest  in  American  affairs.  In  March,  1768,  evi 
dently  in  ignorance  of  the  measures  already  taken  by 
Choisetil,  du  Chatelet  advised  him  to  send  agents  to  America 
to  gather  information  while  the  peace  lasted,  and,  in  case  a 
revolution  seemed  imminent,  to  form  centers  of  union  and 
hope,  and  suggest  an  appeal  for  foreign  aid.2  In  a  letter 
written  in  November,  du  Chatelet  discussed  the  question 
whether  a  revolution  in  the  near  future  was  probable.  The 
Colonists  were  firm  in  their  refusal  to  trade  with  England, 
but  many  people  believed  that  the  mother  country  would 
give  way  under  the  pressure  of  industrial  distress.  Du 
Chatelet  feared  that  the  British  Ministry,  realizing  how 
hard  it  would  be  to  subdue  the  Americans  by  force,  would 
come  to  an  accommodation  with  them  and  then  divert  their 
minds  from  past  grievances  by  operations  against  France 
and  Spain.  He  deplored  the  fact  that  the  Bourbon  powers 
could  not  profit  by  the  state  of  affairs  in  America  ;  but,  like 
de  Kalb,  he  feared  that  any  advances  would  lead  the 
Colonists  to  make  peace  with  England.3  As  time  passed, 
and  there  "was  no  sign  of  change  in  the  British  policy,  he 
began  to  doubt  whether  a  reconciliation  was  probable,  and 

1  De  Kalb  to  Choiseul,  Philadelphia,  Jan.  15,  20,  1768  ;  New  York, 
Feb  25  (or  21)  ;  Boston,  March  (or  May)  2  ;  Philadelphia,  Apr.  19  ; 
Paris  (?)  Aug.  6;  Paris,  Sept.  16  (or  Oct.  10)  ;  Nov.  6,  15.  Kapp, 
Life  of  Kalb,  pp.  53-68,  passim,  and  286  to  295.  Colleville,  Les 
Missions  Secretes,  pp.  43-81.  De  Witt,  Jefferson,  pp.  458-464. 

2Du  Chatelet  to  Choiseul,   March   12,    1768.     De  Witt,    Jefferson, 

P-  433- 

3Du  Chatelet  to  Choiseul,  Nov.  11,  18,   1768.     Ibid.  pp.  445,  448. 


Forecasts  of  Revolution.  9 

to  fear  a  premature  declaration  of  war.  Everything  de 
pended  on  the  action  of  the  English  Parliament,  he  wrote 
early  in  December,  1768.  If  it  persisted  in  taxing  the 
Colonies,  the  revolution  would  probably  break  out  within 
six  months.  In  that  case,  France  would  find  herself  face  to 
face  with  two  questions  :  could  the  union  of  the  Colonies 
maintain  itself  against  the  power  of  England,  without  the 
support  which  a  foreign  war  would  lend  it  ;  and  could 
France  and  Spain  remain  idle  spectators  of  the  struggle  ? 
The  two  nations  would  be  obliged  to  decide  whether  they 
would  run  the  risk  involved  in  supporting  the  revolution,  or 
leave  it  to  the  chance  of  dying  out  for  want  of  sustenance.1 

Choiseul  agreed,  in  the  main,  with  the  ambassador's  con 
clusions.  He  thought  a  revolution  certain  unless  England 
changed  her  colonial  policy.2  But  the  veto  of  his  war  pro 
ject,  occurring  at  about  this  time,  probably  dampened  his 
interest  in  the  Provinces.  De  Kalb  was  coldly  received  on 
his  return  from  America.  For  some  time,  the  Minister  re 
fused  even  to  grant  him  an  audience.  "  It  was  obvious," 
says  de  Kalb,  "  that  his  system  ....  had  changed,  as  he 
no  longer  expressed  any  desire  to  know  what  was  passing  in 
America."3  "  It  was  he,"  Lafayette  afterwards  wrote  of 
de  Kalb,  in  words  which  betray  characteristic  impatience  of 
the  minister's  seeming  apathy, — "  It  was  he  whom  M.  de 
Choiseul  sent  to  visit  the  English  Colonies,  and  who,  on  his 
return,  obtained  money  from  him,  but  no  audience;  so  little 
did  this  minister  think  of  the  Revolution,  the  retrospective 
honor  of  which  some  people  have  assigned  to  him."4 

The  time  for  military  interference  in  America  had  not  yet 
come  ;  but  early  in  1769  Choiseul  and  du  Chatelet  discussed 
the  feasibility  of  binding  the  Colonies  to  France  and  Spain 
by  commercial  ties.  Du  Chatelet  originated  the  plan.  A 
bolder  design,  adapted  only  to  a  state  of  war,  had  been  pro 
posed  to  him  in  a  letter  of  the  preceding  July,  written  prob- 

1  Du  Chatelet  to  Choiseul,  Dec.  9,  1768.     De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  449. 

2  Choiseul  to  du  Chatelet,  Nov.  22,  Dec.   20,  1768.       Ibid.  pp.  449, 

45i- 

3  Sparks  MSS.  XXXII,  vol.  I. 

4  Ibid.  LXXXVI,  p.  3. 


io  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

ably  by  his  chief  secretary,  M.  Frances.1  This  may  have 
suggested  to  the  ambassador  his  own  less  venturesome 
scheme.  The  writer  of  the  letter  believed  that  a  com 
mercial  treaty  with  the  Americans  would  be  desirable. 
Such  a  treaty,  he  said,  could  be  proposed  to  them  only  at 
the  moment  of  a  rupture  with  the  mother  country  and,  for 
that  reason,  ought  to  be  fully  discussed  in  advance.  If 
offered  at  the  critical  moment,  it  might  detach  the  Colonies 
from  England.  France  and  Spain  would  then  profit  by  the 
lowering  of  the  British  revenues  ;  while  a  stipulation  of 
neutrality  would  free  their  colonies  from  the  danger  of 
being  attacked  by  the  Americans  in  future  wars,  and  would 
naturally  develop  into  a  treaty  of  alliance. 

About  six  months  after  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  we  find 
du  Chatelet  laying  before  the  minister,  evidently  not  for  the 
first  time,  a  plan  of  collusion  with  the  Americans,  suited  to 
a  state  of  peace.2  He  proposed  that  France  and  Spain 
should  relax  their  commercial  restrictions,  even  at  the  risk 
of  temporary  inconvenience  to  their  own  citizens.  This 
would  encourage  trade  between  Americans  and  subjects  of 
the  King,  enable  Frenchmen  to  provide  the  Colonists  with 
those  manufactured  articles  which  they  had  ceased  to  obtain 
from  England,  and  lead  to  the  formation  of  commercial 
habits  which  England,  even  in  case  of  a  reconciliation, 
would  find  hard  to  break.  Besides  this,  France  would  gain 
an  indirect  advantage.  The  encouragement  to  American 
commerce  would  inspire  the  Provincials  with  a  desire  for 
independence,  while  giving  them  means  to  carry  on  the 
struggle  for  liberty.  In  this  way,  the  embarrassment  of 
England  would  be  prolonged.  Du  Chatelet  saw,  as  his  cor 
respondent  of  the  preceding  July  had  not  seen,  that,  as  a 
counterpoise  to  these  gains,  the  risk  to  French  and  Spanish 
possessions  from  enterprising  Americans  might  be  increased 
rather  than  diminished  by  helping  them  to  independence. 

1  De  Witt  assigns  the  letter  to  M.  Frances,  (Jefferson,  p.  440  ;)  Ban 
croft,  to  Choiseul,  ( III,  p.  294. )     The  request  for  instructions,  and  the 
writer's  ignorance  of  the  date  at  which  the  treaty  with  Holland  would 
expire,  point  to  the  clerk  rather  than  the  minister. 

2  Du  Chatelet  to  Choiseul,  Jan.  28,  1769.     De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  451, 


Forecasts  of  Revolution.  n 

France  and  Spain  "  must  reflect,"  he  said,  "  whether  it  is 
to  their  interest  to  second  this  revolution  at  the  risk  of  the 
consequences  which  might  result  from  it  later  for  the  whole 
new  world,  and  whether  the  enfeeblement  of  the  common 
enemy  can  compensate  the  risk  to  which  such  an  example 
would  expose  them,  from  their  own  Colonies."  But  the 
danger  was  remote,  and  less  impressive  than  the  present 
advantage. 

This  plan  was  wholly  at  variance  with  the  conservative 
policy  of  the  Bourbons  ;  yet  Choiseul  recommended  it  to  the 
Council,  all  the  members  present  approved  of  it,  and  it  was 
sent  by  the  King's  order  to  the  Court  of  Spain.1  Here,  it 
met  with  serious  opposition.  Spain  feared  that  such  con 
cessions  would  lead  to  contraband  trade  with  her  colonies 
and  to  illicit  extraction  of  gold  and  silver  from  their  mines. 
She  feared,  too,  that  a  republican  neighbor  would  indulge 
in  schemes  of  conquest  at  her  expense.  Choiseul  was 
obliged  to  drop  the  project  for  a  time,  to  give  the  Spanish 
Court  leisure  for  reflection.2  He  never  had  an  opportunity 
to  resume  it,  for  he  was  deprived  of  his  office  in  1770.  The 
too  independent  zeal  with  which  he  showed  his  enmity 
toward  England  was  one  of  the  causes  of  his  downfall.  He 
was  plotting  with  Spain  at  this  time,  for  a  war  against  the 
common  foe  ;  and  it  is  said  that  he  inspired  the  Spanish 
attack  on  the  British  settlement  of  Port  Egmont,  in  the 
Falkland  Islands.  His  personal  enemies  informed  King 
Louis  of  his  secret  activity,  and  the  monarch  promptly 
ended  his  public  career  by  a  decree  of  exile.3 

The  Duke  d'Aiguillon,  who  succeeded  Choiseul,  reversed 
his  foreign  policy.  In  order  to  oppose  the  combined 
powers,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria,  whose  influence  in 
European  politics  was  growing  at  the  expense  of  France, 
d'Aiguillon  cultivated  friendly  relations  with  England.4  Of 

1  Choiseul  to  du  Chatelet,  Feb.  6,  1769.     De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  454. 

2  D'Ossun  to  Choiseul,  Feb.  20,  1769.    Choiseul  to  du  Chatelet,  March 
14.     Ibid.  pp.  455,  457. 

3  Lacretelle,  Histoire  de  France,  IV,  pp.  243,  255. 

4  Flassan,  Diplomatic  Fran£aise,  VII,  p.  45.     Soulavie,  Me"moires, 
III,  p.  340. 


12  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

course  he  did  not  meddle  in  American  affairs.  It  was 
left  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  who  was  promoted  to  the 
head  of  the  foreign  department  in  July,  1774,  at  a  period 
still  more  critical  for  America  than  that  of  the  Stamp  Act, 
to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  which  Choiseul  had 
lacked,  and  conclude  a  friendly  alliance  with  the  Americans. 


II. 

AID  FOR  AMERICA. 


The  Council  appointed  by  Louis  XVI  on  his  accession  to 
the  throne,  was  not  of  a  character  to  raise  expectations 
of  a  vigorous  foreign  policy.  The  King  himself,  without 
whose  consent  no  important  step  could  be  taken,  desired 
peace  even  with  England.  Burdened  with  a  conscience,  an 
awkward  encumbrance  under  the  circumstances,  he  had 
scruples  against  breaking  a  treaty  without  sufficient  cause. 
His  prime  minister,  the  Count  de  Maurepas,  was  an  aged 
courtier  who,  after  suffering  a  long  exile,  had  returned  to 
the  pleasures  of  the  court  with  a  desire  to  enjoy  them  un 
disturbed.  To  the  pursuit  of  this  end,  he  brought  political 
skill  and  incredible  lightness  of  mind,  "capable,"  said  a 
member  of  his  Cabinet,  "of  sacrificing  great  interests  to  a 
witticism."  It  could  be  foretold  that  he  would  not 
willingly  make  himself  responsible  for  another  war  with 
England.  Soon  after  his  appointment,  Turgot,  the  econo 
mist,  became  minister  of  finance.  Finance  ministers  do 
not  love  war,  nor  do  economists.  Tnrgot's  voice  might 
safely  be  counted  on  the  side  of  peace. 

The  policy  of  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  who,  as  head  of 
the  department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  would  probably  have 
more  influence  for  peace  or  war  than  any  other  man,  was 
less  easy  to  predict.  Vergennes  had  already  made  a  reputa 
tion  in  diplomacy  ;  but  his  name  was  not,  like  those  of 
Choiseul  and  d'Aiguillon,  connected  with  any  special  sys 
tem,  Austrian  or  English.  Without  binding  himself  to  any 
theory,  he  had  employed  his  skill  in  dealing  with  each 
problem  as  it  arose.  Yet  the  general  direction  of  his  course 
might  perhaps  be  foreseen  from  certain  facts  of  his  past 
career.  Connected  since  1755  with  the  secret  diplomatic 
service  of  Louis  XV,2  he  had  been  trained  in  hostility  toward 

1  St.  Germain  ;  quoted  by  Soulavie,  III,  p.  170. 

2  Segur,  Le  Politique,  I,  p.  97. 


14  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

Great  Britain  ;  and  when  the  secret  correspondence  was 
burned,  he  had  pleaded  for  leave  to  preserve  a  plan  for  the 
debarkation  of  troops  in  England. 

During  the  three  and  a  half  years  since  the  downfall  of 
Choisetil,  the  dispute  between  the  Americans  and  the 
mother  country  had  reached  a  crisis.  The  Colonies  were 
uniting.  Regular  communication  had  been  established  be 
tween  them  through  committees  of  correspondence  ;  and 
now,  in  response  to  the  series  of  harsh  measures  by  which 
the  British  Parliament  expressed  its  disapproval  of  the 
Boston  tea  party,  the  Provinces  were  electing  delegates  to  a 
Continental  Congress.  The  lack  of  means  of  communica 
tion  and  the  absence  of  any  common  interest,  conditions 
which  de  Kalb  had  noted  as  obstacles  to  union,  were  being 
overcome  ;  and  the  same  changes  which  were  preparing  the 
Colonies  to  unite  against  England,  were  making  it  possible 
for  them  to  welcome  foreign  intervention. 

Vergennes  moved  cautiously.  He  received  reports  of  the 
situation  from  Gamier,  the  charge  d' affaires  in  London,  but 
at  first  showed  no  desire  to  interfere  in  the  quarrel.  Merely 
as  a  quarrel,  whatever  its  outcome,  it  was  to  the  interest  of 
France  ;  for  it  occupied  England,  and  kept  her  from  troub 
ling  her  neighbors.  This  was  an  advantage  ;  for,  however 
busily  France  might  plot  against  England,  she  did  not  at  this 
time  desire  open  war.  Vergennes  regarded  the  American 
conflict  as  "  the  surest  guaranty  of  the  pacific  sentiments  of 
His  Britannic  Majesty  and  of  his  ministers."  Some  guar 
anty,  he  believed,  was  needed  ;  for  he  had  no  confidence  in 
the  peace  policy  of  England.  "Let  us  not  deceive  our 
selves  in  this,"  said  he:  "whatever  parade  the  English 
ministry  make  of  their  pacific  intentions,  we  can  count  on 
this  disposition  only  so  long  as  their  domestic  embarrass 
ments  last."  ' 

Vergennes,  like  many  other  observers  on  both  sides  of  the 
Channel,  at  first  considered  the  American  Revolution  the 
work  of  the  Opposition  party  in  England.  "  If  the  King  of 
England  governs  his  Parliament  at  will,  the  Opposition 

1  Vergennes  to  Garnier,  Sept.  n,  1774.  Memoire  by  Vergennes, 
Dec.  8.  Doniol,  I,  pp.  13,  19. 


A  id  for  A  m erica .  1 5 

governs  the  Colonies  no  less  absolutely."1  Almost  up  to 
the  date  of  Lexington,  he  believed  that  the  interests  of  com 
merce  and  industry  would  force  an  accommodation.  Yet  he 
was  always  on  the  alert  ;  and  it  was  probably  with  his 
approval  that  Gamier,  conversing  with  Franklin  just  before 
his  departure  from  London,  several  weeks  prior  to  the  out 
break  of  the  war,  significantly  reminded  him  of  the  aid 
which  France  had  given  the  United  Provinces  in  their 
struggle  against  Spain.2 

When  war  had  begun,  Vergennes  was  quick  to  see  the 
trend  of  events.  Even  if  the  grievances  of  America  had 
been  at  first,  as  he  suspected,  a  mere  pretext  for  the  quarrel, 
the  Colonists  when  once  aroused  could  not  be  restrained 
from  going  beyond  the  designs  of  their  political  abettors  in 
England,  and  seeking  independence.  Owing  to  the  nature 
of  the  country  and  the  distribution  of  the  population,  he 
thought  that  England  would  be  unable  to  reduce  the  Colo 
nies  by  force  of  arms.  The  success  of  a  negotiation  seemed 
extremely  doubtful,  but  he  believed  that  England  would  try 
this  way  of  adjusting  the  difficulties.  Only  when  he  heard 
of  the  British  King's  proclamation  of  August,  1775,  declar 
ing  the  Americans  rebels,  was  he  convinced  that  England 
had  cut  herself  off  from  all  hope  of  bringing  the  contest  to 
a  peaceful  close.3 

Before  England  had  taken  this  decisive  step,  the  war 
alarm  sounded  in  the  French  Cabinet.  In  July,  1775,  the 
Count  de  Guines,  ambassador  at  London,  reported  a  conver 
sation  in  which  Lord  Rochford  had  said  that  some  of  the 
members  of  both  political  parties  were  advocating  war 
against  France  as  the  surest  way  to  stop  the  American  con 
flict.4  Ever  since  the  time  of  the  Stamp  Act,  the  French 
authorities  had  feared  that  England  would  have  recourse  to 
a  vigorous  foreign  policy  in  order  to  end  her  domestic 
troubles.  Now  the  British  foreign  secretary,  with  singular 

1  Vergennes  to  de  Guines,  July  i,  1775.     Doniol,  I,  p.  83. 
2Parton,  Life  of  Franklin,  II,  p.  67. 

3  Vergennes  to  Gamier,  Jan.  15,  1775.     To  de  Guines,  July  10,  29  ; 
Aug.  20,  27  ;  Sept.  3.     Doniol,  I,  pp.  68,  90,  95,  171,  172,  174. 

4  De  Guines  to  Vergennes,  July  28,  1775.     Ibid.  I,  p.  116. 


16  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

indiscretion,  contributed  his  word  of  warning.  The  hint 
threw  France  on  her  guard.  Vergennes  sent  the  substance 
of  de  Guines'  dispatch  to  the  ambassador  in  Spain,  and  rec 
ommended  a  plan  of  defense.  At  the  first  act  of  open  hos 
tility  on  the  part  of  England,  let  France  and  Spain  seize  as 
many  of  her  ships  as  possible.  They  might,  however,  ex 
empt  the  vessels  of  the  North  American  Colonists ;  for  it 
would  be  impolitic  to  make  them  regret  their  war  with  Eng 
land,  and  to  force  them  back  under  the  yoke.  Circum 
stances  might  arise  in  which  it  would  be  advisable  to  treat 
them  as  an  independent  people,  invite  them  to  visit  French 
and  Spanish  ports,  and  offer  them  freedom  of  commerce.1 

Some  time  before  this,  de  Guines  had  complained  that  he 
could  not  obtain  reliable  American  news  in  England,  and 
had  suggested  the  advantage  of  having  an  agent  in  America. 
For  this  mission  he  had  recommended  M.  de  Bonvouloir,  a 
French  officer  who  had  visited  all  the  British  colonies  in 
America,  and  who  desired  an  opportunity  to  return.  Ver 
gennes,  with  the  King's  approval,  now  authorized  de  Guines 
to  send  the  man.  His  journey  and  correspondence  were  so 
arranged  that  the  Ministry  could  not  be  compromised.  His 
two  chief  duties  were,  to  report  the  course  of  events  and  the 
developments  of  opinion  in  America,  and  to  teach  the  peo 
ple  that  they  had  no  reason  to  fear  the  French.  His  first 
instructions,  which  contained  a  word  of  reassurance  for  the 
Americans  on  independence,  the  destiny  of  Canada,  and 
commercial  facilities  in  French  ports,  were  considerably 
modified  before  he  sailed.  De  Guines  heard  that  the  insur 
gents  were  proclaiming  their  hopes  of  aid  from  France  and 
Spain;  and,  taking  alarm,  he  forbade  his  emissary  "even 
to  pronounce  the  word  French,"  and  left  him  nothing  to  do 
but  watch  and  report  the  progress  of  affairs.2  Bonvouloir, 
as  we  shall  see,  ignored  this  prohibition  ;  and  it  is  hard  to 
decide  whether  Vergennes  was  more  pleased  or  offended  by 
his  indiscretion. 

1  Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Aug.  7,  1775.     Doniol,  I,  pp.  123-7. 

2  De  Guines  to  Vergennes,  July  i,  28,  1775.    Vergennes  to  de  Guines, 
Aug.  7.    Doniol,  I,  pp.  154,  155.    De  Guines  to  Vergennes,  Sept.  8.    De 
Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  475. 


A  id  for  A  m erica .  1 7 

Bonvotiloir  sailed  early  in  September,  1775,  arrived  at 
Philadelphia  in  December,  and  was  cordially^ received.  A 
change  of  sentiment  had  gradually  taken  place  in  the 
Colonies  since  the  days  of  Choiseul,  when  Franklin  met  the 
advances  of  the  French  ambassador  with  suspicion,  and 
when  de  Kalb  became  convinced  that  the  Americans  would 
repel  all  foreign  interference.  Although  the  Colonists 
fought  during  the  first  year  for  redress  of  grievances  and 
not  for  independence,  there  were  a  few  radicals  who  saw 
from  the  beginning  that  independence  would  be  the  natural 
outcome  of  the  contest,  and  that  this  result  might  be 
hastened  by  foreign  alliances.  In  1774,  Patrick  Henry  pre 
dicted  an  alliance  with  France,  Spain,  and  Holland.1  At  the 
opening  of  the  Congress  of  1775,  Samuel  and  John  Adams 
were  convinced  that  an  immediate  declaration  was  necessary. 
Independence  first,  said  John  Adams  ;  then  a  last  attempt  to 
treat  with  England  ;  and  in  case  of  failure,  overtures  to 
foreign  countries.  But  the  conservatives  carried  the  day, 
and  a  last  petition  was  sent  to  the  King.  Convinced  of  its 
uselessness,  Adams  persisted  in  urging  almost  daily  a 
declaration  of  independence  and  the  adoption  of  a  plan  of 
treaties  to  be  offered  to  foreign  powers,  especially  France 
and  Spain.  In  the  fall  of  1775,  probably  late  in  September, 
Mr.  Chase  of  Maryland  moved  to  send  ambassadors  to 
France.  The  effect  of  this  motion  on  the  nerves  of  Con 
gress,  says  Mr.  Adams,  was  galvanic.  "  The  grimaces,  the 
agitations  and  convulsions  were  very  great."  In  the  argu 
ment  which  followed,  many  substitutes  for  the  motion  were 
offered,  and  there  were  "  twenty  subtle  projects  to  get  rid  of 
it."  The  debate  ended,  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  November, 
in  a  compromise  measure  :  the  formation  of  a  committee  to 
correspond  with  friends  "in  Great  Britain,  Ireland,  and 
other  parts  of  the  world." 

A  fortnight  after  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
was  formed,  it  sent  a  letter  to  Dr.  Arthur  Lee,   Franklin's 
successor  in  the  agency  for  Massachusetts  in  London,  direct- 
barton's  Franklin,  II,  p.  HI. 

2  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  II,  pp.  406  ff.  ;  I,  pp.  200-3  ; 
II,  pp.  503-6.  Secret  Journals  of  Congress.,  II,  p.  5. 


1 8  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

ing  him  to  find  out  the  disposition  of  foreign  powers  toward 
the  Colonies.  A  week  later  Franklin  wrote  in  the  name  of 
the  Committee,  to  his  friend  Charles  Dumas,  a  Swiss  resi 
dent  of  Holland,  requesting  him  to  take  advantage  of  his 
situation  at  The  Hague  to  find  out  whether  any  of  the 
European  states  would  probably  be  willing  to  assist  the 
Colonies  or  enter  into  an  alliance  with  them.  Dumas  was 
empowered  to  confer  with  ministers  of  state,  using  Frank 
lin's  letter  as  a  credential  and  taking  precautions  for  keep 
ing  the  matter  from  the  ears  of  the  English  ambassador.1 

At  this  critical  time  the  French  agent,  Bonvouloir,  ap 
peared  in  Philadelphia.  Making  Dr.  Franklin's  acquaint 
ance,  he  obtained  several  hearings  from  the  Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence.  The  substance  of  these  interviews 
may  be  gathered  from  his  report  to  de  Guines.2  He  made 
some  indefinite  offers  of  service,  and  was  asked  how  France 
regarded  the  Colonies.  He  answered  :  he  believed  that 
France  wished  them  well.  Would  she  aid  them  ?  Perhaps 
so.  On  what  footing  ?  He  knew  nothing  about  it  ;  but  if 
she  should  do  so,  it  would  always  be  on  just  and  equitable 
terms.  Would  it  be  prudent  to  send  a  ' '  deputy  plenipoten 
tiary  "  to  France?  He  thought  it  would  be  precipitate,  even 
hazardous.  Yet  he  would  not  advise  them  in  any  way.  He 
was  a  private  individual,  a  curious  traveller  ;  but  he  would 
be  charmed  to  serve  them  through  his  acquaintances.  When 
the  committee  broached  the  subject  of  a  treaty,  Bonvouloir 
refused  to  indicate  the  terms  that  France  might  be  induced 
to  grant  ;  but  he  argued  that  France  was  more  eligible  as  an 
ally  than  Spain.  In  consequence  of  these  interviews,  he 
received  from  the  committee  a  written  request  for  French 
engineers,  leave  to  procure  arms  and  ammunition  in  France, 
and  the  privilege  of  entry  into  French  ports.  He  replied, 
also  in  writing,  giving  some  encouragement  as  to  engineers 
and  munitions,  but  speaking  with  hesitation  about  commer 
cial  privileges. 

While  one    Frenchman  was    telling    Congress  that  help 

1  Franklin  et  al.  to  Arthur  Lee,  Dec.  12,  1775.     Franklin  to  Dumas, 
Dec.  19.     Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  63,  65. 

2  De  Witt,  Jefferson,  pp.  478  fT. 


Aid  for  America.  19 

might  be  obtained  in  France,  another  was  trying  to  persuade 
King  Louis  to  grant  it.  The  political  and  mercantile  ven 
ture  of  Caron  Beaumarchais,  courtier,  man  of  letters,  and 
agent  in  the  secret  service, — his  trials  and  achievements  on 
behalf  of  America — form  one  of  the  most  romantic  episodes 
of  the  Revolution.  Beanmarchais  was  in  London  in  1775, 
collecting  news  of  American  affairs  and  spying  on  the  British 
Ministry.  His  sources  of  information  were  varied.  He  was 
on  friendly  terms  with  Lord  Rochford,  the  English  Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  also  with  Wilkes,  the  most  notori 
ous  leader  of  the  Opposition  ;  he  had  dealings  with  Arthur 
Lee,  the  agent  for  Massachusetts  ;  and  he  frequently  met 
travellers  from  America.  Reporting  his  impressions  to 
King  Louis,  he  repeatedly  urged  him,  for  the  safety  and 
glory  of  France,  to  aid  the  American  insurgents.  In  case 
the  King  decided  to  grant  them  money,  the  breach  of  neu 
trality  might  be  hidden  by  conveying  the  favors  through  a 
fictitious  mercantile  company.  Beaumarchais  expressed  his 
willingness  to  personate  this  firm.1  The  King  objected  to 
the  plan,  on  the  ground  of  justice  to  England.  Beaumar 
chais,  in  a  long  reply,2  tried  to  reconcile  his  project  with  the 
"delicate  conscientiousness"  of  the  King.  "The  policy 
which  maintains  nations,"  he  argued,  "differs  almost  en 
tirely  from  the  moral  law  which  governs  individuals 

The  masterpiece  of  sound  policy  is  to  base  your  tranquillity 
on  the  divisions  of  your  enemies."  With  unscrupulous 
plausibility,  he  argued  that  no  treaty  with  the  English  mon 
arch  could  justly  restrain  the  King  of  France  ;  for  it  was  the 
English  people  who  desired  war,  and  they  would  always 
compel  their  King  to  yield.  The  conscience  of  Louis  was 
not  entirely  satisfied  with  this  logic,  for  we  hear  that  he  con 
tinued  to  protest  ;  but  pressure,  official  and  unofficial,  forced 
him  to  give  way.3 

For  some  time  the  Americans  had  been  obtaining  aid  from 
citizens  of  France  by  the  channels  of  commerce.  The  reports 
of  English  spies  showed  the  existence  of  an  active  trade  in 

1  Deane  Papers,  I,  p.  no. 

2  Durand,  New  Materials,  pp.  59,  68,  69. 
:!  Soulavie,  Memoires,  III,  pp.  346-8. 


20 


France  and  the  American  Revolution. 


arms  and  ammunition.  The  British  Ministry,  believing  that 
the  government  connived  at  it,  repeatedly  called  attention  to 
the  subject  through  their  embassy.  Vergennes  protested 
innocence,  saying  that  military  stores  could  not  be  shipped 
from  France  without  special  orders,  and  that  the  govern 
ment  did  not  lend  such  countenance  to  men  who  were  aiding 
the  insurgents.  He  would  not  vouch  for  all  the  acts  of  un 
ruly  individuals,  but  whatever,  the  Ministry  could  prevent 
should  be  prevented.  England's  trouble  with  her  Colonies, 
he  declared,  was  to  nobody's  interest  ;  the  consequences  of 
it  were  as  obvious  as  those  of  the  cession  of  Canada.  The 
Count  de  Maurepas  added  his  professions  of  friendship. 
"  Be  sure,"  said  he,  "  that  we  are  not  people  who  seek  to 
take  unfair  advantage  of  circumstances,  and  to  fish  in 
troubled  waters."  He  even  hinted  that  the  Americans  had 
forfeited  the  sympathy  of  the  French  in  aiming  at  indepen 
dence.  By  their  united  efforts  the  two  ministers  convinced 
the  suspicious  ambassador,  Lord  Storm  out,  that  France  was 
desirous  of  peace.  * 

It  was  probably  not  far  from  the  time  of  these  friendly 
professions  that  Vergennes'  secretary,  Gerard  de  Rayjj,eval, 
drew  up  an  elaborate  memorial  discussing  the  interest  of 
France  in  the  affairs  of  the  American  Colonies.2  His  argu 
ment  was  based  on  suggestions  which  different  persons  had 
made  to  Vergennes,  some  at  his  request,  others  of  their  own 
initiative.3  The  writer  traces  the  development  of  the  quarrel 
between  England  and  her  Colonies  in  a  manner  which  shows 
his  sympathy  with  the  Americans.  Inquiring  whether 
France  ought  to  desire  the  independence  of  America,  he  an 
swers  that  the  benefit  to  France  can  be  measured  by  the 
injury  to  England.  Three  specific  advantages  will  be 
gained  :  a  diminution  of  English  power  and  an  increase  of 
French  ;  loss  to  English  and  gain  to  French  trade  ;  and  a 
chance  to  recover  part  of  the  French  possessions  in  America. 
To  those  who  fear  that  the  Americans  will  try  to  encroach 

'St.  Paul  to  Rochford,  Sept.  20,  1775.     Stormont  to  Rochford,  Oct. 
31.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1303,  1306. 
2  Reflexions :  qy.  end  of  1775.     Ibid.  1310. 
3Doniol  I,  p.  242. 


A  id  for  A  merica .  2 1 

on  the  French  and  Spanish  territories,  he  says  that  the  peo 
ple  will  be  too  much  exhausted  by  the  war  to  think  of  con 
quest.  This  fear  "deserves  no  consideration."  But  it  does 
not  follow  that  it  is  best  to  aid  them  at  once.  It  would  be 
well  to  wait  and  see  whether  England  can  conquer  them  in 
another  campaign.  If  she  is  not  strong  enough  for  this, 
France  may  safely  interfere.  Meanwhile,  let  her  support 
the  courage  of  the  Americans  and  flatter  them  with  the  hope 
of  assistance.  In  this  way  she  will  avoid  compromising  her 
self  either  with  the  insurgents  or  with  the  English  Court. 
The  animus  with  which  this  counsel  is  given  is  even  more 
significant  than  its  substance.  "England  is  the  natural 
enemy  of  France," — so  reads  this  official  document,  — "  and 
she  is  a  rapacious,  unjust,  and  faithless  enemy.  The  invari 
able  object  of  her  policy  is,  if  not  the  destruction,  at  least  the 
abasement  of  France.  This  is  always  the  real  motive  of  the 
wars  which  she  has  stirred  up  against  her,  and  this  State 
reason  always  prevails  over  any  other  consideration  ;  and 
when  it  speaks,  all  means  are  lawful,  provided  they  be  effi 
cacious.  This  disposition,  known  to  all  the  universe,  dis 
charges  France  from  the  obligations  which  the  right  of 
nations  has  established  between  countries,  and  authorizes  her 
to  make  use  of  reprisals  in  order  to  weaken  an  enemy  who 
is  constantly  seeking  to  injure  her." 

While  the  American  question  was  under  consideration  in 
the  foreign  office,  Beaumarchais  was  urging  the  government 
to  adopt  a  decided  course.  On  the  last  day  of  February, 
1776,  he  addressed  to  the  King  a  memorial,1  written  to  prove 
the  necessity  of  assisting  the  Americans,  as  a  measure  of 
self-defense.  Whether  England  obtained  peace  with  her 
Colonies  by  victory,  defeat,  or  reconciliation,  war  between 
France  and  England  was  sure  to  follow7.  The  only  way, 
then,  for  France  to  maintain  peace  was  to  keep  the  Ameri 
can  conflict  alive.  At  nearly  the  same  time  with  Beau 
marchais'  memorial,  the  government  received  Bonvouloir's 
report,2  containing  an  assurance  that  the  Americans  would 
welcome  the  co-operation  of  France.  The  arguments  of 

1  Peace  or  War.     Beaumarchais  and  his  Times,  III,  p.  117. 

2  De  Witt,  Jefferson,  p.  478,  note. 


22  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

these  amateur  diplomatists  were  reinforced  by  urgent  mes 
sages  from  the  Court  of  Spain.  Bound  to  France  by  an 
alliance  offensive  and  defensive,  bound  to  her  still  more 
closely  by  common  hatred  of  England,  Spain  was  as  ready 
for  mischief  as  her  ally,  and  far  more  eager  for  gain.  At 
this  period,  her  ambition  pointed  toward  the  conquest  of 
Portugal,  with  whom  rival  interests  in  America  had  brought 
her  into  conflict.  France  had  declared  her  unwillingness  to 
risk  a  continental  war  by  attacking  Portugal  in  Europe,  and 
had  tried  to  dissuade  Spain  from  a  course  which  would  rouse 
England  to  hostility  and  divert  her  from  the  American  war 
so  advantageous  to  the  Bourbon  powers.  But  when  the 
aggressions  of  Portugal,  prolonged  beyond  reason,  suggested 
the  connivance  of  England,  Spain  availed  herself  of  this 
opportunity  to  persuade  France  that  their  old  enemy  was 
preparing  for  an  attack,  and  that  counter-measures  were 
needed.  "  His  Majesty* understands,"  wrote  Grimaldi,  the 
prime  minister  of  Spain,  "that  it  is  necessary  before  all 
else  to  decide  whether  or  no  we  ought  to  prepare  for 
war,  ....  whether,  calmly  relying  on  our  good  faith  and 
our  upright  intentions,  we  ought  to  wait  until  England  her 
self  ....  strikes  a  blow  at  our  possessions  or  those  of 
France  in  such  a  way  that  afterwards  it  may  be  almost  im 
possible  to  recover  them." 

Vergenues,  though  averse  to  premature  aggressive  meas 
ures,  was  keenly  alive  to  a  threatened  danger.  Unwilling 
to  go  to  the  extreme  which  Spain  desired,  he  chose  a  course 
that  would  leave  France  uncommitted  for  the  present,  but 
.able  at  any  moment  to  strike  at  England  or,  better  still,  to 
provoke  England  into  dealing  the  first  blow.  On  the 
twelfth  of  March,  with  the  approval  of  the  King — won  with 
difficulty,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Beaumarchais'  arguments — 
he  submitted  his  plan  to  his  colleagues  in  the  Council. 
Rayneval's  mcmoire  had  asserted  that  France  was  interested 
in  favoring  the  insurgents,  and  that  the  previous  conduct  of 
England  would  justify  such  a  policy.  Vergennes  went 
farther.  Like  Beaumarchais,  he  claimed  that  this  course 

1  Grimaldi  to  d'Aranda,  Feb.  26,  1776.     Doniol,  I,  p.  336.     See  other 
documents  in  chapters  IX  and  X. 


A  id  for  A  meriea .  2  3 

was  dictated  by  political  necessity.  Whatever  the  outcome 
of  the  American  contest,  war  between  France  and  England 
might  result.  In  case  of  reconciliation,  England  might  be 
tempted  to  use  against  France  the  troops  set  free  in  America, 
or  the  English  King  might  wish  to  build  up  arbitrary  power 
at  home  by  the  aid  of  a  foreign  war.  In  case  of  defeat,  the 
ministers  would  have  recourse  to  such  a  war,  to  save  their 
official  heads.  On  the  other  side  was  the  risk  that  the 
Colonies  might  encroach  on  their  neighbors  ;  but  Vergennes 
gave  this  danger  only  passing  mention,  and  returned  to  less 
remote  possibilities.  If  the  two  Kings  did  not  prefer  peace, 
he  said,  this  would  be  the  time  to  strike  a  blow  at  England, 
place  her  in  the  rank  of  secondary  powers,  and  "  deliver  the 
universe  from  a  rapacious  tyrant."  In  any  case,  it  was  de 
sirable  that  the  present  war  should  last  a  year,  to  keep  the 
British  forces  in  America,  to  prevent  a  change  in  the  British 
Ministry,  to  weaken  the  British  army,  and  to  give  France 
and  Spain  time  for  preparation.  To  ensure  this,  they  must 
convince  the  English  of  their  friendship,  and  at  the  same 
time  encourage  the  Americans  with  vague  hopes.  "Con 
tinue  to  feed  dexterously  the  security  of  the  English  Min 
istry  as  to  the  intentions  of  France  and  Spain  ;  "  aid  the  in 
surgents  with  money  and  munitions,  but  enter  into  no 
alliance  with  them  ;  above  all,  increase  the  forces  of  France 
and  Spain,  and  prepare  for  defense  : — this  was  the  sum  of 
Vergennes'  advice.1 

This  memorial  drew  from  Turgot  a  reply 2  remarkable 
for  its  deviation  from  the  political  and  economic  views  of 
the  time.  The  prevailing  belief  was  that  a  country  reaped 
benefit  from  its  colonies  only  so  long  as  it  monopolized  their 
trade,  and  that  it  could  secure  this  ascendancy  only  by  force 
The  aim  of  the  pro- American  party  in  France,  as  we  find  it 
expressed  in  many  writings  of  the  period,  was,  by  severing 
the  political  tie  which  bound  the  Colonies  to  England,  to 
deprive  her  of  the  prestige  and  also  of  the  commercial  pros 
perity  which  she  owed  to  that  connection,  and  thus  to  bring 

1  Stevens  Facsimiles,  1316. 

2  Oeuvres,  II,  p.  551. 


24  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

about  her  ruin.1  Turgot,  while  predicting  wide-spread 
results  from  the  success  of  the  American  revolt,  threw 
doubt  on  its  efficacy  as  a  means  for  the  abasement  of 
England.  He  said  that  if  the  British  Provinces  became  in 
dependent,  the  colonies  of  all  the  other  European  nations 
would  demand  commeicial  freedom  and,  if  denied  it,  would 
fight  for  it  until  they,  too,  acquired  independence.  But  he 
maintained  that  the  loss  of  all  the  colonies  would  affect  the 
prosperity  of  the  European  nations  but  little,  because 
only  a  very  small  part  of  the  commercial  benefit  derived 
from  colonies  was  due  to  restrictions  on  trade.  In  view  of 
the  coming  revolution,  he  advised  that  France  should  make 
concessions  to  her  own  colonies  and  thus  secure  them  as 
friends  and  allies,  instead  of  waiting  to  see  them  become 
enemies  ;  and  that  she  should  urge  Spain  to  take  the  same 
precautions. 

Turgot  saw  no  reason  to  fear  an  attack  from  England  ex 
cept  in  case  of  reconciliation  with  her  Colonies.  As  minister 
of  finance,  he  objected  to  beginning  a  war  with  army  and 
navy  only  half  prepared  and  with  a  yearly  deficit  of  twenty 
million  livres.  Besides,  he  feared  that  an  attack  on 
England  would  be  the  signal  for  an  accommodation  with  her 
Colonies.  Aid  to  the  Americans,  he  thought,  should  not 
transgress  the  bounds  of  strict  neutrality.  French  citizens 
might  trade  with  the  insurgents,  because  the  government 
had  no  reason  to  discriminate  between  them  and  other 
British  subjects  ;  but  to  supply  them  with  money  would  be 
a  step  difficult  to  conceal,  and  in  case  of  exposure,  would 
incur  the  just  resentment  of  England. 

Vergennes'  memoire,  attacked  in  part  by  Turgot,  was 
adopted  by  the  majority  of  theConncil,  approved  by  the  King, 
and  submitted  to  the  Court  of  Spain.  The  Spanish  King  had 
already  expressed  his  willingness  to  share  the  expense  of 
aiding  the  Americans,  in  order  to  prolong  the  revolt  and 
allow  England  and  the  Colonies  to  exhaust  one  another.2 
He  thought,  with  Vergennes,  that  the  two  Courts  were  in 
terested  in  prolonging  the  struggle  ;  that  the  Colonists,  if 

1  Fiske,  American  Revolution,  II,  pp.  5-6,  131-2. 

2  Letter  of  Grimaldi,  March  14,  1776.     Doniol,  I,  371. 


Aid  for  America.  25 

not  aided,  would  probably  soon  succumb  ;  and  that,  while 
it  was  best  not  to  make  common  cause  with  them,  it  would 
be  well  to  furnish  them  with  what  they  needed.1 

In  the  meantime,  the  commercial  facilities  granted  to 
American  traders  in  French  ports  continued  to  arouse  indig 
nation  in  England.  Vergennes  had  more  than  once  issued 
orders  forbidding  the  exportation  of  arms  by  Americans  ; 
but  they  were  sham  orders,  and  the  practice  continued.  In 
April,  1776,  the  English  discovered  through  the  treacherous 
mate  of  an  American  ship,  that  several  vessels  from  the 
Colonies,  consigned  to  merchants  of  Nantes,  were  on  their 
way  to  France  to  procure  arms  and  ammunition.  Beau- 
marchais,  then  in  London,  was  questioned  by  Lord  Roch 
ford,  and  answered  with  all  the  nonchalance  of  an  irrespon 
sible  private  citizen  :  "  Why  would  you  wish  our  adminis 
tration  to  take  proceedings  against  the  Nantes  merchants  ? 
Are  we  at  war  with  anyone?  .  .  .  are  not  our  ports  open  to 
all  the  merchants  in  the  world  ?  ...  On  account  of  a 
quarrel  special  to  England,  and  in  which  we  do  not,  nor  do 
we  want  to,  take  part,  has  England  the  right  to  restrict  our 
commerce?"  "  But,  Sir,"  Lord  Rochford  answered,  "  the 
Americans  are  rebels  and  are  declared  enemies!"  "My 
Lord,  they  are  not  ours.  .  .  .  Who  prevents  you  from  tak 
ing  measures  against  them  ?  Cruise  on  all  sides,  seize  them 
everywhere  ;  except  under  the  cannon  of  our  forts,  how 
ever  ;  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  it."  Vergennes,  forced 
by  his  official  position  to  be  more  complaisant,  ordered  that 
the  vessels  should  not  be  allowed  to  take  powder  and  arms 
on  board  ;  but  he  conve)^ed  to  Beaumarchais  the  King's 
approval  of  his  reply  to  Lord  Rochford.  Powder  and  arms 
were  objects  of  commerce,  he  said  ;  and  it  was  out  of  friend 
ship  for  England  that  the  King  had  forbidden  their  exporta 
tion.  Lord  Rochford's  tone  implied  that  France  was  bound 
to  make  England's  interest  her  own.  l<  I  do  not  know  of 
this  agreement,"  said  Vergennes  ;  and,  calling  to  mind  the 
aid  which  England  had  given  to  the  Corsicans  in  their 
recent  struggle  against  France,  he  added:  "It  does  not 

1  D'Ossun  to  Vergennes,  Apr.  i,  1776.     Doniol,  I,  p.  341. 


26  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

exist  in  the  example  which  England  gave  us  at  the  time 
when  she  thought  she  conld  injure  us." 

Dissatisfied  with  Vergennes'  assumption  of  neutrality, 
Beaumarchais  urged  him  to  lend  the  insurgents  one  or  two 
million  livres,  and  thus  gather  all  the  fruits  of  victory  with 
out  a  battle.  Vergennes  began  his  reply  by  contrasting  the 
responsibilities  of  practical  statesmen  like  himself  with  the 
freedom  of  theorists  like  Beaumarchais,  but  concluded  by 
assuring  him  that  his  advice  was  not  necessarily  rejected 
because  not  seized  with  avidity  :  "  Consider  the  matter  well, 
and  you  will  find  me  nearer  to  you  than  you  think."  "  You 
were  certainly  near  me,"  replied  Beaumarchais,  quick  to 
take  the  hint,  "  when  I  thought  you  far  away."  His  confi 
dence  was  justified.  On  the  very  day  of  the  reassuring 
letter,  Vergennes  submitted  to  the  King  for  his  signature  an 
order  for  a  million  livres,  to  be  used  in  aiding  the  English 
Colonies.'2  The  conduct  of  the  enterprise  was  entrusted  to 
Beaumarchais,  who  assumed,  for  the  sake  of  concealment, 
the  style  of  a  commercial  firm, — Rodrique  Hortalez  and 
Company. 

During  the  next  few  weeks,  between  the  decision  of  the 
Cabinet  and  the  completion  of  Beaumarchais'  plans,  an  agent 
of  the  Americans,  without  proper  credentials  but  with  a 
goodly  supply  of  zeal,  was  laboring  on  behalf  of  his  coun 
trymen  and  receiving  some  encouragement  from  the  Minis 
try.  Dr.  Barbeu  Dubotirg,  a  friend  of  Franklin,  had  been 
entrusted  by  an  agent  of  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence  with  the  charge  of  American  interests  at  Paris 
and  Versailles.  Having  learned  in  conversation  with  the 
ministers  and  their  friends,  that  they  were  devising  means 
of  aiding  the  insurgents,  he  tried  to  procure  a  supply  of 
ammunition.  By  official  connivance,  he  was  allowed  to  bor 
row  muskets  and  cannon  from  the  King's  arsenals,  for  sale 

Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Apr.  16,  1776.  St.  Paul  to  Wey- 
mouth,  Apr.  17.  Vergennes  to  Beaumarchais,  Apr.  26.  Stevens 
Facsimiles,  1322,  1324,  1330. 

2  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Apr.  26,  May  n,  1776.  Vergennes  to 
Beaumarchais,  May  2.  Ibid.  1328,  1334,  861.  Diplomatic  Corre 
spondence,  II,  p.  89. 


Aid  for  America.  27 

to  the  Americans.  Knowing  that  the  American  army 
needed  engineers,  Dubonrg  tried  to  procure  them.  He  also 
"ventured  promises"  to  one  or  two  officers  of  artillery, 
though  he  doubted  the  wisdom  of  employing  foreign  officers. 
"  I  believe  this  is  what  you  have  the  least  need  of,"  he  wrote 
to  Franklin,  "as  it  may  disgust  your  valiant  countrymen." 
He  set  on  foot  arrangements  with  the  Farmers  General  for 
the  reception  of  American  tobacco,  and  obtained  a  promise 
from  the  Minister  of  the  Navy  that  his  department  would 
purchase  supplies  from  America.  He  reported  that  the 
Ministry  in  general  seemed  to  be  favorably  disposed  toward 
the  insurgents,  but  were  not  inclined  to  assume  any  respon 
sibility  for  their  fortunes.  Indeed,  these  gentlemen  were 
much  absorbed  in  their  own  concerns.  Turgot  had  just 
received  his  dismissal,  "  and  all  the  others,"  wrote  Dubourg, 

are  so  teased  at  this  time  by  the  extraordinary  cabals  of 
the  court,"  that  no  one  wishes  to  go  outside  his  own  imme 
diate  department.1 

The  change  in  the  ministry  of  finance  did  not,  of  course, 
affect  the  decision  already  reached  with  regard  to  the  insur 
gents.  On  the  tenth  of  June,  Beaumarchais  received  a  mil 
lion  livres  from  the  treasury,  and  he  began  without  delay  to 
collect  supplies  for  shipment  to  America. 

It  is  natural  to  ask,  while  considering  the  first  acts  of 
France  in  support  of  the  American  cause,  whether  her  plea  of 
self-defense  was  genuine,  or  whether  she  was  influenced 
wholly  by  a  wish  to  humiliate  her  rival.  Vergennes,  in  his 
memoire  of  March  12,  gave  prominence  to  the  aggressive 
motive, — the  desire  to  strike  a  blow  at  England  and  restore 
the  former  glory  of  France.  As  we  see  him,  ostensibly  in 
fear  of  British  designs,  draw  gradually  nearer  to  an  alliance 
with  America,  the  suspicion  recurs  again  and  again  that  he 
saw  danger  ahead  because  he  wished  to  see  it,  and  that  his 
eye  for  peril  grew  keener  as  France  became  better  prepared 
for  defense.  But  this  suspicion  is  misleading.  No  one  who 
reads  the  letters  that  passed  between  the  French  and  Span- 

1  Dubourg  to  Franklin,  June  12-July  2,  1776.  Sparks  MSS.  UI,  vol. 
I,  p.  i.  Stevens  Facsimiles,  566,  567,  568,  570,  884.  Diplomatic  Cor 
respondence,  II,  p.  113. 


28  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

ish  Courts  during  the  early  years  of  the  Revolution  can  fail 
to  see  that  they  were  watching  England  as  men  watch  some 
dangerous  animal  crouching  for  a  spring.  Every  increase 
in  the  British  naval  forces,  every  movement  of  a  British 
fleet,  was  jealously  noted.  Spain,  especially,  was  uncom 
fortably  conscious  that  her  own  colonies  were  near  the 
revolted  Provinces,  and  that  the  destination  of  an  English 
fleet  need  be  changed  but  little  to  menace  her  possessions. 
Early  in  1776  she  had  special  cruisers  on  the  American  coast 
to  watch  the  movements  of  British  ships,  and  was  urging 
France  to  co-operate  with  her  in  the  defense  of  her  colonies.1 
Though  considerations  of  safety  set  the  pace  of  the  Bour 
bon  Courts  from  week  to  week,  as  they  made  haste  to  antici 
pate  a  dreaded  attack  or  held  back  from  provoking  an 
encounter  for  which  they  were  not  quite  prepared,  we  can 
not  doubt  that,  without  regard  to  the  intentions-of  England, 
they  desired  war,  provided  they  might  have  it  in  their  own 
good  time.  They  were  eager  to  wipe  out  the  treaty  of  1763, 
and  to  regain  their  lost  prestige.  Very  early  in  the  discus 
sion,  Spain  freely  hinted  her  desire  for  territorial  acquisi 
tions.  With  France,  the  chief  ambition  was  to  humiliate 
England  and  destroy  her  influence  among  nations.  Ver- 
gennes  has  left  a  clear  statement  of  his  owrn  leading  motive, 
and  of  the  means  which  he  intended  to  employ.  A  memo 
rial  written  by  him  at  the  end  of  his  career,  contains  the 
following  passage  :  "A  nation  may  experience  reverses- 
and  may  yield  to  the  imperious  law  of  necessity  and  of  her 
own  preservation  ;  but  when  these  reverses  and  the  humilia 
tion  which  has  resulted  from  them  are  unjust,  when  they 
have  had  for  their  principle  and  their  end  the  pride  of  an 
influential  rival,  she  ought,  for  her  honor,  her  digtiity,  and 
her  reputation,  to  recover  herself  whenever  she  finds  the 
opportunity.  If  she  neglects  it,  if  fear  overpowers  duty, 
she  adds  abasement  to  humiliation  ;  she  becomes  the  object 
of  scorn  of  her  century  and  of  future  races. 

'These   important    truths,    Sire,    have    never    left    my 
thoughts.      They  were  already  deeply  graven  in  my  heart 

1  Grimaldi  to  d'Aranda,  Feb.  26,  1776.     D'Ossun  to  Vergennes,  Apr. 
29.     Doniol,  I,  333,  350. 


A  id  for  A  m  erica .  2  9 

when  Your  Majesty  summoned  me  to  your  Council  ;  and  I 
waited  with  lively  impatience  an  opportunity  to  follow  their 
impulse.  It  was  these  truths  that  fixed  my  attention  on  the 
Americans,  that  caused  me  to  watch  for  and  to  seize  the 
moment  when  Your  Majesty  could  assist  this  oppressed 
nation  with  the  well-founded  hope  of  effecting  their  deliver 
ance.  If  I  had  held  other  sentiments,  Sire,  other  principles, 
other  views,  I  should  have  betrayed  your  confidence  and 
the  interests  of  the  State  ;  I  should  regard  myself  as 
unworthy  to  serve  Your  Majesty  ;  I  should  regard  myself 
as  unworthy  to  bear  the  name  of  Frenchman." 

1  Doniol,  I,  p.  3. 


Ill 

THE   BEGINNING   OF  DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS. 


We  have  seen  that  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspond 
ence  wrote  in  December,  1775,  to  Arthur  Lee  and  Charles 
Dumas,  requesting  them  to  find  out  whether  any  of  the 
European  powers  were  willing  to  assist  the  Americans. 
Lee  held  several  interviews  with  the  French  ambassador  at 
London,  and  indirectly  heard  from  him  that  aid  would 
be  furnished  to  the  Colonies.  Dumas  obtained  an  inter 
view  with  the  French  minister  at  The  Hague,1  and 
enquired  whether  the  King  of  France  would  offer  his 
mediation  to  end  the  war  ;  and,  in  case  of  failure  to  reach 
an  agreement,  whether  France  and  Spain  would  form  an 
alliance  with  the  Colonies.  He  received  the  impression 
that  the  minister  was  pleased  with  the  idea  of  mediation 
and  would  not  have  objected  to  a  treaty  except  for  the 
danger  of  a  European  war.  But  a  few  weeks  later  the  same 
official  told  Dumas  that  the  King  could  not  mediate  while 
the  Colonies  were  subject  to  Great  Britain,  nor  ally  himself 
with  them  nor  furnish  them  aids  while  he  was  at  peace  with 
England.  '  The  King  is  a  true  knight,"  said  the  minister  ;. 
"  his  word  is  sacred."  But  he  promised  that  strict  neu 
trality  should  be  maintained,  and  that  the  Americans  should 
have  the  same  right  as  "  all  the  other  English,"  to  export 
merchandise,  arms,  and  munitions  of  war  from  France.2 

Early  in  March,  1776,  while  Franklin's  letter  was  on  its 
way  to  Dumas,  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence 
appointed  Silas  Deane,  an  ex-member  of  Congress  and  of  the 
Secret  Committee  for  procuring  supplies,  commercial  agent 
to  France,  giving  him  at  the  same  time  an  important  political 

1  Dumas  to  Franklin,  Apr.  30,  1776.  Diplomatic  Correspondence, 
II,  p.  86. 

1  Dumas  to  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  May  21,  1776. 
Ibid.  II,  p.  91. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  31 

errand.  They  instructed  him  to  introduce  himself  to  the 
Count  de  Vergennes  as  a  merchant,  ask  for  a  supply  of  arms 
and  ammunition  on  the  credit  of  Congress  and,  in  case  of 
refusal,  request  permission  to  buy  in  France  as  large  a 
quantity  of  these  articles  as  he  could  pay  for  or  obtain  on 
credit.  If  received  with  favor,  he  was  to  ask  whether  the 
Colonies  might  hope  for  an  alliance,  commercial  or  defensive, 
with  France  ;  and  at  what  time  she  would  be  ready  to 
recognize  them.1  He  was  given  no  power,  however,  to  con 
clude  a  treaty. 

On  his  arrival  in  France,  in  June,  1776,  Deane  was  told 
that  he  could  probably  accomplish  nothing,  as  a  new  reign 
had  lately  begun  ;  several  departments  of  the  government, 
notably  that  of  finance,  were  deranged  ;  and  the  King  and 
his  ministers  wished  to  keep  the  peace.  Yet  Deane  easily 
obtained  an  audience  with  Vergennes,  and  was  partly  suc 
cessful  in  the  commercial  half  of  his  errand.  Vergennes 
told  him  that  the  Court  could  not  openly  encourage  the 
shipping  of  warlike  stores  to  America,  but  would  place  no 
obstacles  in  the  way.  He  invited  Deane  to  avail  himself  of 
the  privilege,  open  to  all  American  merchants,  of  carrying 
on  every  kind  of  commerce  allowed  to  the  traders  of  any 
nation.  He  refused  to  discuss  the  feasibility  of  a  treaty 
while  events  were  so  uncertain,  but  he  questioned  Deane 
about  the  resources  of  the  Colonies  and  the  strength  of  their 
union.2 

This  interview  was  an  auspicious  beginning,  and  Deane 
soon  detected  further  evidence  of  ministerial  good-will,  in 
an  offer  of  Beaumarchais  to  procure  on  credit  the  supplies 
which  the  Colonies  had  ordered.  Deane  suspected  that 
Beaumarchais  was  supported  by  the  government,  because 
he  did  not,  like  other  merchants,  require  securities  endorsed 
by  a  banker  or  a  well-known  man  of  business  ;  and  M. 
Gerard,  Vergennes'  first  secretary,  confirmed  the  suspicion 
by  telling  Deane  that  he  could  safely  rely  on  Beaumarchais' 

1  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  to  Deane,    March  3,  1776. 
Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  78. 

2  Deane  to   Committee  of   Secret   Correspondence,   Aug.    18,    1776. 
Ibid.  II,  p.  112. 


32  /''rancc  and  tlie  American   Devolution. 

commercial  engagements.  The  two  agents  soon  came  to  an 
agreement,  Beaumarchais  promising  to  furnish  supplies,  and 
Deane  pledging  the  credit  of  Congress  to  pay  for  them  in 
tobacco  or  other  American  products.1 

Beaumarchais  knew  how  to  obtain  powder  and  arms  from 
the  state  arsenals.  Because  the  exportation  of  this  mer 
chandise  was  forbidden,  and  because  it  could  not  even  be 
carried  to  the  sea-coast  without  publicity,  he  suggested  to 
Deane  the  advantage  of  having  influential  friends  at  court. 
With  this  in  view,  he  advised  him  to  send  officers  to  America 
with  the  stores,  "  and,  by  fixing  on  such  as  should  be 
recommended  by  persons  at  court,  or  of  influence  by  their 
connections,  to  procure  .  .  .  friends  and  patrons."  It  is 
due  to  Beaumarchais  to  state  that  he  also  believed  the 
Americans  too  inexperienced  in  the  art  of  war  to  manage 
artillery  without  the  aid  of  foreign  officers.  Deane  listened 
to  his  advice,  and  the  crowd  of  officers,  "  all  brave  as  their 
swords,"  who  besieged  the  American  agents  in  Paris,  per 
plexed  Congress,  and  harassed  Washington,  was  a  direct  re 
sult  of  this  ingenious  scheme.2 

The  Ministry  winked  at  the  little  emigration,  but  was 
careful  to  avoid  responsibility.  Of  all  the  officers  who 
crossed  the  water,  four  engineers  were  the  only  ones  sent  by 
the  government.3 

Even  with  the  aid  of  influential  friends,  the  work  of  sup 
plying  the  American  army  was  not  easy.  Beaumarchais 
informed  Congress  in  August  that  he  had  procured  two 
hundred  brass  cannon,  a  large  amount  of  ammunition,  and 
a  quantity  of  clothing  for  the  troops.  Everything  promised 
well,  and  Deane  hoped  that  the  troops  would  sail  in  October.* 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  116  ff.  Beaumarchais  to 
Deane,  July  18,  1776.  Deane  to  Beaumarchais,  July  20,  24.  Ibid.  II, 
pp.  99,  102,  105. 

2Deane's  Address  to  Congress,  Dec.  1778.  Sparks  MSS.,  LII,  vol. 
I,  p.  104.  Beaumarchais  to  Deane,  July  26,  1776.  Deane  to  Beaumar 
chais,  July  27.  Deane  Papers,  I,  pp.  164,  166. 

3  Memoirs  of  Lafayette,  I,  p.  70. 

4Roderique  Hortalez  and  Co.  to  Committee  of  Secret  Correspond 
ence,  Aug.  18,  1776.  Deane  to  R.  Morris,  Sept.  17.  Diplomatic  Cor 
respondence,  II,  pp.  129,  148. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  33 

But  the  British  ambassador  spread  a  report  that  Congress 
was  treating  with  General  Howe,  and  at  once  the  supply  of 
government  stores  was  checked.  Soon  after  this  a  native  of 
Maryland,  in  the  service  of  France,  insinuated  that  Deane 
was  trying  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  with  Great  Britain 
and  planning  to  use  the  supplies  against  France.  These 
rumors,  annoying  as  they  were,  caused  little  delay.  A  far 
more  serious  obstacle  was  the  indifference  produced  in  the 
Ministry  by  news  of  the  serious  defeat  on  Long  Island. 
This  disaster  threatened  to  wreck  American  hopes,  in  France 
as  well  as  at  home.  Another  reason  for  ministerial  coldness 
was  the  delay  in  receiving  news  from  America.  The  British 
were  so  active  at  sea  that  it  was  November  before  an  official 
announcement  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  arrived 
in  France.1  In  the  meantime  the  English  were  on  the  watch 
for  suspicious  shipments,  and,  in  order  to  escape  the  notice 
of  their  spies,  the  government  hindered  the  loading  and 
despatching  of  Beaumarchais'  vessels  almost  as  persistently 
as  if  it  had  disapproved  the  enterprise.  At  last,  "after 
orders  and  counter-orders  and  manceuvers  the  very  history 
of  which,"  Deane  said,  "  would  fill  a  volume,"  the  Amphi- 
trite  set  sail  on  the  fourteenth  of  December,  laden  with 
military  stores  and  carrying  a  number  of  officers  for  the 
American  service.  She  had  been  loaded  at  night, — over  a 
hundred  men  working  together  in  confusion,  crowding  in 
stores  picked  up  by  lighters  from  the  nearest  points  of  the 
shore,  with  little  regard  to  the  invoice.2  The  cause  of  this 
haste  was  an  indiscretion  on  the  part  of  Beaumarchais.  While 
superintending  the  affairs  of  his  mercantile  house  he  had 
called  attention  to  himself  by  directing  the  rehearsals  of  one 
of  his  comedies.  The  English  ambassador  had  learned 
where  he  was,  and  why  ;  and  the  Ministry  had  been  forced 
to  take  notice  of  his  doings.  A  government  embargo  caught 
his  other  ships  and  detained  them  in  port.  Unfortunately, 

1  Deane  to  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  Oct.  i,  17,  25,  1776. 
Diplomatic   Correspondence,   II,  pp.    153,    173,   183.     Deane  to  Ver- 
gennes,  about  Nov.  8.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  592. 

2  Beaumarchais  to  Deane,  Dec.  17,  1776.     Deane  Papers,  I,  p.  424. 

3 


34  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

through  the  selfish  caprice  of  an  officer  on  board  the 
Amphitrite,  that  ship  was  brought  back  to  L' Orient,  and 
there  detained.  For  several  weeks  the  enterprise  remained 
at  a  standstill.  It  was  not  until  the  last  of  January,  1777, 
that  Beaumarchais  received  the  welcome  news  that  three  of 
his  vessels  had  sailed.  In  February,  he  despatched  a  fourth  ; 
early  in  March,  he  reported  eight  ships  at  sea  and  one  load 
ing  ;  in  the  first  \veek  of  May,  the  ninth  ship  sailed,  and 
Beaumarchais  heard  that  three  of  his  cargoes  had  arrived  in 
America.  These  supplies  came  just  in  time  for  the  campaign 
of  1777,  and  were  especially  welcome  b}^  reason  of  an  alarm 
ing  scarcity  of  guns,  due  to  the  fact  that  many  of  the  soldiers, 
at  the  end  of  their  short  terms  of  service,  not  only  refused  to 
re-enlist,  but  carried  home  the  government  property.1 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  Beaumarchais'  first  nine  car 
goes,  to  say  nothing  of  later  ones,  were  paid  for  out  of  the 
million  livres  which  he  obtained  from  the  French  treasury 
in  June,  1776.  In  August  of  the  same  year,  he  received  an 
equal  amount  from  Spain,  and  over  a  million  livres  were 
contributed  by  France  during  1777. 2  Besides  this,  he  bor 
rowed  money,  like  an  ordinary  merchant,  from  wealthy 
individuals.  During  one  year,  he  shipped  to  America  stores 
to  the  value  of  five  million  livres. 

The  terms  on  which  the  French  government  advanced 
the  money,  especially  the  first  million,  have  been  and  are 
still  the  subject  of  much  discussion.  The  disputed  question 
is  whether  the  money  was  intended  as  a  gift  to  the  Ameri 
cans  or  as  a  loan  to  Beaumarchais,  capable  of  being  con 
verted  into  a  gift  if  his  losses  were  so  great  as  to  call  for 
some  recompense.  On  the  former  supposition,  the  amount 
ought  to  have  been  deducted  from  the  bill  which  Beau 
marchais  presented  to  the  United  States  for  services  ren 
dered  ;  on  the  latter,  the  United  States  had  no  claim  on  it, 
and  Beaumarchais  was  responsible  only  to  the  French 

'Deane  to  Gerard,  Jan.  7,  1777.  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Jan. 
7,  30  ;  Feb.  4,  Mar.  7,  May  4.  Vergennes  to  Gerard,  Jan.  7.  Stevens 
Facsimiles,  617,  912,  916,  1424,  1445,  1526,  618.  Deane's  Address  to 
Congress,  Dec.,  1778.  Sparks  MSS.,  UI,  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 

2  Beaumarchais  and  his  Times,  III,  pp.  130,  165. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  35 

Ministry.  The  doubt  on  this  point  caused  dissensions 
among  the  American  Commissioners  in  Europe,  and  fac 
tional  disputes  in  Congress  ;  deprived  Beaumarchais  of  the 
remittances  from  America,  which  he  claimed  in  return  for 
his  outlay  ;  and  gave  rise  to  a  law-suit  half  a  century  long, 
which  ended  in  a  compromise  between  the  United  States 
and  the  heir  of  Beaumarchais,  to  the  great  disadvantage  of 
the  claimant.  To  decide  this  question,  on  which  congres 
sional  committees  and  attorneys  general  of  the  United  States 
have  disagreed,  is  exceedingly  difficult,  even  with  the  aid 
of  the  documents,  both  private  and  official,  now  open  to  the 
public  ;  but  a  few  facts  may  be  given  on  either  side. 

Against  the  claim  of  Beaumarchais  we  may  place,  first, 
the  statements  of  Arthur  Lee.  Lee  said  that  Beaumarchais 
told  him  in  1775  that  France  would  furnish  the  United 
States  with  ,£200,000,  to  be  sent  by  way  of  the  West  Indies. 
He  claimed  that,  after  the  plan  of  direct  remittance  had 
been  changed  to  that  of  utilizing  a  commercial  company, 
the  appearance  of  commerce  was  only  a  blind,  and  no  pay 
was  expected  in  return  for  the  supplies.  An  entry  in  Lee's 
Journal,  for  October  3,  1777,  tells  us  that  M.  Grand,  a 
banker  with  whom  the  Americans  had  dealings,  coming 
direct  from  Vergennes,  brought  word  that  Congress  "  need 
give  themselves  no  trouble  about  making  returns ;  that 
nothing  which  we  had  received  or  were  to  receive  was  lent, 
but  to  be  considered  as  given."  In  line  with  this  testi 
mony  is  a  letter  written  by  Vergennes  to  the  ambassador  in 
Spain,  May  3,  1776,  in  which  the  following  words  occur  : — 
"All  will  be  done  in  the  name  of  a  commercial  society 
directed  by  a  merchant  of  one  of  our  maritime  towns,  who 
will  take  securities — not  very  binding,  to  be  sure  ;  but  will 
color  his  zeal  with  the  motive,  plausible  enough  on  the  part 
of  a  merchant,  of  desiring  to  attract  to  himself, the  largest  * 
part  of  the  American  commissions  when  the  commerce  of 
the  Colonies  shall  be  rendered  free  by  the  declaration  of 
their  independence."  The  fact  that  Beaumarchais,  in 
pressing  his  claim,  falsely  stated  that  the  supplies  were 

1  Life  of  Arthur  Lee,  I,  p.  336. 

2  Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  May  3,  1776.     Doniol,  I,  p.  375. 


36  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

bought  with  his  own  money,1  would  seem  almost  conclusive 
evidence  against  him,  if  it  had  not  been  impossible  for  him 
to  explain  the  matter  truthfully  without  divulging  govern 
ment  secrets. 

One  of  the  strongest  arguments  in  favor  of  Beaumarchais 
may  be  drawn  from  his  own  plan  of  operations,  submitted  to 
the  King  in  the  fall  of  I775/2  He  asked  the  French  govern 
ment  to  entrust  him  with  a  million  livres,  half  of  which  he 
would  send  to  America  in  the  form  of  coin  and  the  rest  in 
powder.  He  asked  leave  to  buy  the  powder  from  the  state 
magazines,  at  the  government  rate  of  from  four  to  six  sols  a 
pound  ;  intending  to  sell  it  to  the  insurgents  at  the  market 
price  of  from  twenty  to  thirty  sols,  and  invest  the  difference 
in  more  supplies  for  the  Americans.  By  a  clever  calculation, 
whose  weakest  point  was  reliance  on  remittances  that  never 
arrived,  he  proved  that  the  King,  by  advancing  one  million 
livres,  could  make  enough  money  to  invest  three  million  in 
the  second  venture  and  nine  in  the  third.3  If  it  were  certain 
that  this  plan  was  adopted,  Beaumarchais'  reputation  would 
be  cleared. 

One  of  the  most  baffling  elements  in  the  puzzle  is,  that 
most  of  the  evidence  seems  to  be  of  little  value.  Nothing 
could  be  more  positive  than  the  assertions  of  Arthur  Lee, 
that  all  the  supplies  advanced  by  the  French  Court  were 
intended  as  a  gift ;  but,  after  repeating  this  declaration  again 
and  again,  Lee  finally  owned  that  he  did  not  know  whether 
they  were  so  intended  or  not.  If,  as  Lee  recorded,  Vergennes 
told  M.  Grand  in  October,  1777,  that  no  return  was  expected 
for  the  supplies,  he  also  wrote  to  Gerard  in  September,  1778  : 
The  Commissioners  "insinuate  that  all,  or  at  least  a  large 
portion,  of  what  has  been  sent  is  on  account  of  His  Majesty. 
I  am  about  to  reply  that  the  King  has  not  furnished  any 
thing  ;  that  he  has  simply  allowed  M.  de  Beaumarchais  to 
provide  himself  with  what  he  wanted  in  the  arsenals,  on  con 
dition  of  replacing  what  he  took."4  Again,  in  1779,  he 

1  Journal  of  Arthur  Lee,  Dec.  24,  1777.     Life,  I,  369. 

2  Possibly  in  February,  1776. 

3  Deane  Papers,  I,  p.  108. 

4  A  Vindication  of  Arthur  Lee,  p.  36. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  37 

declared  through  Gerard  that  Beaumarchais  was  "the  credi 
tor  of  the  United  States,  and  at  the  same  time  debtor  to  the 
King."  '  These  statements  might  be  taken  as  conclusive  if 
diplomats  always  spoke  the  truth.  When  the  United  States 
government,  learning  by  accident  that  a  million  livres  had 
been  advanced  by  France,  requested  an  explanation,  Ver- 
gennes  merely  kept  silence  and  refused  to  name  the  person 
to  whom  the  money  had  been  paid.  His  successors,  unable 
to  conceal  the  agency  of  Beaumarchais,  stoutly  and  falsely 
averred  that  the  money  "  was  for  an  object  of  secret  political 
services,  the  knowledge  of  which  the  King  had  reserved  to 
himself,"  and  that  it  was  unjust  "  to  confound  this  political 
object  with  the  mercantile  operations  of  the  same  individual 
with  Congress."  While  a  witness  who  perverts  the  truth 
ordinarily  throws  discredit  on  the  cause  which  he  represents, 
the  attempts  of  the  French  government,  repeated  through  a 
period  of  fifty  years,  to  secure  attention  to  the  claim  of 
Beaumarchais,  may  be  regarded  as  a  strong  point  in  his 
favor.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  why  a  succession  of  ministers 
should  have  devoted  so  much  effort  and  prevarication  to  the 
support  of  a  groundless  demand. 

While  Deane,  with  the  aid  of  Beaumarchais,  was  obtain 
ing  supplies  for  the  Americans,  he  did  not  neglect  the  polit 
ical  side  of  his  mission.  He  promptly  announced  to  the 
French  Court  the  Congressional  resolution  of  May  15,  the 
forerunner  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence ;  and,  pre 
dicting  that  this  resolution  would  soon  be  followed  by  im 
portant  instructions  with  regard  to  France,  he  asked  aid 
for  his  country.  A  month  later  he  submitted  an  elaborate 
memorial  on  American  trade,  in  the  hope  of  persuading 
France  to  abandon  her  restrictive  system  and  open  her  own 
ports  and  those  of  her  colonies  to  American  commerce.3  He 
did  not  obtain  all  the  concessions  which  he  desired  for  his 
countrymen,  but  they  were  liberally  treated.  The  authorities 
allowed  them  to  import  certain  prohibited  articles  and  tocon- 

1  Claim  of  Beaumarchais'  Heir,  p.  4. 
2 Ibid.,  p.  8. 

3  July  18,  Aug.  15,  1776.  Stevens  Facsimiles,  572,  577.  See  Dip 
lomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  126. 


38  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

tinue  to  export  arms  and  ammunition.  ' '  The  registers  must 
not  contain  any  item  nor  any  indication  of  this  connivance, 
entire  liberty  being  left  to  the  Americans  to  load  and  export 
as  they  please  the  articles  in  question:" — such  were  Ver- 
gennes'  significant  orders.1 

Not  all  the  commercial  privileges  which  France  gave  to 
the  Americans  were  necessarily  violations  of  international 
law.  The  French  theory  of  the  rights  of  neutral  trade  was 
broader  than  the  English.  It  embraced  the  principle  that 
free  ships  make  free  goods  ;  while  England  claimed  that  an 
enemy's  goods,  even  in  a  neutral  ship,  were  liable  to  confisca 
tion.  If  the  Americans  could  be  considered  a  separate  power 
at  war  with  England,  France,  according  to  her  own  doctrine, 
had  the  right  to  trade  with  them.  England,  of  course,  de 
nied  both  the  premise  and  the  conclusion.  If,  on  the  con 
trary,  the  Americans  were  colonies,  France  admitted  that 
England,  if  powerful  enough,  might  prevent  them  from 
trading  with  French  citizens,  but  denied  her  right  to  for 
bid  French  citizens  to  trade  with  them  : — a  distinction  which 
the  Bourbon  monarch  would  hardly  have  maintained  if  his 
own  colonies  had  been  the  ones  concerned.  There  are  two 
kinds  of  commerce,  said  the  French  authorities  :  that  which 
confines  its  dealings  to  ordinary  merchandise,  and  that  which 
includes  contraband  articles.  Even  if  our  citizens  indulge 
in  contraband  trade,  this  constitutes  no  breach  of  neutrality, 
but  merely  renders  the  goods  subject  to  confiscation.2  With 
this  careful  definition  of  the  rights  in  question  France  veiled 
her  connivance  at  prohibited  trade. 

While  playing  fast  and  loose  with  international  obliga 
tions,  the  Ministry  assumed  a  defiant  attitude  in  the  face  of 
British  protest.  An  unofficial  agent  of  the  English  govern 
ment  having  called  the  French  charge  d'affaires  to  account, 
for  the  presence  of  Deane  in  Paris,  Vergennes  made  this 
comment :  "  He  surely  knows  that  the  King  is  master  in  his 
own  house,  that  he  has  no  account  to  render  to  any  one  con 
cerning  the  strangers  whom  he  thinks  proper  to  admit  into 
his  States,  and  that  His  Majesty  does  all  that  Great  Britain 

1  Vergennes  to  Clugny,  Sept.  22.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1365. 

2  Sparks'  translation  and  abridgment  of  Rayneval's    Observations 
sur  le  Memoire  Justicatif  de  la  Gourde  Londres.     Sparks'  MSS.,  LI. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  39 

could  demand  as  a  favor,  in  not  receiving  openly  a  repre 
sentative  on  the  part  of  the  English  Colonies." 

The  expression,  even  in  a  private  letter,  of  a  sentiment  so 
uncompromising,  indicated  the  approach  of  a  crisis.  At 
this  time,  France  and  Spain  were  seriously  considering  a 
declaration  of  war  against  England.  Spain,  on  the  eve  of  a 
contest  with  Portugal,  in  which  England  might  be  expected 
to  take  part  with  her  ally,  had  one  more  reason  than  usual 
for  desiring  the  co-operation  of  France.  Late  in  August, 
the  Spanish  ambassador  d'Aranda  tried,  in  an  unofficial 
interview  with  Maurepas,  to  persuade  him  that  the  time  for 
an  attack  on  England  had  come.  It  was  believed  in  Spain 
that  no  effort  to  keep  the  peace  would  long  be  successful  ; 
and  that  it  would  be  wise  to  take  the  offensive  and  anticipate 
the  dreaded  attack.  There  was  no  proposal  to  form  an 
alliance  with  the  Americans.  The  reason  or  pretext  for 
hesitation  was  the  advantage  of  waiting  until  another  cam 
paign  had  shown  how  much  aid  the  Colonists  could  give  to 
an  ally.'' 

In  a  memoire  laid  before  the  King  and  Council  as  a  result 
of  the  Spanish  overtures,  Vergennes  reviewed  the  arguments — 
in  favor  of  war,  but  gave -the  ^proposals  of  France  a  turn 
which  might  easily  prove  obnoxious  to  Spain,  and  so  defer 
the  critical  moment.  Once  more,  he  declared  that  a  war 
with  England  could  be  justified  as  a  measure  of  self-defense  ; 
for  England  was  so  jealous  of  the  increasing  naval  power  of 
France  that  only  the  necessity  of  concentrating  her  forces  in 
America  restrained  her  from  giving  vent  to  her  enmity.  He 
gave  the  impression  that  France  would  welcome  a  war  with 
Great  Britain,  if  it  could  be  waged  without  the  intervention 
of  other  European  powers  ;  and  that,  unlike  Spain,  she  saw 
advantage  in  an  alliance  with  America.  In  order  to 
avoid  the  danger  of  arousing  jealousy  of  the  increasing 
power  of  France,  he  suggested  that  Spain  might  begin  the 
war,  and  allow  France  to  enter  as  her  auxiliary.3 

1  Vergennes  to  Gamier,  Aug.  31,  1776.     Doniol,  I,  p.  583. 

2  Grimaldi  to  d'Aranda,   Aug.   26,    1776.     Bancroft  MSS.,  Archives 
Francises,  Espagne,  1768-1776,  p.  267. 

3  Considerations  read  to  the  King  in  Committee,  on  the  course  to  be 
taken  with  regard  to  England,  Aug.  31,  1776.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  897. 


4O  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

Thus  called  on  to  act  as  principal,  Spain  beat  a  prompt 
retreat.  Maintaining  still  that  war  could  not  long  be 
avoided,  her  minister  developed  a  doubt  whether  the  proper 
moment  had  arrived.  He  feared  that,  while  France  and 
Spain  were  attacking  England,  she  might  make  peace  with 
America  and  turn  her  forces  against  them.  Another  reason 
for  objecting  to  hasty  action,  a  reason  ominous  of  future  dis 
agreement  between  Spain  and  her  ally,  was  the  necessity  of 
deciding  beforehand  on  some  plan  of  operations.  Incident 
ally,  d'Aranda  expressed  a  desire  to  drive  the  English  from 
Jamaica  and  Minorca.1 

Before  this  reply  reached  the  French  Court,  Vergennes 
heard  news  that  made  him  even  less  desirous  of  war  than 
before, — that  of  the  American  defeat  on  Long  Island.  The 
fate  of  New  York  was  not  known  ;  but,  in  its  bearing  on  the 
foreign  policy  of  France,  it  was  considered  immaterial. 
Even  if  New  York  was  in  the  hands  of  the  British  there 
would  no  longer  be  any  reason  for  haste  in  attacking  Eng 
land  or  declaring  for  the  Americans.  They  were  not  likely 
to  submit  after  one  defeat  ;  and  the  occupation  of  their 
strongholds  would  keep  the  common  enemy  busy.  Besides, 
delay  would  give  France  and  Spain  time  for  further  prepara 
tion,  and  at  the  same  time  exhaust  the  resources  of  England. 
Meanwhile,  it  would  be  possible  "  to  direct  the  furnishing  of 
aid  to  the  Colonies  in  such  a  way  as  to  force  the  English  into 
becoming  the  aggressors  themselves  ;  in  this  capacity,"  said 
Vergennes,  with  his  eye  on  the  danger  of  a  continental  war, 
''they  would  lose  their  right  to  the  interest  which  several 
powers  might  take  in  not  seeing  them  crushed." 

In  this  way  the  military  disasters  in  America  fixed,  for 
the  time  being,  the  hesitating  course  of  the  two  European 
powers.  "After  all,"  said  a  French  noble,3  "  France  was 
not  fool  enough  to  play  such  a  silly  game  as  Spain  did  in 
the  last  war,  when  she  got  so  soundly  drubbed  for  espousing 
a  ruined  cause." 

1  Grimaldi  to  d'Aranda,  Oct.  8,  1776,  Doniol,  I,  pp.  608-612. 

2  Gamier  to  Vergennes,  Oct.  n,  1776.     Vergennes  to  the  King,  Oct. 
17,  26.     Vergennes  to  d'Aranda,  Nov.  5.     Ibid.,  I,  pp.  615,  618,  620, 
682-4. 

3  The  Duke  de  Chartres. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  41 

In  the  midst  of  the  discussion  between  the  French  and 
Spanish  Cabinets,  Deane  called  attention  to  the  Declaration 
of  Independence, — the  adoption  of  which  was  a  well-known 
fact,  although  it  had  not  been  officially  announced, — and 
asked  for  an  answer  to  the  questions,  whether  France  would 
recognize  the  United  States  and  receive  an  ambassador  from 
them,  and  whether  they  might  hope  for  an  alliance.  "The 
moment  approaches,"  wrote  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes, 
"  when  you  will  have  to  say  yes  or  no.  I  would  go  and 
hang  myself  immediately  if  it  were  the  latter."  Beaumar 
chais  was  mistaken.  The  moment  was  receding.  Deane 
continued  to  wait  for  an  answer  to  his  questions.  He 
waited,  too,  in  a  state  of  distress  "  beyond  the  power  of 
language  to  paint,"  for  official  news  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  and  power  to  negotiate  a  treaty.  He  at 
tributed  the  failure  of  his  efforts  to  the  negligence  of  Con 
gress,  not  knowing  that,  since  the  tidings  from  Long  Island, 
the  Americans  could  hope  for  only  enough  aid  to  keep  them 
from  succumbing.1 

At  the  moment  when  the  fortune  of  America  was  lowest 
in  official  circles,  the  powerful  force  of  public  opinion  began 
to  make  itself  felt  in  our  favor.  "It  is  difficult,"  says  a 
French  historian  of  this  period,  "for  governments,  even 
absolute  ones,  to  resist  a  movement  of  public  opinion  when 
it  extends  to  all  classes,  from  the  summit  of  society  to 
its  lowest  foundations."1  It  is  more  difficult  when,  in 
addition  to  this,  the  king  lacks  strength  and  is  desirous  of 
winning  popular  favor.  It  is  hardest  of  all  when  the 
general  cry  is  for  war,  and  when  a  popular  war- minister  in 
exile  has  a  strong  party  of  friends  at  court.  Choiseul  is 
said  to  have  disapproved  of  the  alliance  with  the  United 
States,  and  to  have  wished  merely  to  use  the  Americans  for 
the  exhaustion  of  England  ;3  but,  however  persistently  he 
opposed  the  measures  of  Vergennes,  every  influence  in  favor 
of  war  was  pushing  the  country  with  almost  irresistible  logic 
toward  an  American  alliance. 

1  Memo nre    of    Deane,    Sept.    24,    1776.     Stevens    Facsimiles,    585. 
Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Sept.   25.     Ibid.,  898. 

2  Capefigue,  Louis  XVI,  II,  p.  34. 

3  Soulavie,  Memoires,  III,  p.  412. 


42  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

During  the  first  months  of  our  Revolution,  the  French 
public  knew  little  of  Jhe  incidents  or  the  merits  of  the  strug 
gle  ;  but  Deane's  attempt  to-gain  friends-at-court-by  con 
ferring  fa-vors  on  military  officers,  soon  made  the  insurgent 
cause  popular  among  the  young  nobility  ;  and  they,  in  turn, 
enlisted  the  enthusiastic  sympathy  of  the  Queen,     At  the  same 
time  the  admission  of  American  trader's  to  French  ports  en 
gaged  the  interest,  less  conspicuous  but  equally  important, 
of  the  mercantile  class  ;   and  the  struggle  of  the  insurgents 
for    republican^  self-government    won    the    support    of    the 
philosophers  and  their  followers,  who  formed  a  large  and 
influential    body,   and  who  appreciated  American    political 
ambitions  all  the  more  because  they  took  it  for  granted  that 
these,  aspirations   were   borrowed  from  their  own  writings.1 
Radical  theories  had  spread  through  the  entire  younger  gen 
eration    of    French    society.     The    military    nobility    were 
attracted  toward  the  American  cause,  not  only  through  am 
bition,  desire  of  adventure,  weariness  of  peace,  and  hatred  of 
England,  but  through  their  recently  acquired  admiration  for 
republican   and  democratic  institutions.     Under  the  influ 
ence  of  such  motives,  Lafayette,  among  others,  determined 
to  offer  his  services  to  Washington.     Finding  that  the  disas 
ter  of  Long  Island  had  placed  a  serious  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  the  shipments  directed  by  Deane  and  Beaumarchais,  and 
that  he  could  not  hope  to  reach  America  soon  on  one  of  their 
vessels,  he  offered  to  buy  and  equip  a  ship  on  his  own  ac 
count  ;  and,  eluding  the  vigilance  of  the  Ministry,  he  made 
his  way  to  the  scene  of  action.     The  escapade  of  Lafayette 
greatly  increased  the  popularity  of  the  American  cause.     As 
time  passed  and  news  of  the  battles  in  which  he  and  his 
companions  figured,  reached  France,  the  court  and  even  the 
ministers  felt  their  interest  quicken.     With  the  army,  "  de 
sertion    became  a    fashion."     A    friend    of    Lafayette2    has 
recorded  that  Maurepas  said  more  than  once  '  '  that  it  was 
the  impetuous  ardor  of  the  young  courtiers  and  the  French 
warriors  which  had  cried  down  the  wisdom  of  the  Council 


,  Mhnoires,  I,  pp.  74,  80  ;  II,  p.  43. 
2  Ibid.,  I,  p.  80. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  43 

and,  so  to  speak,  forced  the  government  into  war."  Ac 
cepting  this  statement  as  true  of  Maurepas  and  the  King, 
we  may  believe  that  Vergennes,  though  he  sometimes  vacil 
lated,  followed  a  consistent  policy  in  the  main,  and  advised 
the  recognition  of  America  for  reasons  of  state. 

The  desirability  of  an  alliance  had  been  debated  in  \ 
America  as  well  as  in  France.  The  question  was  closely 
bound  up  with  that  of  independence.  The  more  radical 
element  in  Congress  had  asserted  that  the  Colonies  could 
hope  for  no  European  assistance  until  they  declared  their  hide-  , 
pendence  ;  the  more  cautious  members  had  feared  that  such  a 
declaration  would  place  them  in  the  power  of  foreign  nations. 
"France,"  they  said,  "will  take  advantage  of  us  when 
they  see  we  cannot  recede,  and  demand  severe  terms  of  us  ; 
....  she  and  Spain,  too,  will  rejoice  to  see  Britain  and 
America  wasting  each  other."  In  spite  of  these  fears,  a 
committee  had  been  appointed  on  the  twelfth  of  June,  1776, 
to  draw  up  a  plan  of  treaties  for  presentation  to  foreign  ( 
powers.1  Dr.  Franklin  and  John  Adams  were  the  most  dis 
tinguished  members.  Adams,  with  all  his  enthusiasm  for 
independence,  saw  the  threatening  danger,  and  always  in 
sisted  that  any  connection  established  with  foreign  powers 
should  be  purely  commercial.  In  his  work  on  the  com 
mittee,  he  held  his  colleagues  rigidly  to  this  principle.  On 
the  supposition  that  France  would  not  accept  a  distinctly 
commercial  treaty,  many  motions  wrere  offered  to  insert 
"articles  of  entangling  alliance,  of  exclusive  privileges, 
and  of  warranties  of  possessions  ;"  but  they  were  all 
defeated,2  and  the  draft  submitted  to  Congress  for  debate 
was  that  of  a  perpetual  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce, 
drawn  up  with  special  reference  to  France.  It  contained  y 
a  stipulation  that  if  England  should  attack  France  in  conse 
quence  of  the  treaty,  the  United  States  would  not  aid 
England.  As  some  of  the  members  of  Congress  feared  that 
France  would  not  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  promise  of  neu 
trality,  the  plan  was  reconsidered.  John  Adams  was  absent 
at  the  time  ;  but  in  spite  of  the  withdrawal  of  his  restrain- 

1  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  475-7. 

2  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  II,  pp.  516-7  ;  IX,  p.  409. 


44  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

ing  influence,  the  concessions  which  were  made  did  not 
greatly  alter  the  spirit  of  the  treaty.  The  Commissioners 
were  instructed  to  promise,  if  necessary,  that  the  United 
States  would  never  acknowledge  allegiance  to  GreatL. Britain 
nor  grant  more  commercial  privileges  to  her  than  to  France  ; 
and  also  to  stipulate  that  no  treaty  for  ending  the  war  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  or  between  Great 
Britain  and  France  should  take  effect  until  six  months  after 
the  allies  had  notified  each  other.  Thus  modified,  the  plan 
of  treaty  was  agreed  to  by  Congress,  September  17,  1776. 
Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas  Jefferson,  and  Silas  Deane 
were  chosen  Commissioners  to  treat  with  France  ;  but  Jeffer 
son  declined  to  serve,  and  Arthur  Lee  was  appointed  in  his 
place.1 

Early  in  November,  Deane's  painful  suspense  was  relieved 
by  an  official  announcement  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence,  and  news  that  Congress  had  a  plan  of  treaty 
under  consideration.  On  notifying  the  Ministry,  Deane 
was  met  by  the  question  :  What  would  the  United  States 
gain  from  the  acknowledgement  of  their  independence, 
unless  this  were  followed  by  a  war  against  Great  Britain  ; 
since  they  already  enjoyed  all  the  other  advantages  which 
would  accrue  to  them  from  such  an  acknowledgment  ?  It 
was  intimated  that  in  one  respect  the  change  would  be  a 
disadvantage  :  it  would  place  the  United  States  under  addi 
tional  obligations  to  France.2 

Though  the  Declaration  of  Independence  had  no  immedi 
ate  effect  on  the  policy  of  the  government,  it  justified  itself, 
in  France  as  in  America,  by  its  influence  on  public  opinion. 
Expressing,  as  it  did,  the  English  instinct  for  liberty  in  the 
formulas  of  French  political  philosophy,  it  was  sure  to  in 
crease  the  popular  enthusiasm  for  the  young  republic.3 

Soon  after  the  Americans  had  taken  the  irrevocable  step, 
Vergennes  marked  out  in  a  tentative  way  the  general  lines 

1  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  27  ff. ,  31,  35. 

2  Stevens  Facsimiles,  592.     Deane  to  Committee   of  Secret  Corre 
spondence,  Nov.  28,  1776.     Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  197. 

3  Capefigue,  Louis  XVI,  II,  p.  38. 


The   Beginning  of  Diplomatic  Relations.  45 

which  the  French  government  afterward  tried  to  follow.1 
He  wished  to  postpone  the  war  with  England  until  the  end 
of  1777,  when  he  thought  the  naval  and  military  prepara 
tions  of  France  and  Spain  w?ould  be  completed.  Even  then, 
they  were  not  to  take  the  aggressive  or  to  call  for  allies  : 
they  would  leave  that  to  England.  Would  it  be  well,  he 
asked  the  Spanish  minister,  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  the 
Americans,  offensive  while  the  war  lasted  and  defensive 
from  the  conclusion  of  peace?  As  Spain  was  betraying 
solicitude  with  regard  to  the  objects  of  the  war,  he  urged 
that  the  abasement  of  England  and  the  destruction  of  her 
commerce  should  be  made  their  primary  aim.  Thus,  by  the 
close  of  1776,  a  fairly  definite  plan  was  shaping  itself  out  of 
the  fluctuating  counsels  of  the  French  Ministry. 

1  Vergennes  to  d'Aranda,  Nov.  5,  1776.  Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Dec. 
8.  Sparks  MSS.,  LXXX,  vol.  I,  pp.  116,  133.  Plan  de  measures 
a  eoncerter  avec  VEspagne,  Dec.  1776.  Bancroft  MSS.,  Archives 
Fran^aises,  Espagne,  1768-1776,  p.  289. 


IV. 

THE  DEMAND  FOR  RECOGNITION. 


When  the  British  ambassador  heard  that  Franklin  was  on 
the  way  to  Paris  he  threatened,  it  is  said,  to  leave  without 
ceremony.  Vergennes  told  him  that  a  message  had  already 
been  sent  to  intercept  Franklin  and  forbid  him  the  country  ; 
but  that,  as  his  route  was  uncertain,  the  courier  might  fail 
to  meet  him.1  This  messenger,  if  he  existed,  was  con 
veniently  unsuccessful  ;  for  Franklin  arrived  in  Paris  in  the 
last  part  of  December.  On  the  following  day,  he  and  Deane 
were  joined  by  Arthur  Lee.  The  Commissioners  informed 
Vergennes  of  their  powers,  and  asked  for  an  audience. 
Vergennes  received  them  in  secret,  renewed  his  promise  of 
commercial  facilities,  and  presented  them  to  the  ambassador 
of  Spain.  From  this  time  until  the  revocation  of  their  com 
missions,  the  Deputies  labored  to  obtain  aid  and  recognition 
for  their  country.  Their  success  has  won  them  fame. 
Their  most  conspicuous  failure  has  been  mercifully  obscured 
by  time  ;  namely,  their  inability  to  preserve  harmony  among 
themselves.  The  three  colleagues  had  not  been  long  in 
France  when  they  and  two  other  agents  of  Congress  then  in 
Paris  became  involved  in  a  lively  quarrel,  which  spread  to 
their  constituents  in  Congress,  delayed  and  complicated  the 
public  business,  and  introduced  personal  rancor  into  ques 
tions  of  international  policy  which  needed  for  their  decision 
as  clear  and  unbiased  judgment  as  any  problems  which  have 
ever  confronted  the  American  Congress.  Fortunately,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  enter  into  the  petty  details  of  these  disagree 
ments  ;  but  whoever  desires  a  complete  picture  of  the  life  of 
our  representatives  in  Paris,  should  remember  that  they 
were  zealous  in  their  enmities  as  well  as  in  devotion  to  their 
public  duties.  Franklin  was  the  only  one  who  had  self- 
control  ;  and  this  very  quality  was  an  added  source  of  ex 
asperation  to  his  opponents. 

1  Lescure,  Correspondance  Secrete,  I,  p.  2. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  47 

The  Deputies  not  only  addressed  themselves  to  the  Min 
istry,  but  tried  to  enlist  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
American  cause.  A  large  part  of  their  success  with  the 
people,  however,  was  unpremeditated.  The  simplicity  of 
their  costumes  and  manners  won  the  approval  of  a  society 
enthusiastic  for  democratic  plainness  and  equality.  They 
were  compared  to  citizens  of  the  ancient  republics  of  Greece 
and  Rome.  The  most  eminent  men  of  the  kingdom  sought 
their  acquaintance.  Franklin,  especially,  made  himself  the 
idol  of  the  hour.  Gifted  with  a  natural  comprehension  of 
the  French  character,  he  won  his  way  with  an  adroitness 
which  may  have  been  unstudied,  but  which  has  been  attrib 
uted  to  art.  "He  showed  himself  little,"  said  a  French 
historian,  "  as  all  men  do  who  wish  to  exert  a  mysterious 
influence  ;  but  he  made  people  speak  of  him  a  great  deal.  . 
.  .  .  His  simple  air  concealed  extreme  shrewdness  ;  he  un 
derstood  that  in  France  it  is  necessary  to  get  one's  self  talked 
about,  and  talked  about  continually,  if  one  wishes  to  remain 
master  of  public  opinion,  and  he  did  not  fail  to  do  it."  l 

As  soon  as  possible  after  their  arrival  in  Paris,  the  Com 
missioners  submitted  the  proposed  treaty  to  Vergennes,  and 
asked  France  to  sell  eight  ships  of  the  line  and  a  supply  of 
munitions  to  the  United  States  and  to  provide  a  convoy  at 
the  expense  of  Congress.2 

In  his  surprise  at  the  moderate  terms  of  the  treaty,  Ver 
gennes  wrote  to  d'Ossun,  the  ambassador  in  Spain,  with 
some  exaggeration,  that  the  Americans  really  asked  for 
nothing  which  they  did  not  already  enjoy.  "If  it  is 
modesty,"  he  said,  "  if  it  is  fear  of  being  a  burden  to  powers 
on  whose  interest  they  think  they  can  rely,  the  sentiments 
are  very  praiseworthy. ' '  But  he  suspected  that  they  secretly 
washed  to  provoke  England,  by  the  loss  of  her  commerce, 
into  declaring  war  ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  avoid  aii3r  en- 

1  Capefigue,  Louis  XVI,  II,  pp.  44,  15. 

2  American    Commissioners    to  Vergennes,    Dec.  23,   1776,    Stevens 
Facsimiles,  606.     Memoire,  Jan.  5,    1777.     Ibid.,  614.     Franklin  and 
Deane  to  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,    Jan.   17,  March  12. 
Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Vergennes,  Jan.  5.     Diplomatic  Corres 
pondence,  II,  pp.  248,  283,  245. 


48  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

gagement  which  would  outlast  the  conflict.  The  application 
for  ships  of  the  line  confirmed  his  suspicion.  This  favor 
was  refused,  as  courteously  as  possible,  and  the  request  for 
convoy  met  the  same  fate.  The  question  how  to  avoid 
either  accepting  or  rejecting  the  proffered  treaty,  was  more 
serious.  At  first,  Vergennes  thought  of  a  declaration  of 
commercial  reciprocity,  but  he  feared  that  it  would  be  con 
strued  as  a  refusal,  and  would  lead  to  a  reconciliation  be 
tween  the  contending  parties.  The  reply  which  was  finally 
given  was,  that  at  present  France  had  not  enough  interest 
in  an  alliance  with  America  to  justify  her  in  risking  a  war  ; 
and  that,  while  future  events  might  make  an  alliance 
desirable,  it  was  best  in  the  mean  time  not  to  ' '  anticipate 
time  and  events."  In  a  letter  to  d'Ossun,  Vergennes  went 
so  far  as  to  say  that  he  did  not  wish  an  alliance  with 
America.  He  put  no  faith  in  the  honor  of  republics,  and 
he  did  not  see  what  security  France  could  have  for  the 
fidelity  of  the  Americans.  But  if  England  should  declare 
war  against  France  or  Spain  such  an  alliance  might  become 
valuable,  and  with  this  contingency  in  view  he  left  an  open 
ing  for  future  negotiations.1 

The  Spanish  Ministry  were  still  more  emphatic  in  their 
objections  to  an  American  alliance,  unless  in  case  of  an  at 
tack  by  England.2  They  granted  that,  if  the  insurgents 
were  showing  themselves  capable  of  respectable  resistance, 
such  a  connection  might  be  necessary  to  prevent  reconcilia 
tion  with  England.  But,  said  Grimaldi,  they  continually 
retreat  ;  the  British  generals  are  masters  of  entire  provinces  ; 
it  is  probable  that  the  Americans  must  soon  submit.  Besides, 
their  example  is  to  be  dreaded.  The  King  "  ought  to  hesi 
tate  greatly  to  make  a  formal  treaty  with  provinces  which 
cannot  yet  be  considered  in  any  other  light  than  that  of 
rebels.  .  .  .  The  rights  of  all  sovereigns  in  their  respective 
territories  ought  to  be  extremely  sacred,  and  the  example  of 
a  rebellion  is  too  dangerous  for  his  Majesty  to  wish  to  sup 
port  it  openly." 

'Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Jan.  4,  12,  1777.  Doniol,  II.  pp.  113,  122. 
Minutes  for  the  Answer  of  the  French  King.  Approved.  Jan.  9, 
Stevens  Facsimiles,  622,  See  also  621. 

2  Grimaldi  to  d'Aranda,  Feb.  4,  Doniol,  II,  p.  189. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  49 

While  repelling  the  offer  of  a  treaty,  the  French  Court 
granted  the  Americans  a  loan  of  two  million  livres.1  This 
gave  Congress  a  little  respite  from  the  anxiety  which  they 
were  beginning  to  feel  about  the  public  credit.  The  evil 
results  of  indiscriminate  issues  of  paper  money  were  already 
showing  themselves  in  America^  At  the  close  of  1776, 
specie  was  worth  from  two  to  two  and  a  half  times  as  much 
as  paper  ;  but  a  far  greater  depreciation  was  necessary  to 
teach  our  rulers  financial  wisdom,  and  many  French  mil 
lions  were  destined  to  be  sunk  in  this  ever-widening  gulf. 

Franklin  and  his  colleagues  did  not  relax  their  efforts  be 
cause  of  the  first  rebuffs.  Early  in  February,  1777,  on 
hearing  alarming  accounts  of  England's  preparations  for  the 
next  campaign,  they  again  tried  to  persuade  Vergennes  that 
the  Bourbon  powers  would  find  it  advantageous  to  declare 
war.  At  the  same  time,  the  Commissioners  placed  on  record 
in  a  private  written  agreement  their  intention,  under  certain 
circumstances,  to  exceed  their  instructions,  and  hazard  the 
censure  or  the  utmost  penalty  of  Congress.  That  is,  if 
France  or  Spain  should  conclude  a  commercial  treaty  with 
the  United  States,  and  be  drawn  into  a  war  with  Great 
Britain  in  consequence,  the  Commissioners  resolved  to 
stipulate  that  the  United  States  would  not  conclude  a 
separate  peace,  provided  the  other  power  concerned  would 
give  the  same  pledge.2 

Until  now,  the  Commissioners  had  been  acting  under  their 
first  instructions,  without  official  news  from  America.  On 
the  fourteenth  of  March,  they  received  letters  containing 
further  directions,  together  with  an  account  of  the  retreat 
through  the  Jerseys.  Discouraged  by  repeated  misfortunes, 
Congress  had  voted  to  offer  France  a  treaty  of  alliance. 
That  this  decision  did  hot  meet  with  unanimous  approval  is 
shown  by  a  letter  of  John  Adams,  written  a  few  months 

'Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Gerard,  Jan.  14,  1777.  To  Committee 
of  Secret  Correspondence,  Jan.  17.  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II, 
pp.  247,  250. 

'Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  i,  1777.  Personal 
pledge  of  Commissioners,  Feb.  2.  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II, 
pp.  257,  260. 


50  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

later.1  "  I  must  confess,"  said  he,  "  that  I  am  at  a  loss  to 
determine  whether  it  is  good  policy  in  us  to  wish  for  a  war 
between  France  and  Britain,  unless  we  could  be  sure  that  no 
other  powers  would  engage  in  it.  But  if  France  engages, 
Spain  will,  and  then  all  Europe  will  arrange  themselves  on 
one  side  and  the  other,  and  what  consequences  to  us  might 
be  involved  in  it,  I  do  not  know.  ...  I  have  very  often 
been  ashamed  to  hear  so  many  Whigs  groaning  and  sighing 
with  despondency,  and  whining  out  their  fears  that  we  must 
be  subdued,  unless  France  should  step  in.  Are  we  to  be 

beholden  to  France   for  our   liberties?"     The  irritation  of 

§ 

self-reliant  patriots  like  Adams  could  not  bring  back  the  day 
of  moderate  measures.  In  order  to  induce  France,  if  she 
intended  war  against  England,  to  open  hostilities  .sooner,  the 
United  States  offered  to  join  her  in  an  attack  on  the  British 
territories  and  a  division  of  the  conquests,  and  to  enter  into 
a  stipulation  that  neither  party  should  conclude  a  separate 
,  peace.  As  an  inducement  to  Spain  Congress  offered  not 
only  to  declare  war  against  Portugal,  if  a  report  that  she  had 
insulted  American  commerce  should  prove  true,  but  to  "  con 
tinue  the  said  war  for  the  total  conquest  of  that  kingdom  to 
be  added  to  the  dominion  of  Spain."  To  such  a  subversion 
of  their  principles,  discouragement  over  military  reverses  led 
the  representatives  of  a  people  who  were  righting  for  their 
own  independence.  They  were  saved  from  the  necessity  of 
fulfilling  this  promise  by  Spain's  rejection  of  the  overtures 
as  premature.'2 

Besides  requesting  a  treaty  of  alliance,  Congress  asked  for 
a  secret  loan  of  two  millions  sterling,  to  be  secured  by  lands 
on  the  Mississippi  or  the  Ohio.  The  Commissioners  made 
special  exertions  to  obtain  this  favor,  but  they  were  told  that 
France  could  not  spare  the  money.  They  received  permis 
sion  to  borrow  of  private  capitalists,  on  condition  that  they 

'To  James  Warren,  Apr.  27,  1777.     Life  and  Works,  IX,  p.  462. 

'Deane  to  Vergennes,  March  15,  1777.  Deane  on  behalf  of  himself 
and  B.  Franklin,  March  18.  Stevens  Facsimiles,  655,  659.  Secret 
Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  36  and  38  ff.  Committee  of  Secret  Cor 
respondence  to  Commissioners,  Dec.  30,  1776.  Diplomatic  Corres 
pondence,  II,  p.  240.  D'Ossun  to  Vergennes,  March  24.  Bancroft 
MSS.,  Archives  Franc,  aises,  Espagne,  1777,  p.  429. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  51 

should  not  offer  more  than  the  government  rate  of  interest. 
In  the  existing  state  of  American  credit,  this  was  equivalent 
to  a  prohibition.  But  the  second  quarterly  installment  of 
the  two  million  livres  promised  in  January  was  furnished 
promptly ,  and  the  Commissioners  were  told  that  payments 
would  be  continued  even  after  the  full  amount  had  been  con 
tributed.  Besides  this,  the  Farmers  General  entered  into  a 
contract,  engaging  to  place  two  million  livres  at  their  dis 
posal,  and  to  take  American  tobacco  in  return.!-. 

At  this  time,  the  Ministry  were  keeping  a  watchful  eye  on 
the  Deputies,  because  of  certain  interviews  with  which  they 
were  favored  by  agents  of  Great  Britain.  Although  the 
Americans  promptly  reported  these  conversations  to  Ver- 
gennes,  he  feared  that  they  might  be  tempted  to  listen  to 
secret  proposals  from  the  British  government.  "  We  cannot 
conceal  from  ourselves,"  he  owned,  "  that  what  we  have 
done  so  far  for  the  United  Colonies  is  not  enough  to  engage 
their  gratitude."  Far  from  meditating  concessions  to  Eng 
land,  the  Commissioners  were  in  good  spirits  over  the  pros 
pect  of  a  French  war.  "  It  is  the  universal  opinion,  "  they 
wrote  to  the  Committee  at  home,  "  that  the  peace  cannot 
continue  another  year."  Vergennes  shared  this  conviction. 
He  expected  the  outbreak  of  war  within  a  few  months,  and 
already  thought  of  warning  the  fishermen  at  sea.3 

The  forbearance  of  England  was  due  to  policy,  and  not  to 
any  illusion.  The  British  not  only  learned  through  spies 
the  details  of  ttie  intercourse  between  France  and  America, 

1  Stevens  Facsimiles,  660,  661.    Deane  to  Beaumarchais,  Macrh  24,  27, 
1777.     Beaumarchais  to  Maurepas,  March  30.     To  Vergennes,  March 
30  and  Apr.  i.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1493,  1498,  1499,  1500.     Franklin, 
Deane,  and  Lee  to  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  Apr.  9.    Dip 
lomatic   Correspondence,    II,    p.  285.     Contract,  March  24.     Stevens 
Facsimiles,  251. 

2  M.    Gerard,    Report   of   information    received    from    Mr.    Deane. 
Stevens  Facsimiles,  675.     Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Apr.  7,  1777.   (Never 
sent.)     Doniol,  II,  p.  341. 

3  Commissioners  to  Committee  of   Secret  Correspondence,  Apr.  9, 
1777.     Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  289.     Inquiry  about  the  pre 
cautions  to  be  taken  against  England.     Vergennes,  Apr.  Doniol,  II, 
p.  409.     Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  July  18.     Ibid.,  II,  p.  451. 


52  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

but  they  penetrated  the  secrets  of  the  Cabinet.  It  was  at 
this  time  that  Lord  Stormont  wrote  :  ' '  The_Courts _of  JErance 
and  Spain  have  had  three  projects  in  agitation  ; - 1.  To  ac 
cede  to  the  requisitions  of  the  Court  of  London  in  pre 
serving  an  exact  neutrality  ;  2.  To  continue  the  plan  formed 
under  the  Ministry  of  the  Duke  of  Choiseul,  in  seeking  to 
detach  the  Colonies  from  the  mother  country,  and  to  oppose 
against  her  a  redoubtable  rival  in  the  republic  formed  of  the 
thirteen  Colonies  .  .  .  ;  3.  To  deceive  equally  on  both 
sides,  to  promise  his  Britannic  Majesty  not  to  afford  an 
asylum  to  his  rebel  subjects,  and  yet  to  do  it  under  the  pre 
tence  of  humanity."1  Lord  Stormont' s  information  was 
probably  correct.  The  French  and  Spanish  correspondence 
of  the  time  abounds  in  discussions  of  the  policy  of  active 
interference  and  that  of  temporizing  deception.  A  French 
historian 2  informs  us  that  neutrality  also  was  seriously  con 
sidered,  and  that  the  price  to  be  demanded  was  the  retro 
cession  of  Canada.  This  statement,  surprising  because  at 
variance  with  repeated  official  declarations  of  intention  with 
regard  to  Canada,  is  confirmed  by  a  memoire*  attributed  to 
Vergennes,  written  during  the  war.  After  setting  forth  the 
advantages  that  France  would  gain  by  the  restitution  of 
Canada  and  Louisiana,  the  writer  suggests  that  these  trans 
fers  be  discussed  in  a  general  Congress  of  European  nations 
at  the  close  of  the  war,  in  case  the  American  Colonies  ob 
tain  their  independence.  The  main  reason  given  for  this 
advice  is  the  danger, — which  Vergennes  made  light  of  when 
advocating  a  more  vigorous  policy, — that  the  Americans 
may  develop  a  spirit  of  conquest. 

With  these  three  plans  in  view,  the  Ministry  are  said  to 
have  made  their  choice  from  necessity  rather  than  judgment. 
A  contemporary  author4  describes  them  as  halting  between 
the  peace  policy  of  the  King  and  the  warlike  measures  urged 
upon  them  by  public  opinion,  until  they  were  forced  to  take 
a  middle  course,  deceiving  England  and  the  Colonies  alter- 

1  Capefigue,  II,  p.  47,  note. 

2  Capefigue,  II,  p.  46. 

3  Memoire  Historique  et  Politique  sur  la  Louisiane. 

4  Se"gur,  Memoires,  I,  p.  109. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  53 

nately,  and  failing  to  reap  the  advantages  of  either  peace  or 
war.  This  statement,  while  true  to  appearances,  probably 
exaggerates  the  indecision  of  the  Ministry,  especially  of 
Vergennes.  He  adopted  the  policy  of  double-dealing  so 
early  and  maintained  it  so  steadily  that  we  may  say  with 
some  confidence,  he  was  not  forced  into  this  line  of  action, 
but  chose  it.  He  predicted  the  date  of  the  rupture  so  ac 
curately,  a  year  ahead,  that  we  can  hardly  suppose  his  final 
decision  to  have  been  due  solely  to  a  military  chance.  At 
least,  we  must  believe  the  chance  was  welcomed.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  would  be  misleading  to  regard  Vergennes 
as  a  man  of  unshaken  resolution.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
he  sometimes  vacillated.  All  that  can  be  claimed  for  him  is 
a  fairly  steady  adherence  to  a  policy  of  compromise.  It  was 
natural  that  men  like  Lafayette,  impatient  for  results  and 
unburdened  by  responsibility,  should  complain  of  the 
"  labyrinth  of  precautions,  of  weaknesses,  and  of  dis 
avowals,"  in  which  the  foreign  department  involved  itself. 
But  it  would  have  taken  a  man  of  iron  to  remain  unmoved 
in  the  midst  of  the  influences  which  surrounded  Vergennes  : 
the  King,  the  people,  the  intriguing  friends  of  Choiseul,  the 
calculating  and  obstinate  Spaniard. 

While  Franklin  and  Deane  labored  with  the  French  Min 
istry,  Lee  had  taken  a  journey  to  Spain,  in  hope  of  procur 
ing  an  alliance.  He  had  been  warned  off  from  the  capital, 
but  had  received  promises  of  material  aid,  which  was  after 
ward  furnished  in  moderation.  In  April,  1777,  Spain,  under 
the  lead  of  her  new  minister,  Florida  Blanca,  brought  for 
ward  a  new  project  :  that  Spain  and  France,  adding  to  the 
weight  of  their  influence  by  strengthening  their  colonial  de 
fenses,  should  try  to  influence  the  deliberations  between  the 
American  Provinces  and  England,  and  also  the  relations  of 
the  Provinces  among  themselves.1  France  was  not  im 
pressed  with  the  wisdom  of  her  ally.  "  In  order  to  have  the 
right  to  meddle  in  the  internal  deliberations  of  the  Colonies," 
Vergennes  wrote,  "and  in  the  negotiations  which  they 

1  Bancroft's  note  on  a  letter  of  Florida  Blanca  to  d'Aranda,  Apr.  7, 
1777.  Bancroft  MSS.,  Archives  Francises,  Espagne,  1777,  p.  443. 
See  Doniol,  II,  p.  264. 


54  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

might  have  with  the  metropolis,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
bind  ourselves  so  closely  to  them  that  our  respective  interests 
would  be  the  same.  This  would  be,  assuredly,  to  place  our 
selves  in  a  state  of  open  though  undeclared  war  with  Eng 
land."  Florida  Blanca  had  suggested  that  France  and 
Spain,  while  acting  as  mediators,  might  regain  some  of  their 
lost  territory  by  negotiation  with  England.  In  reply,  Ver- 
gennes  gave  the  reason  for  the  moderate  policy  which  France 
had  already  decided  to  adopt.  "  If  the  loss  of  Canada  was 
felt  by  her,"  he  said,  "  she  ought  to  regret  it  the  less  since 
her  forced  abandonment  of  it  has  become  the  signal  for  the 
revolt  of  the  English  possessions  on  the  continent.  If  we 
should  think  of  reinstating  ourselves  there,  we  should  arouse 
again  the  old  uneasiness  and  jealousies  which  ensured  the 
fidelity  and  submission  of  these  same  Provinces  to  England." 
These  Provinces,  he  said,  "  are  not  striving  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  the  mother  country  in  order  to  run  the  risk  of  bow 
ing  beneath  that  of  any  other  power." 

During  July  and  August,  ,.777,  the  relations  between 
France  and  England  became  so  strained  that  it  appeared 
doubtful  whether  the  Bourbon  powers  would  retain  the 
choice  between  peace  and  war.  The  principal  cause  of  irri 
tation  was  the  treatment  accorded  to  American  privateers  in 
French  ports.  In  April,  1776,  Congress  had  authorized  the 
capture  of  English  vessels/'  and  by  the  summer  of  1777, 
privateering  enterprise  was  at  its  height.  France  had  en 
couraged  it  by  ignoring  treaty  stipulations  and  allowing  the 
sale  of  prizes  in  her  ports.8  The  Americans  responded  by  try 
ing  with  true  Yankee  ingenuity  to  force  France  into  war. 
Their  captains  were  ordered  to  fit  out  privateers  in  French 
ports,  man  them  with  French  sailors,  and  try  to  provoke 
the  English  to  unfair  reprisals,  in  order  that  France  might 
be  involved  in  the  claims  to  compensation.4  Encouraged  by 

1  Vergennes  to  d'Aranda,  Apr.  26,  1777.     Doniol,  II,  p.  273. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  I,  p.  304. 

3  Deane  to  R.  Morris,  Aug.  23,   1777.     Diplomatic  Correspondence, 
H>  P-  379-    Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  20,  March  7.    Vergennes 
to  Noailles,  March  21.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  919,  1445,  1488. 

*Carmichael  to  Bingham,  June  25-July  6,  1777.  Diplomatic  Cor 
respondence,  II,  pp.  347,  348. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  55 

the  leniency  of  the  French  government  privateers  grew 
more  and  more  daring.  Ships  were  armed  in  the  ports  of 
France,  and  returned  thither  with  their  prizes  ;  an  English 
mail  packet  was  carried  into  Dunkirk  ;  a  small  fleet  cruised 
off  the  coast  of  England  and  took  seventeen  or  eighteen 
captured  vessels  to  France.  "  For  the  first  time,"  we  are 
told,  "  since  Britain  was  a  maritime  power,  the  river  Thames 
and  other  of  its  ports  were  crowded  with  French  and  other 
ships,  taking  in  freight,  in  order  to  avoid  the  risk  of  having 
British  property  captured."  The  English  government  pro 
tested  angrily  against  the  violations  of  international  law. 
Vergennes  was  obliged  to  act.  He  rebuked  the  Commis 
sioners  severely,  and  apologized  for  rebuking  them  ;  he  had 
a  man  imprisoned  now  and  then  ;  he  took  securities  for 
good  behavior,  that  failed  to  secure  it.  He  seriously  em 
barrassed  the  privateers,  but  did  not  produce  conviction  in 
the  American  mind. 

The  English  Ministry  were  still  less  convinced.  The  per 
sistence  with  which  they  made  their  resentment  known  sug 
gested  the  approach  of  an  ultimatum.  This  danger,  and  the 
constantly  recurring  fear  of  an  accommodation  between  Eng 
land  and  America,2  may  have  been  among  the  reasons  which 
led  Vergennes,  in  July,  to  advise  aggressive  measures.3  He 
declared  that  the  insufficiency  of  the  aid  which  France  had 
given  to  the  insurgents  would  lend  countenance  to  the  belief 
that  she  merely  wished  to  see  England  and  America  wear 
each  other  out.  As  the  military  preparations  of  France 
were  nearly  complete,  it  would  be  well  to  anticipate  the  de 
signs  of  England  by  setting  an  early  date  for  the  commence 
ment  of  hostilities.  "  If  the  two  Crowns  allow  January  or 
February  of  1778  to  pass,"  he  said,  mentioning  in  advance 
the  very  months  in  which  the  treaty  with  the  Americans  was 
negotiated,  "  they  will  have  only  to  regret  the  opportunity 
which  they  have  neglected."  The  change  from  their  late 
professions  of  friendship  toward  England  might  seem  unduly 

1  Deane's  Address  to  Congress,  Dec.,  1778.     Sparks  MSS.  LIT,  vol.  I, 
p.  124. 

2  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  I,  p.  311. 

8  Mhnoire,  July  23,  1777,  Doniol,  II,  p.  460. 


56  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

abrupt : — this  he  foresaw.  But  they  would  have  a  reason 
able  pretext  for  their  action  in  England's  recent  encroach 
ments  on  their  commerce,  while  exercising  her  so-called 
right  to  search  the  ships  of  neutrals  for  American  goods.1 
If  they  decided  on  war,  they  must  first  of  all  make  sure  of 
the  Americans  by  a  treaty  ;  for  "it  would  be  inconsistent," 
Vergennes  said,  "to  arm  ourselves  for  them  and  to  allow 
them  to  lay  down  their  arms."  In  discussing  the  plan  of 
sending  political  agents  to  the  Americans,  he  suggested  the 
expediency  of  persuading  them  that  they  would  need  the 
guaranty  of  France  and  Spain.  This  idea  was  seized  with 
avidity  in  Spain.  The  proposal  of  a  guaranty  would  test  the 
sincerity  of  England  ;  and  if  she  should  unexpectedly  give 
her  consent,  the  guarantors  might  be  able  to  influence  the 
terms  of  the  treaty. 

On  ever}7  other  point  Spain  proved  intractable.  She  ob 
jected  to  the  date  suggested  by  Vergennes,  because  a 
treasure-ship  and  a  troop-ship  which  she  was  expecting  from 
America  could. not  arrive  so  soon.  She  doubted  the  wisdom 
of  aggression,  at  a  time  when  it  seemed  probable  that  the 
British  Ministry  would  welcome  a  foreign  war  as  a  happy 
release  from  their  embarrassment.  She  did  not  wish  an 
American  alliance,  and  she  did  wish  Gibraltar.  In  order  to 
make  sure  of  enough  causes  of  complaint  to  justify  a  future 
attack  on  England,  she  devised  a  plan  as  cold-blooded  as  it 
was  likely  to  be  effectual.  "  We  will  treat  the  English  with 
justice  and  dignity  .  .  .  while  taking  care  not  to  give  [the 
Ministry]  just  motives  for  complaint,  and  complaining  our 
selves  with  firmness  but  without  bitterness,  of  those  which 
they  and  their  nation  give  us,  so  that  the  complaints,  multi 
plying,  may  assume  more  consistence."  2 

The  French  Ministry  consented  to  postpone  the  war  in 
deference  to  the  wishes  of  Spain,  and  Vergennes  took  up 
the  problem  of  inducing  the  Americans  to  accept  a  guaranty. 
He  hoped  to  effect  this  through  the  messengers  whom  the 
two  Courts  were  sending  to  America.  He  despaired  of 

1  Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  July  18,  1777.     Doniol,  II,  p.  451. 
2 Memoir -e  of  the   Court  of  Spain,    Aug.    8,    1777.     Sparks  MSS., 
LXXX,  vol.  I,  p.  281. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  57 

gaining  his  point  with  the  Deputies  at  Paris.  They  were 
men  who  would  not  lend  themselves  to  interested  schemes. 
Vergennes  complained  of  their  suspicion,  their  unwilling 
ness  to  assume  any  ties  unless  France  engaged  to  take  part 
in  the  war,  and  the  calculated  indiscretion  by  which  they 
were  apparently  trying  to  commit  France  in  the  sight  of 
England.  Still,  he  would  have  some  proposals  of  a  guaranty 
thrown  to  them.  "If  they  do  not  bite  at  this  hook," 
he  says,  he  has  an  alternative  plan  :  namely,  to  per 
suade  them  that  they  cannot  trust  to  an  acknowledgment  of 
their  independence  by  England  ;  and  that  their  best  security 
would  lie  in  commercial  treaties,  to  be  concluded  with  the 
nations  most  interested,  at  the  same  time  with  the  treaty  of 
peace.1  For  the  moment,  France  halts  in  the  position 
assumed  at  first  by  the  Americans  : — commercial  union,  but 
no  entangling  alliance. 

France  had  no  sooner  declared  her  readiness  to  wait  the 
pleasure  of  Spain,  than  a  sudden  threat  from  the  British 
government  reminded  them  both  that  they  did  not  control 
the  situation.  Through  a  private  agent,  whose  words  could 
be  disavowed,  the  English  Ministry  demanded  that  the  King 
should  surrender  without  examination  all  prizes  brought 
into  his  ports  by  the  Americans,  publish  the  orders  given  to 
his  admirals  on  the  subject,  and  dismiss  all  the  privateers 
who  were  then  in  the  ports  of  France.  Vergennes  prepared 
an  answer  to  these  demands — a  refusal,  tempered  by  yield 
ing  some  minor  points.  His  report  was  approved  by  the 
King,  on  August  twenty-third.2  "If  these  concessions  are 
not  enough  for  England,  there  can  be  no  further  choice." 

Vergennes  expected  war.  He  advised  that  all  vessels  be 
detained  in  port  for  fifteen  days,  and  despatch  boats  sent 
to  the  fisheries,  the  French  islands,  and  the  Levant.  He 
warned  the  ambassador  at  London  :  "  The  flame  of  war  is  to 
all  appearance  ready  to  burst  forth,  and  will  probably  have 
broken  out  before  my  letter  reaches  you.  ...  I  fear  much 
that  I  shall  have  the  pleasure  of  seeing  you  sooner  than  I 

'Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Aug.  22,  1777.     Doniol,  II,  p.  500. 
2  Stevens  Facsimiles,  706. 


58  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

wished."1  Those  Americans  who  wanted  to  drag  France 
into  war  seemed  sure  of  success.  But  they  did  not  attain  it. 
Lord  Stormont,  who  conversed  with  Maurepas  and  Ver- 
genneson  the  English  demands,  carefully  refrained  from  sup 
porting  these  by  any  official  sanction.'  The  British  demon 
stration  ended  in  an  anti-climax,  and  war  was  averted.  After 
this,  the  treatment  of  privateers  was  discussed  in  a  desultory 
manner,  while  the  increase  of  armaments  for  the  French  and 
Spanish  colonies  became  the  crying  grievance  of  England. 
The  French  Court  continued  to  profess  friendship  for  Great 
Britain,  and  to  give  "  very  essential  aids"  to  the  United 
States.  "  How  long  these  twro  parts  will  continue  to  be 
acted  at  the  same  time,  the  Deputies  said,  in  one  of  their 
reports,  "and  which  will  finally  predominate,  may  be  a 
question.  As  it  is  the  true  interest  of  France  to  prevent  our 
being  annexed  to  Britain  ...  we  are  inclined  to  believe 
the  sincerity  is  toward  us." 

In  September,  the  Commissioners  found  themselves  em 
barrassed  for  want  of  funds.  They  had  ordered  a  large 
quantity  of  supplies  in  anticipation  of  remittances  from 
America  and  of  money  which  Spain  had  promised  them  ; 
but  the  accidents  of  war  had  cut  off  the  remittances,  and 
Spain,  in  irritation  at  the  conduct  of  some  American  pri 
vateers,  had  suddenly  withheld  her  assistance.  Obeying 
timely  orders  of  Congress,  the  Deputies  appealed  to  France 
and  Spain  for  a  loan  of  eight  million  livres.  News  of  the 
abandonment  of  Ticonderoga  had  recently  arrived,  and  the 
Commissioners  were  so  discouraged  that  Vergennes  became 
alarmed.  In  order  to  secure  their  confidence,  he  advised 
giving  them  some  compensation  for  the  rigorous  treatment 
to  which  their  privateers  had  been  subjected  ;  and,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  "beneath  the  dignity  of  two  great 
powers  to  lend,"  he  advocated  a  subsidy.  France  asked 
Spain  to  join  her  in  a  contribution  of  six  million  livres,  on 
condition  that  the  Deputies  solemnly  bind  themselves  not  to 
begin  any  secret  negotiation  with  England.  But  the  Spanish 

'Vergennes  to  Noailles,  Aug.  23,  1777.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1656. 

2  Vergennes  to  Noailles,  Aug.  30,  1777.     Ibid.,  1666. 

3  Sept.  8,  1777.     Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  388. 


The  Demand  for  Recognition.  59 

Ministry,  preferring  to  keep  the  Americans  in  expectancy, 
refused  to  promise  any  definite  amount.  Though  all  at 
tempts  to  change  this  decision  were  unsuccessful,  France 
resolved  to  furnish  three  million  livres  during  the  next 
year.1 

France  and  Spain  now  carried  out  their  intention  of 
sending  emissaries  to  America.  The  French  agent,  M. 
Holker,  was  directed  to  approach  the  leaders  of  Congress, 
inform  them  of  the  favors  and  aids  which  France  had  ex 
tended  to  the  Americans,  and  impress  upon  them  her 
interest  in  their  independence.  It  was  hoped  that  he 
could  persuade  them  that  their  liberties  would  be  insecure 
without  a  guaranty  from  France  and  Spain,  and  the  ex 
clusion  of  England  from  all  special  commercial  privileges. 
He  was  instructed  to  try  cautiously  to  find  out  their  senti 
ments  on  the  subject  of  commercial  treaties,  and  to  suggest 
that  interest  would  lead  them  to  favor  the  powers  from 
which  they  expected  support.  He  was  also  to  enquire  into 
the  state  of  American  resources  and  the  trend  of  opinion 
among  the  people  and  in  the  Provincial  Congresses,  and  to 
find  out  whether  there  were  any  party  divisions  in  Con 
gress.2 

Before  these  instructions  were  formulated,  a  decisive 
event  had  occurred  in  America,  to  convince  Vergennes  that 
favors,  subsidies,  and  persuasions  were  not  sufficient  to 
bind  the  United  States  to  France.  During  November, 
rumor  said  that  the  fortune  of  war  was  turning  against  the 
English  ;  and  on  December  fourth,  the  Commissioners  an 
nounced  the  fact  of  Burgoyne's  capitulation.3 

^  Memoir e  submitted  to  Vergennes  and  d'Aranda,  Sept.  26,  1777. 
Vergennes  to  d'Ossun,  Sept.  26,  Nov.  7.  Florida  Blanca,  Oct.  17. 
Stevens  Facsimiles,  1698,  267,  1704,  1711,  1725. 

2Nov.  25,  1777.     Ibid.,  1748. 

3  Ibid.,  716. 


V. 

THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  TREATY. 


The  news  of  Burgoy lie's  defeat  impelled  the  vacillating 
French  Ministry  to  decisive  action.  The  King  authorized 
more  definite  overtures  to  the  American  Commissioners. 
Gerard  conveyed  to  them  the  congratulations  of  Maurepas 
and  Vergennes,  with  an  intimation  that  the  Court  wished  a  re 
newal  of  their  proposals  for  an  alliance.1  At  the  same  time, 
M.  Holker,  who  had  not  yet  sailed  for  America,  was  made  the 
bearer  of  an  open  proffer  of  friendship.2  The  change  in  the 
situation  was  explained  to  him,  for  the  benefit  of  the  Ameri 
cans,  as  inoffensively  as  possible.  It  was  said  that  the  un 
willingness  of  European  powers  to  recognize  them  had  been 
due  chiefly  to  the  uncertainty  of  their  fortunes.  A  slight 
cause  would  have  been  enough  to  defeat  them,  and  any  na 
tion  which  had  declared  for  them  would  have  been  compro 
mised  to  no  purpose.  Yet  the  value  of  the  recent  success, 
it  was  said,  lay  not  so  much  in  its  military  as  in  its  political 
consequences  :  it  would  strengthen  the  credit  of  the  Ameri 
can  leaders  and  ensure  popular  support  for  the  cause  of  in 
dependence.  The  time  had  come  for  closer  contact  between 
the  United  States  and  the  European  powers.  "  If  the  Con 
gress  thinks  proper  to  address  instructions  to  its  Commis 
sioners  in  France,"  M.  Holker  was  directed  to  say,  "there 
is  every  reason  to  be  persuaded  that  they  will  speedily  re 
ceive  substantial  proofs  of  the  favorable  disposition  of  the 
Courts  of  the  House  of  Bourbon." 

'Statement  in  the  hand  of  Comte  de  Vergennes,  Dec.  6,  1777. 
Stevens  Facsimiles,  1762.  Arthur  Lee's  Journal,  Dec.  6.  Life,  I,  p. 
357- 

2  M.  Gerard.  Paper  dictated  to  M.  le  Ray  de  Chaumont  for  M. 
Holker.  Overtures  of  a  more  open  policy  toward  America.  Stevens 
Facsimiles,  760. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  61 

This  explanation  of  the  change  in  the  policy  of  France 
was  incomplete,  and  hence  misleading.  Nothing  was  said 
of  the  motive  most  conspicuous  in  the  official  correspondence 
of  those  critical  days, — the  fear  that  defeat  would  lead  Eng 
land  to  offer  terms  which  the  Americans  could  accept.  The 
apprehension  was  not  so  much  that  they  would  be  strong 
enough  to  wrest  their  independence  from  England,  as  that 
she  would  grant  it  and  profit  by  the  concession.  Holker's 
instructions  give  no  indication  of  the  anxiety  with  which 
the  French  Ministry  and  its  embassy  at  London  were  watch 
ing  for  the  effect  of  the  American  victory  on  the  tactics  and 
the  personnel  of  the  British  Cabinet.1  Beaumarchais,  who 
had  the  instincts  of  a  diplomatist,  was  on  the  alert  at  once. 
' '  What  is  the  real  meaning  of  this  crisis  ?  "  he  wrote  to  Ver- 
gennes.  "  It  is,  that  of  two  nations,  English  and  French, 
the  first  who  recognizes  American  independence  will  alone 
gather  from  it  all  the  fruits,  while  that  independence  will  be 
certainly  fatal  to  the  one  who  allows  her  rival  to  take  the 
lead."  Vergennes  adopted  his  very  words.  "Let  us  not 
be  mistaken,"  he  wrote  to  the  ambassador  in  Spain  ;  "  the 
Power  which  first  recognizes  the  independence  of  the  Amer 
icans  will  be  the  first  to  gather  all  the  fruits  of  this  war."  2 

The  Deputies  responded  promptly  to  the  friendly  hints  of 
the  Ministry,  by  formally  requesting  an  answer  to  their 
proposal  of  a  treaty.  They  repeated  the  well-worn  argu 
ment,  that  the  Americans,  uncertain  with  regard  to  the  in 
tentions  of  France  and  ignorant  of  the  secret  aids  which 
she  had  furnished,  might  be  tempted  by  the  enemy  to 
waver ;  and  that  a  treaty  concluded  at  this  time  would 
strengthen  their  resolution.3 

The  French  Cabinet,  convinced  that  the  Americans  could 
resist  England  with  some  hope  of  success,  anxious  about 
the  future  course  of  the  British  Ministry,  and  besieged  by 

'Gamier  to  (qy.)  Rayneval,  Dec.  5,  1777.  Vergennes  to  Noailles, 
Dec.  6.  Stevens  Facsimiles,  1755,  1760. 

2  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Dec.  n,  1777.     Vergennes  to  Mont- 
morin,  Dec.  n.     Ibid.,  1768,  1769. 

3  Franklin,   Deane,  and   Lee  to  Vergennes,  Dec.   8,    1777.     Diplo 
matic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  444. 


62  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

the  military  enthusiasts,  had  decided  to  conclude  a  treaty 
with  the  Americans  ;  and  the  King,  against  his  will,  had 
given  his  approval.  Vergennes  granted  the  Deputies  an 
audience  on  the  twelfth  of  December,  1777.  The  day  be 
fore  this  meeting,  he  wrote  to  supply  the  ambassador  in 
Spain  with  arguments  for  an  American  alliance.1  "  What 
have  we  to  put  in  the  way,"  said  he,  "  to  prevent  the 
Americans  lending  themselves  to  a  reconciliation  ?  We 
have  no  measures,  no  ties,  and  no  means,  in  common  with 
them."  An  accommodation  would  be  all  the  more 
dangerous  to  France,  since  war  with  England  now  seemed 
inevitable.  It  would  be  best  to  enter  on  this  war  in  alliance 
with  the  Americans  ;  for,  even  if  they  should  listen  to  pro 
posals  from  England  after  they  had  bound  themselves  to 
France,  the  consequences  would  not  be  so  serious  as  those 
which  might  be  expected  from  a  refusal  of  their  demands. 
They  might  desert  their  ally,  but  they  would  hardly  be  so 
base  as  to  attack  her. 

In  a  subsequent  letter,  Vergennes  expressed  the  opinion 
that  Spain's  interest  in  the  proposed  war  was  ten  times  as 
great  as  that  of  France,  since  the  French  islands  would 
offer  little  temptation  to  the  British,  in  comparison  with  the 
Spanish  treasures  on  the  mainland.  Looking  for  every 
argument  that  would  appeal  to  Spain,  he  suggested  that  she 
might  regain  Florida  by  the  war.  He  confessed  that  he  did 
not  know  the  sentiments  of  the  Americans  on  this  point  ; 
but  lie  thought  it  natural  to  suppose  that  they  did  not 
specially  care  to  possess  Florida  themselves.2 

Meeting  the  Deputies  at  the  appointed  time,  Vergennes 
complimented  them  on  the  prosperous  state  of  American 
affairs,  and  on  the  conduct  of  Washington  in  giving  battle 
to  General  Howe's  army  at  Germantown  ;  an  unsuccess 
ful  attempt,  the  boldness  of  which  had  impressed  him 
as  deeply  as  the  victory  at  Saratoga.  Circumstances,  he 
said,  seemed  favorable  to  an  understanding  between  the 


'Vergennes  to    Montmorin,    Dec.   n,    1777.      Stevens   Facsimiles, 
1769. 

2  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  13,  1777.     Ibid.,  1775. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  63 

two  countries  ;  and  he  promised  that  the  King  would  i 
examine  all  the  proposals  of  the  Americans  and  give  them 
as  many  marks  of  "affection  and  interest"  as  possible,  re 
serving  the  right  to  conclude  nothing  without  the  King  of 
Spain.  In  the  informal  conversation  that  followed,  Ver- 
gennes  enquired  into  the  demands  of  Congress  and  indicated 
the  terms  that  France  would  accept  : — all  this,  with  the 
understanding  that  the  interview  should  have  "no  conse- 
sequences."  The  Americans  at  first  proposed  a  mere  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce  ;  but  Vergennes,  reminding  them 
that  such  a  treaty  would  draw  France  into  war  with  England, 
insisted  that  the  agreement  between  them  should  ' '  have  all 
the  solidity  of  which  human  institutions  are  capable."  At 
the  same  time,  he  assured  them  that  they  could  not  be  secure 
without  the  guaranty  of  France  and  Spain,  as  long  as  Eng 
land  retained  any  land  on  the  continent.  The  Commis 
sioners,  in  turn,  renewed  the  offer  of  Congress  to  guarantee 
the  American  possessions  of  France  and  Spain.1 

The  reports  from  England  confirmed  the  government  in 
its  policy.  The  party  of  the  Administration  was  said  to  be 
outdoing  the  Opposition  in  proposing  concessions  to  the 
Americans,  while  at  the  same  time  it  asked  for  unlimited 
subsidies.  If  the  attempts  at  conciliation  were  genuine,  for 
what  purpose  were  the  subsidies  demanded  ?  The  question 
was  ominous  for  France.  The  situation  was  critical.  Lord 
North  might  even  feel  sure  enough  of  support  to  begin  a 
negotiation  without  waiting  until  the  measure  had  been 
discussed  in  Parliament.  Vergennes  was  impatient  at  the 
length  of  time  that  must  pass  before  he  could  hear  from 
Spain.  "  1  will  not  conceal  from  you,"  he  wrote  to  the 
ambassador,  Montmorin,  "that  the  issue  makes  me 
tremble."  Next  came  a  rumor  that  the  King  of  England 
was  making  overtures  to  Lord  Chatham  ;  and  another,  that 
Lord  Germaine  was  sending  his  secretary  to  Paris,  to  treat 
with  the  American  Commissioners.  "If  his  offers  are  pre- 

1  Journal  of  Arthur  Lee.     Life,  I,  p.  360.     Statement  in  the  hand  of 
Vergennes,  marked  by  the  King,  "  Approuve"  Dec.  6,  1777.  Stevens 
Facsimiles,  1762.     Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  13.     Ibid.,  1774. 

2  Dec.  13,  1777.     Ibid.,  1774. 


64  France  and  the  American  Revohition. 

cise,"  said  Vergennes,  "  if  those  who  receive  them  have  the 
good  faith  to  ask  our  advice  and  decision,  what  shall  we 
reply  ?  ' '  He  did  not  say  that  France  would  reply  by  con 
cluding  a  treaty  with  the  Americans  ;  but  he  hinted  that  if 
she  did,  Spain  would  have  no  right  to  complain.1 

It  was  true  that  an  agent  of  the  British  government, 
Wentworth  by  name,  was  busy  with  the  Deputies.  Deane 
reported  the  conferences  to  Vergennes.  They  did  not 
threaten  any  serious  results  ;  but  Vergennes  learned  from 
the  reports,  that  the  Ministry  had  instructed  the  brothers 
Howe  to  open  a  negotiation  in  America,  and  that  a  formal 
proposition  had  been  made  to  unite  with  America  against 
France  and  Spain.2  Mr.  Wentworth  was  not  the  only 
British  agent  who  communicated  with  the  Americans  at  this 
time.  The  Londoners  showed  enough  interest  in  Franklin 
and  his  colleagues  to  justify  some  uneasiness  on  the  part  of 
France  ;  and  it  is  not  strange  that,  when  these  attempts 
failed,  Vergennes  betrayed  an  emotion  of  relief.  "  I  regard 
it  as  a  special  piece  of  good  fortune,"  this  benefactor  of 
America  wrote,  "  and  as  the  effect  of  the  happy  star  of  the 
House  of  Bourbon,  that  the  English  Ministry  in  the  intoxi 
cation  of  its  hopes  rather  than  of  its  successes  has  so  cir 
cumscribed  itself  by  the  acts  which  it  has  caused  Parliament 
to  pass,  that  it  has  no  power  to  grant  this  independence 
which  it  foresees  that  it  will  be  obliged  to  let  slip."3  In 
order  to  make  sure  that  the  overtures  on  the  other  side  of 
the  water  should  be  equally  unsuccessful,  a  King's  frigate 
carried  to  Boston  despatches  of  the  Deputies,  reporting  the 
proposals  of  the  British  emissaries,  and  warning  Congress 
of  the  advances  to  be  made  through  the  Howes. 

While  the  interviews  between  Deane  and  Wentworth  were 
takingplace,  the  Commissioners  impressed  upon  Vergennesthe 
importance  of  their  knowing,  at  a  time  when  England  seemed 
on  the  point  of  proposing  peace,  what  the  United  States 
might  expect  from  France  and  Spain.  This  was  the  critical 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Evening  of  Dec.    13,    1777.      Stevens 
Facsimiles,  1776. 

2  Ibid.,  1778,  718,  719,  231,  1780,  1781,  1786,  etc. 

3  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  19,  1777.     Doniol,  II.  p.  662. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  65 

question  which  Vergennes  thought  would  justify  him  in  pro 
ceeding  without  the  concurrence  of  Spain.  He  informed  the 
Commissioners  through  Gerard,  on  the  seventeenth  of  De 
cember,  that  the  King  had  resolved  to  acknowledge  their  in 
dependence  and  to  make  a  treaty  with  them.1  As  His 
Majesty  aimed  to  found  a  permanent  alliance,  advantageous 
to  both  peoples,  and  not  to  exact  concessions  because  he  was 
dealing  with  a  new  nation,  the  terms  of  the  treaty  would  be 
liberal.  In  supporting  the  independence  of  the  United 
States,  the  Kifig  would  probably  be  drawn  into  war  with 
England  ;  yet  he  would  ask  no  compensation,  and  France 
would  seek  her  advantage  in  diminishing  the  power  of  Great 
Britain.  The  Commissioners,  in  their  report  to  the  Com 
mittee  of  Foreign  Affairs,2  represented  Gerard  as  saying  that 
the  King  would  not  insist  on  a  stipulation  forbidding  a 
separate  peace,  and  would  require  only  that  the  Americans 
should  not  give  up  their  independence.  This  interpretation 
of  the  King's  intentions  gave  rise  to  one  of  the  earliest  de 
bates  of  Congress  on  our  duty  to  our  ally.  At  the  time  of 
the  discussion,  Gerard  denied  that  he  had  made  the  state 
ment  ;  and  it  seems  more  probable  that  he  was  misunder 
stood  than  that  France  contemplated  any  such  half-way 
measure.  Gerard  did  not  fix  a  date  for  beginning  the 
negotiations,  but  promised  that  the  treaty  should  be  con 
cluded  as  soon  as  Spain  was  ready  to  join  the  alliance. 

While  the  Ministry  waited  for  the  decision  of  the  Spanish 
Court,  important  events  were  occurring  in  England.  When 
Parliament  adjourned,  to  meet  on  the  twentieth  of  January, 
Lord  North  announced  that  he  would  propose  a  plan  of 
reconciliation  at  the  opening  of  the  next  session.3  It 
seemed  improbable  that  the  North  Ministry  would  offer 
America  complete  independence  ;  but  Vergennes  feared  that 
they  would  gain  their  point  by  yielding  the  substance  while 
withholding  the  name.  Granting  that  reconciliation  on 
these  terms  might  be  difficult  if  the  American  government 

'Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Dec. 
18,  1777.  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  p.  452. 

2  Successor  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence. 

3  Noailles  to  Vergennes,  Dec.  23,  1777.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1793. 

5 


66  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

had  more  influence  and  stability,  he  feared  that  the  people, 
suffering  for  the  necessaries  of  life,  would  not  continue  the 
war  for  a  point  of  honor.  "The  Americans  propose  that 
we  should  conquer  the  English  islands,"  said  he,  "and 
grant  them  free  trade  thither.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
English  make  the  same  proposal,  will  it  not  be  listened  to? 
will  it  be  rejected?"  He  confessed  that  the  views  of  the 
French  government  had  been  too  restricted  ;  they  had 
feared  a  change  in  the  British  Ministry,  and  had  not 
anticipated  the  consequences  of  a  change  in  the  policy  of 
the  Ministry  now  in  power.  "  England's  aim  being  no 
longer  doubtful,"  he  said,  "it  seems  that  neither  should 
our  decision  be  so  ;  for  the  question  we  have  to  decide  is  to 
know  whether  it  is  more  expedient  for  us  to  have  war  against 
England  and  America  together,  than  with  America  for  us 
against  England."  In  writing  to  the  ambassador  at  Lon 
don,  he  spoke  with  more  hesitancy,  as  if  trying  to  draw  out 
information.  :<  What  would  be  important  to  find  out  is  with 
what  view  the  Ministry  seems  to  incline  to  peace  ;  many 
people  believe,  and  wish  to  make  us  believe,  that  it  would  be 
fatal  to  us  in  the  present  and  in  the  future.  ...  I  confess 
to  you  that  I  am  not  far  from  that  way  of  thinking."2 
Yielding  to  these  apprehensions,  Vergennes  engaged  Gerard 
in  drawing  up  a  plan  of  treaty,  and  Gerard  began  to  dis 
cuss  with  the  Deputies  the  several  articles  of  the  Congres 
sional  plan.3  It  was  not  thought  worth  while  even  to  con 
ceal  their  interviews.  The  customary  precautions  for  en 
suring  secrecy  were  relaxed,  and  Franklin  was  observed  in 
the  company  of  all  the  ministers  in  turn,  dining  and  ne 
gotiating  with  them.4 

On  the  last  day  of  the  year,  Vergennes  received  the 
answer  of  the  Spanish  Court.5  It  could  hardly  have  been 
less  complaisant  under  any  circumstances,  and  it  might 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  27,  1777.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1805. 

2  Vergennes  to  Noailles,  Dec.  27.     Ibid.,  1807. 

3  Arthur  Lee's  Journal,  Dec.  29,  1777,  and  subsequent  dates.     Life, 
I,  pp.  371  fT. 

4  Correspondance  Secrete,  I,  p.  125. 

•^Florida  Blanca  to  d'Aranda,  Dec.  23,  1777.     Doniol,  II,  p.  765. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  67 

have  been  more  so  if  the  Spanish  authorities  had  not  heard 
of  the  advances  which  the  French  Court  had  already  made 
to  the  Americans.  On  receiving  this  news,  Florida  Blanca, 
a  statesman  characterized  by  extreme  reserve,  was  betrayed 
into  an  explosion  of  anger.  Montmorin  assured  him  that 
no  formal  negotiation  had  been  opened,  took  pains  to  soothe 
his  injured  vanity,  and  flattered  himself  that  he  had  suc 
ceeded  and  that  Spain  would  soon  follow  in  the  steps  of 
France  ;  '  but  the  length  of  time  which  elapsed  before 
Spain,  on  her  own  exorbitant  terms,  entered  the  war,  bore 
witness  that  she  did  not  easily  forget  an  injury  or  yield  a 
purpose. 

In  his  reply  to  France,1'  Florida  Blanca  expressed  a  .strong 
doubt  whether  an  early  reconciliation  between  Great  Bri 
tain  and  America  was  probable.  In  conversation,  just  be 
fore  this,  he  had  given  England  four  years  to  come  to 
terms  with  her  Colonies.  He  made  allowance  for  the  fact 
that  the  Americans  had  an  interest  in  exaggerating  the 
likelihood  of  an  agreement.  "  The  American  Deputies  are 
playing  their  game.  Their  aim  has  always  been  to  com 
promise  us  with  the  English."  Repeating  an  argument 
often  used  by  Spanish  statesmen,  he  said  that  an  alliance 
between  America  and  the  Bourbons  would  give  the  British 
Ministry  the  best  possible  excuse  for  ending  the  war, — the 
plea  of  necessity,  and  of  perfidy  on  the  part  of  France  and 
Spain.  The  outcome  of  his  argument  was  that  Spain 
would  engage  to  do  nothing  except  fix  the  amount  of  her 
subsidy  to  the  Americans,  offer  them  her  mediation  in  case 
of  need,  and  watch  the  English  Ministry. 

On  learning  the  Spanish  decision,  the  advisers  of  the 
King  carefully  discussed  the  situation.  Vergennes  then 
sent  the  Court  of  Spain  an  elaborate  reply,4  and  the  King 
added  the  weight  of  his  influence  by  a  personal  letter  to  his 
uncle".  Vergennes  declared  the  Spanish  proposals  in- 

1  Montmorin    to   Vergennes,    Dec.   23,   1777.      Stevens   Facsimiles, 
1792. 

2  Florida  Blanca  to  d'Aranda,  Dec.  23,  1777.     Doniol,  II,  p.  765. 

3  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Dec.  23.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1792. 
4Jan.  7,  1778.     Ibid.,  1824. 


68  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

adequate.  Pecuniary  aid  had  served  to  keep  up  the 
hopes  of  the  insurgents  ;  but  now  that  the  desired  end 
was  within  their  reach,  money  would  not  prevent  them 
from  forming  a  coalition  with  England.  Mediation  would 
be  useless  and  dangerous,  for  England  would  regard  it  as 
an  insult.  Besides,  she  was  now  offering  the  Colonies  all 
that  France  and  Spain  could  procure  for  them  ;  for  media 
tion  based  on  absolute  independence  would  amount  to  a 
declaration  of  war  against  England.  To  offer  a  guaranty 
would  be  equally  useless  ;  for  both  England  and  the  Colo 
nies,  if  they  treated  without  the  intervention  of  France  and 
Spain,  would  reject  their  guaranty.  As  to  watching  for  a 
change  of  ministry  in  England,  Lord  North  was  now  more 
likely  to  bring  about  a  war  against  France  than  Lord 
Chatham.  A  treaty,  then,  was  absolutely  necessary. 
France  must  begin  negotiations  before  ' '  the  ominous  date 
of  the  twentieth." 

CXG«  the  independence  of  America,  Vergennes  expressed 
his  opinion  plainly.  "The  United  States  are  in  fact  inde 
pendent.  They  have  in  their  hands  all  that  constitutes 
sovereign  power.  Our  recognition  will  add  nothing  to  the 
reality  of  that  possession."  Without  asserting  this  inde 
pendence,  France  was  prepared  to  assume  it  for  the  purposes 
of  the  alliance.  She  desired  a  treaty  consisting  of  two  parts  : 
the  first  establishing  a  commercial  agreement  ;  the  second 
providing  for  an  eventual  alliance,  "  to  procure  absolute  and 
unlimited  independence  to  the  United  States-." — France 
would  require  that  the  Americans  should  not  make  peace 
secretly  or  without  her  guaranty  ;  and  the  two  powers  would 
guarantee  each  other's  American-  possessions.  The  King 
might  be  obliged  to  sign  a  treaty  before  hearing  from  Spain 
again.  In  that  case,  Vergennes  promised  to  reserve  the 
right  of  Spain  to  accede  to  it  at  any  time.  One  reason  for 
hastening  the  negotiation  was  Vergennes'  suspicion  that, 
even  at  this  late  stage,  the  Deputies  were  withdrawing  their 
confidence.  "  What  a  humiliation  .  .  .  if  after  having  the 
opportunity  to  attach  the  Americans  to  ourselves,  we  should 
have  reason  to  reproach  ourselves  with  having  attached  them 
to  England.  ...  I  do  not  know,"  he  said,  "whether  I 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  69 

could  survive  the  shame  of  signing  the  passport  which  the 
Deputies  would  ask  of  me  to  go  to  London." 

"As  it  is  not  we  who  will  and  act,  but  circumstances 
which  imperiously  dictate  the  law  to  us,"  Vergennes  wrote 
to  the  ambassador  in  Spain,  in  this  letter  of  January  8,  *'  to 
morrow  will  not  pass  without  my  informing  the  Americans 
of  our  disposition  and  endeavoring  to  penetrate  theirs."  He 
was  better  than  his  word.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day, 
Gerard  held  a  conference  with  the  Commissioners.  Binding 
them  to  secrecy,  he  told  them  that  the  King  had  resolved  to 
assist  the  United  States  in  maintaining  their  independence. 
After  warning  them  against  the  designs  of  England,  Gerard 
asked  them  two  definite  questions  :  first,  what  they  would 
regard  as  sufficient  to  ensure  their  rejecting  all  English  pro 
posals  which  did  not  include  absolute  independence  ;  second, 
what  they  believed  necessary  to  cause  Congress  to  reject  all 
such  proposals.  The  Commissioners  replied  to  the  first 
question,  that  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  alliance  would  be 
sufficient."  Gerard  told  them  that  the  King,  anticipating 
this  answer,  had  decided  to  conclude  a  treaty  ;  and  that  the 
formal  negotiations  should  begin  whenever  they  wished.  At 
their  request,  he  made  a  brief  statement  of  the  terms  which 
would  be  agreeable  to  France,  following  the  lines  of  Ver 
gennes'  despatch  to  the  Spanish  Court.  The  policy  of  the 
commercial  treaty,  he  said,  would  not  differ  materially  from 
that  of  the  Congressional  plan.  He  explained  that  the  King 
would  not  require  any  compensation  for  his  support;  and  that, 
since  his  motive  was  not  desire  for  conquest,  France  could 
not  co-operate  with  America  for  the  reduction  of  Canada  and 
the  West  Indies.3  In  spite  of  this  limitation,  the  Deputies 
felt  that  the  main  object  of  their  endeavor  was  gained. 
They  "  applauded  this  recital,"  Gerard  reported,  "with  a 
sort  of  transport." 

Three  days  later,  Deane  gave  Gerard  the  answer  of  the 
Commissioners  to  his  second  question.4  To  prevent  Con- 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Jan.  8,  1778.     Doniol,  II,  p.  719. 

2  Stevens  Facsimiles,  774. 

3  Journal  of  Arthur  Lee.     Life,  I,  p.  377. 

4  Jan.  11,  1778.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  776. 


jo  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

gress  from  making  peace  with  England,  they  said  it  would 
be  necessary  that  France  should  guarantee  the  territories 
then  in  possession  of  the  United  States  and  those  acquired 
during  the  war,  and  either  declare  war  against  England  or 
provide  Congress  with  enough  money  to  carry  on  the  strug 
gle  until  the  British  should  be  expelled  from  the  continent. 
A  fleet  of  six  or  eight  ships  of  the  line  would  make  doubly 
sure,  by  procuring  the  success  of  the  Americans.  In 
making  these  requests,  the  Commissioners  asked  for  more 
than  they  could  hope  to  obtain  ;  for  they  had  been  told  that 
immediate  war  formed  no  part  of  the  King's  plan.  Ver- 
gennes  was  annoyed.  "These  people,"  he  said,  "show 
themselves  infinitely  more  troublesome  and  more  morose 
than  we  could  have  thought."1 

After  the  interview  just  described,  the  negotiation  went 
on  with  little  delay.  On  the  eighteenth  of  January,  the 
treaties  drawn  up  by  Vergennes  were  submitted  to  the 
Deputies,  who  deliberated  on  them  for  ten  days2  and,  after 
obtaining  some  changes  in  minor  points,  accepted  them. 
Thetprincipal  matter  of  discussion  was  the  nature  of  the 
alliance  ;  the  Americans  wishing  to  make  it  actual,  the 
French  insisting  that  it  must  be  eventual.  Of  course  the 
Commissioners  were  obliged  to  yield. 

While  France  was  entering  on  the  last  stage  of  her  ne 
gotiation  with  the  Americans,  the  Spanish  Ministry  were 
preparing  an  elaborate  set  of  questions  for  discussion.  They 
took  this  step,  apparently,  with  a  double  aim  :  to  gain  time  ; 
and  to  give  a  forcible  hint  that  Spain  would  not  prosecute  a 
war  for  the  mere  humiliation  of  England,  but  would  insist 
on  substantial  advantages.3  This  promising  document  had 
scarcely  been  completed,  when  the  French  memoir e  of  Jan 
uary  8  arrived,  to  convince  the  Spaniards  that  their  efforts 
were  useless,  for  the  measure  which  they  were  trying  to 
delay  had  probably  been  adopted.  The  natural  irritation  of 
the  baffled  statesmen  found  vent  in  criticism  of  their  ally. 
The  Court  of  France  had  not  performed  its  agreements  ;  it 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Jan.  16,  1778.     Stevens  Facsimiles,  1838. 

2 See  Arthur  Lee's  Journal,  Jan.,  1778.     Life,  I,  pp.  377  ff. 

3  Florida  Blanca  to  d'Aranda,  Jan.  13,  1778.     Doniol,  II,  p.  775. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  7 1 

had  compelled  Spain  to  change  her  whole  plan  of  war,  with 
the  result  that  her  colonies  were  ill  defended  ;  it  had  "  ob 
served  neither  secrecy,  moderation  nor  neutrality  in  any  re 
spect  as  to  the  Americans.  ...  In  a  matter  of  so  grave 
importance," — thus  ran  the  Spanish  arraignment,  — "  it  has 
followed  no  system  or  plan,  since  at  one  time  it  worked 
openly  and  with  great  zeal  in  favor  of  the  Colonies,  and  at 
another,  had  resort  to  condescensions  by  no  means  becoming, 
on  the  slightest  complaint  or  insinuation  of  the  British  Cabi 
net."  In  this  light,  the  temporizing  policy  of  France 
appeared  to  her  ally.  Spain  was  not  left  long  in  doubt  of 
the  outcome  of  that  policy.  On  January  30,  Vergennes 
wrote  to  Montmorin  that  the  treaties  were  practically  com 
pleted  ;  and  on  the  sixth  of  February,  the  month  which, 
half  a  year  before,  Vergennes  had  set  as  a  limit  beyond 
which  delay  would  be  disastrous,  they  were  signed  and 
sealed. 

The  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  followed,  in  its  main 
lines,  the   plan  of  Congress  and  the   specific  modifications 
contained  in   the   instructions  of  the   Commissioners.     The 
plan  provided  for  mutual  exemption  from  all  duties— oil—: Im 
ports  except  rijosej^fii^ 

zens.  France  declined  to  become  a  party. to_this  agreement, 
and  the  privileges  of  the  most  favored  nation  _were__  substi 
tuted,  each  party  reserving  liberty  to  admit  other  nations  to 
the  same  advantages.  An  attempt  was  made  to  provide  for 
reciprocal  exemptions  between  the  United  States  and  the 
West  Indies.  This  met  with  objections  on  the  part  of  one 
member  of  the  Commission  and  two  of  his  countrymen  who 
were  admitted  into  the  secret.  After  the  discussion  had  done 
as  much  harm  as  possible  by  exciting  ill  feeling  among  the 
Americans,  an  effort  was  made  to  have  the  articles  in 
question  omitted.  They  were  left  untouched,  with  the  un 
derstanding  that  Congress  might  ratify  them  or  not,  without 
prejudice  to  the  rest  of  the  treaty,  and  were  finally  rejected. 
France  reserved  her  share  in  the  Newfoundland  fishery,  as 

1  Mhnoire  to  be  read  in  Council  of  Ministers,  Jan.  22,  1778.     Sparks 
MSS.,  CII. 


72  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

stipulated  in  the  treaty  of  Paris  ;  and  each  nation  renounced 
the  right  to  fish  on  the  grounds  belonging  to  the  other. 

More  important  to  the  world  at  large  than  the  commer 
cial  privileges  and  fishing  rights  conveyed  by  the  treaty 
were  the  rules  which  it  laid  down  for  the  regulation  of  trade 
in  time  of  war.  The  principle  that  "  free  ships  make  free 
goods"  was  adopted  ;  and  the  term  'contraband'  was  re 
stricted  to  arms,  munitions,  accoutrements,  and  horses.1 

A  treaty  of  defensive  alliance2  supplemented  the  commer 
cial  agreement  and  ensured  protection  to  the  trade  thereby 
authorized.  The  alliance,  eventual  in  its  nature  as  long  as 
Great  Britain  and  France  remained  at  peace,  should  become 
actual  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  them,  if  this 
occurred  during  the  American  war.  The  aim  of  the  alliance 
was  declared  to  be,  to  maintain  effectually  the  liberty,  sov 
ereignty,  and  independence  of  the  United  States.  Each 
nation  bound  itself  to  attack  the  enemy  separately  and,  on 
request,  to  assist  its  ally  as  much  as  possible.  The  rights  of 
the  two  powers  to  conquests  in  America  were  defined  :  the 
United  States  claiming  any  which  they  might  make  in  the 
northern  part  of  America,  or  the  Bermuda  Islands  ;  while 
France  reserved  the  right  to  take  any  of  the  English  islands 
in  or  near  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  articles  containing 
these  reservations  were  expressed  in  general  terms,  although 
the  corresponding  passage  in  the  Congressional  plan  named 
specifically  the  territories  and  islands  which  the  United 
States  desired  to  possess  :  among  them,  Florida,  Newfound 
land,  Cape  Breton,  and  St.  Johns.  This  change  caused  the 
same  men  who  protested  against  the  reciprocity  articles  to 
suspect  that  France  wished  "  to  leave  an  opening  for  nego 
tiating  Florida  into  the  possession  of  Spain  "  at  a  general 
peace,  and  for  excluding  the  United  States  from  the  islands 
which  command  the  Newfoundland  fisheries/1  Their  ob 
stinacy  in  clinging  to  this  suspicion  was  a  source  of  annoy- 

1  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  II,  p.  59. 

2  Ibid.,  II,  p.  82. 

3  Ralph  Izard  to  Arthur  Lee,  May  18,  1778.     A.  Lee  to  Izard,  May 
23.     Izard  to  Henry  Laurens,  June  28,  Sept.  12.     John  Adams  to  Izard, 
Oct  2.     Diplomatic  Correspondence,  II,  pp.  586,  594,  629,  713,  753. 


77/6'  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  73 

ance  to  the  negotiators  at  the  time,  and  has  since  been  treat 
ed  by  some  of  the  ablest  historians  as  wholly  unjustified  ; 
but  the  instructions  given  to  Gerard,  the  first  French  minis 
ter  to  the  United  States,  show  that  France  preferred  to  see 
Florida,  at  least,  in  the  hands  of  Spain.1 

The  parties  to  the  treaty  bound  themselves  to  conclude  no 
peace  without  mutual  consent,  and  not  to  lay  down  their 
arms  until  the  independence  of  the  United  States  had  been 
"  formally  or  tacitly"  assured.  They  renounced  in  advance 
all  claim  to  compensation.  They  mutually  guaranteed  their 
American  possessions  ;  and  France  guaranteed  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  United  States  from  the  moment  of  a  rupture 
with  England  or,  in  case  no  such  breach  should  occur,  from 
the  close  of  the  American  war.  A  separate  article  gave  the 
King  of  Spain  the  right  to  accede  to  the  treaties  at  pleasure. 

Vergennes  thought  at  the  time  of  the  negotiation  that, 
owing  to  the  natural  difficulty  of  keeping  such  a  secret,  the 
Americans  would  hear  of  the  treaty  by  the  end  of  April 
or  the  beginning  of  May  ;  so  he  decided  to  announce  it 
to  England  at  that  time.2  But,  before  the  date  set,  he 
began  to  fear  that  Congress  would  not  hear  of  it  early 
enough  to  prevent  them  from  listening  to  the  British  propo 
sitions.  As  news  reached  America  more  surely  and  quickly 
by  way  of  the  English  newspapers  than  when  sent  direct 
from  France,  he  determined  to  announce  the  treaty  to 
England  even  earlier  than  he  had  intended.  Rumors  of 
the  negotiation  had  reached  England  before  it  was  concluded, 
and  news  of  the  signing  was  promptly  conveyed  to  the 
British  Cabinet  by  agents  who  were  always  ready  to 
carry  reports  across  the  Channel.  But  the  existence  of  the 
treaty  was  positively  known  to  only  a  few  people  ;  and  the 
doubt  thrown  upon  it  by  the  British  Ministry  indicated  that 
concealment  was  desired  by  England  and,  as  a  natural  con 
sequence,  that  an  announcement  would  be  advantageous  to 
France.  So  the  ambassador  at  London  received  orders  to 
declare  the  treaty  ;  and,  for  fear  that  the  British  govern- 

1  Gerard's  Instructions,  approved  March  29.  1778.  Vergennes  to 
Gerard,  Oct.  26.  Doniol,  III,  pp.  155,  156. 

7  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Jan.  30,  1778.     Ibid.,  II,  p.  791. 


74  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

ment  might  conceal  the  facts,  he  was  instructed  to  let  noth 
ing  prevent  him  from  allowing  the  secret  to  leak  out  in 
private  conversation  the  next  day.1  The  announcement 
was  made  on  the  thirteenth  of  March.  The  Treaty  of 
Amity  and  Commerce  was  communicated  with  insolent  un 
concern  ;  and  England  was  informed  that  France  and  the 
United  States  had  also  entered  into  an  engagement  for  the 
protection  of  their,  commerce.2  Within  a  week,  both  Eng 
land  and  France- recalled  their  ambassadors,  and  war  had 
virtually  begun. 

In  announcing  the  treaty  so  early,  France  ignored  the  re 
quest  of  Spain  that  it  be  concealed  until  July,  to  allow  the 
return  of  her  troops  and  her  treasure-fleet.  In  this  way, 
another  cause  of  offense  was  prepared  ;  but  one  more  was 
of  little  consequence,  where  the  points  of  disagreement  were 
already  so  many  and  important.  Clearly,  if  France  desired 
more  aid  than  the  minimum  secured  to  her  by  the  Family 
Compact,  she  must  promote  the  exorbitant  ambition  of  her 
ally.  With  the  utmost  frankness,  d'Aranda  had  exposed 
the  reason  why  Spain  demanded  so  many  advantages  as  the 
price  of  her  assistance.  Her  statesmen  feared  that,  if 
war  should  break  out  and  be  continued  until  England 
made  overtures  of  peace,  France  would  ' '  require  Spain  to 
comply  also,  and  to  be  content  with  the  same  terms;" 
they  believed  ' '  that  the  explanation  of  the  purposes  of 
Spain  having  preceded,  France  would  be  obliged  to  sustain 
the  undertaking  until  they  should  be  carried  out."' 

By  the  ratification  of  the  treaties,  which  took  place 
promptly  on  their  arrival  in  America,  France  gained  two 
important  points  :  she  bound  the  United  States  to  continue 
the  war  until  their  independence  was  achieved,  and  to  accept 
her  guaranty.  But  w^isjtjtiecessary  that  she  should  commit 
herself  so  decisively  and,  with  reference  to  her  other 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  6,  10,  1 778.    Vergennes  to  Noailles, 
March  10.     Doniol,  II,  pp.  810,  813,  822,  826. 
2 Ibid.,  II,  p.  823. 
3DAranda  to  Florida  Blanca,  Jan.  31,  1778.     Sparks  MSS.,  CII. 


The  Conclusion  of  the   Treaty.  75 

interests^  so  prematurely.,,  in.. order  to  secure  the  end  desired  ? 
In  other  words,  was  there  imminent  danger_oLrie_ace  between 
England  and  America  ? 

It  is^generally  conceded  that  the  United  States  could  not 
have  carried  the  struggle  to  a  successful  issue  without  the 
aid  of  France.  Submission  must  have  come  at  last  ;  but, 
for  the  immediate  purpose  of  counteracting  Lord  North's 
Conciliatory  Bills,  the  treaty  which  Vergennes  rushed  to  a 
conclusion  without  the  concurrence  of  Spain,  was  super 
fluous.  Lord  North's  propositions  were  not  so  '  conciliatory' 
as  Vergennes'  fears  led  him  to  believe  :  they  did  not  hold  in 
reserve  an  offer  of  independence  as  a  last  resort.  Hurried 
to  America  before  their  first  reading  in  Parliament,  they 
arrived  in  advance  of  the  French  treat)7,  only  to  be  re 
jected.1  France  might  have  postponed  her  decision  without 
serious  danger. 

This  decision  was  of  fatal  consequence  to  France.  The 
immediate  results  were  "ot_the_  most  serious.  The  war  in 
which  France  became  involved,  her  difficult  task  as  guardian 
of  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  United  States  and  Spain, 
the  restoration  of  her  prestige  at  the  close  of  the  war, — 
trials  and  gains  alike  dwindle  to  incidents,  beside  the  over 
throw  of  her  tottering  finances  and  the  impulse  given  to 
revolutionary  sentiment  at  home.  Of  this  result,  Spain  had 
warned  her  ;  England  herself  had  warned  her.  Happily 
for  America,  most  unhappily  for  her  own  interests,  she  was 
deaf  to  the  warning.  "You  are  arming,  imprudent  mon 
arch  ;  do  you  forget  in  what  century,  in  what  circumstances, 
and  over  what  nation  you  reign  ?  .  .  .  The  legislaiars-of 
America  are  proclaiming  themselves  disciples 'of  the  French 
philosophers  ;  they  are  executing  what  these  have  dreamed. 
Will  not  the  French  philosophers  aspire  to  be  legislators  in 
their  own  country  ?  Will  principles  which  cannot  be  bent 
to  English  laws  accord  better  with  those  on  which  your 
monarchy  is  based  ?  How  dangerous  to  place  the  flower  of 
your  officers  in  communication  with  men  enthusiastic  for 
liberty  !  You  will  take  alarm,  but  too  late,  when  you  hear 

'Journals  of  Congress,  II,  pp.  521  ff. 


7  6  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

repeated  in  your  court  vague  and  specious  axioms  which 
they  have  meditated  in  the  forests  of  America.  .  .  .  Eng 
land  will  be  only  too  well  avenged  for  your  hostile  designs, 
when  your  government  is  examined,  judged,  and  condemned 
according  to  the  principles  professed  at  Philadelphia  and 
applauded  in  your  capital." 

1  Retranslated  from  the  French.  Quoted  from  a  pamphlet  pub 
lished  in  England  toward  the  end  of  1777,  said  to  have  been  inspired 
by  the  British  Ministry.  Lacretelle,  Histoire  de  France,  V,  p.  82. 


A  LIST  OF  THE  AUTHORITIES  CITED 
IN  THIS  THESIS. 


ADAMS,  JOHN.  The  Works  of  :  With  a  life  of  the  author,  notes  and 
illustrations,  by  Charles  Francis  Adams.  10  vols.  Boston,  1856. 

BANCROFT,  GEORGE.  History  of  the  United  States  of  America,  from 
the  Discovery  of  the  Continent.  6  vols.  New  York,  1884-5. 

BANCROFT,  GEORGE.     Manuscripts.     Lenox  Library,  New  York. 
BEAUMARCHAIS,  see  Chevallie  and  Lomenie. 

CAPEFIGUE,  J.  B.  H.  R.  Louis  XVI  son  Administration  et  ses  Rela 
tions  Diplomatiques  avec  1' Europe.  4  vols.  Bruxelles,  1844. 

CHEVALLIE,  P.  J.  Claim  of  Beaumarchais'  Heir  against  the  United 
States.  Washington,  1817. 

COLLEVILLE,  VICOMTE  BE.  Les  Missions  Secretes  du  General-Major 
Baron  de  Kalb  et  son  Role  dans  la  Guerre  de  1'Independance 
Americaine.  Paris,  1855. 

CONGRESS,  see  Jour^ia^ls..a-nxd  Secre-t  Journals. 
CORRESPONDANCE^ECRETE,  see  de  Lescure. 
CORRESPONDENCE,  DIPLOMATIC,  see  Wharton. 

DEANE  PAPERS.  Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society  for 
the  year  1886.  New  York,  1887. 

DONIOL,  HENRI.  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  a  1'Eta- 
blissement  des  Etatfe-Unis  d'Amerique.  Correspondance  diplo 
matique  et  documents.  5  vols.  Paris,  1886-92. 

DURAND,  JOHN,  editor.  New  Materials  for  the  History  of  the  Ameri 
can  Revolution.  New  York,  1889. 

FiSKE,  JOHN.     The  American  Revolution.     2  vols.     Boston,  1891. 

FLASSAN,  GAETAN  DE  RAXIS,  COMTE  DE.  Histoire  Generale  et  Rai- 
sonnee  de  la  Diplomatic  Francaise,  ou  de  la  Politique  de  la  France, 
depuis  la  Fondation  de  la  Monarchic,  jusqu'  a  la  Fin  du  Regne  de 
Louis  XVI.  7  vols.  Paris,  1811-29. 

FRANKLIN,  THE  COMPLETE  WORKS  OF.  John  Bigelow,  editor.  10 
vols.  New  York  and  London,  1887-8. 

FRANKLIN,  see  Parton. 


7  8  France  and  the  American  Revolution. 

JOURNALS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  CONGRESS.  From  1774  to  1778.  4  vols. 
Washington,  1823. 

KALB,  see  Colleville  and  Kapp. 

KAPP,  FRIEDRICH.  The  Life  of  John  Kalb,  Major-General  in  the 
Revolutionary  Army.  New  York,  1884. 

LACRETELLE,  CHARLES.  Histoire  de  France  pendant  le  Dix-huitieme 
Siecle.  6  vols.  Paris,  1810. 

LAFAYETTE,  Memoirs,  Correspondence  and  Manuscripts  of.  Pub 
lished  by  his  family.  New  York,  1837. 

LECKY,  W.  E.  H.  A  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century. 
8  vols.  New  York,  1878. 

LEE,  ARTHUR.     See  Lee,  Charles  Henry  and  Richard  Henry. 

LEE,  CHARLES  HENRY.  A  Vindication  of  Arthur  Lee,  Former  Rep 
resentative  of  the  Province  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  at  London. 
Richmond,  Va.,  1894. 

LEE,  RICHARD  HENRY.     Life  of  Arthur  Lee.     2  vols.     Boston,  1829. 

LESCURES,  M.  F.  A.  DE.  Correspondance  Secrete  Inedite  sur  Louis 
XVI,  Marie  Antoinette,  la  Cour,  et  la  Ville,  de  1777  a  1792.  2 
vols.  Paris,  1866. 

LOMENIE,  Louis  DE.  Beaumarchais  and  his  Times.  Sketches  of 
French  society  in  the  eighteenth  century,  from  unpublished  doc 
uments.  Translated  by  Henry  S.  Edwards.  4  vols.  London, 
1856. 

MAHON,  LORD.  (Stanhope. )  History  of  England  from  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht  to  the  Peace  of  Versailles.  7  vols.  London,  1851. 

MANUSCRIPTS,  see  Bancroft,  Sparks  and  Stevens. 
MEMOIRS,  see  Lafayette,  Segur,  Soulavie,  and  Vergennes. 
PARKMAN,  FRANCIS.     A  Half-Century  of  Conflict.     2  vols.     Boston, 

1893- 
PARTON,  JAMES.     Life  and   Times   of  Benjamin   Franklin.     2   vols. 

Boston. 
SECRET  JOURNALS  OF  THE  ACTS  AND  PROCEEDINGS  OF  CONGRESS. 

2  vols.     Boston,  1820-1821. 

SEGUR,  Louis  PHILIPPE,  LE  COMTE  DE.  Memoires  ou  Souvenirs  et 
Anecdotes.  2  vols.  Paris,  1844. 

SEGUR,  Louis  PHILIPPE,  L'AINE.  Politique  de  Tous  les  Cabinets  de 
PEurope,  pendant  les  Regnes  de  Louis  XV  et  de  Louis  XVI.  3, 
vols.  Paris,  1801. 


Authorities  Cited  in  this   Thesis.  79 

,  JEAN  Louis,  i/AiNE.     Memoires  Historiques  et  Politiques 
du  Regne  de  Louis  XVI,  depuis  son  Manage  jusqu'  a  sa  Mort. 
Paris,  1801. 
SPARKS,  JARED.     Manuscripts.     Library  of  Harvard  University. 

STEVENS,  B.  F.  Facsimiles  of  Manuscripts  in  European  Archives 
Relating  to  America,  1773-1783.  23  vols.  1889-1895. 

TURGOT,  OEUVRES.  Editeurs,  Eugene  Daire  et  Hippolyte  Dussard. 
2  vols.  Paris,  1844. 

VERGENNES,  MEMOIRE  HISTORIOUE  ET  POUTIQUE  SUR  IVA  LOUISI- 
ANE. 

WHARTON,  FRANCIS,  editor.  The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Corre 
spondence  of  the  United  States.  6  vols.  Washington,  1889. 

WiTT,  CORNEUS  DE.  Thomas  Jefferson.  Etude  Historique  sur  la 
Democratic  Americaine.  Paris.  1861. 


INDEX. 


ADAMS,  JOHN,  advises  Declaration 
of  Independence  and  treaties 
with  foreign  powers,  17  ;  mem 
ber  of  Committee  on  plan  of 
treaty,  wishes  commercial  treaty 
only,  43  ;  objects  to  alliance,  50. 

Adams,  Samuel,  advises  Declara 
tion  of  Independence,  17. 

Aiguillon,  d',  foreign  policy  of ,  u. 

Alliance  between  France  and 
America,  measures  leading  to, 
advocated  in  1768,  10  ;  not  de 
sired  by  Spain,  39  ;  considered 
by  Vergennes,  39,  44  ;  nrged  by 
Beaumarchais,  41  ;  objections  of 
Vergennes  and  Grimaldi,  48  ;  of 
fered  by  Congress,  49  ;  France 
wishes  proposals  for,  60  ;  nature 
of,  actual  or  eventual,  63,  65,  70  ; 
Florida  Blanca  objects  to,  67  ; 
terms  of,  72.  See  Treaty. 

Ambassadors,  motion  to  send  to 
France,  17  ;  withdrawn  by  En 
gland  and  France,  74. 

Amphi  trite,  33-34. 

Aranda,  d',  39,  40,  46,  74. 

Armaments,  a  cause  of  jealousy,  58. 

BEAUMARCHAIS,  collects  informa 
tion,  19  ;  urges  the  King  to  aid 
America,  19,  21  ;  replies  to  Lord 
Rochford,  25  ;  advises  a  loan 
to  the  Americans,  26 ;  receives 
1,000,000  livres  from  French 
Treasury,  27  ;  agreement  with 
Deane,  31  ;  obtains  supplies  from 
royal  arsenals,  32  ;  advises  send 
ing  French  officers  to  America, 
32  ;  sends  cargoes  to  America, 
32,  33  ;  receives  money  from 
Spain  and  France,  34  ;  claim 
against  United  States,  34-37  ; 
plan  for  aiding  Americans,  36  ; 
desires  recognition  of  Ameri 
cans,  41  ;  comment  on  capitula 
tion  of  Burgoyne,  61. 

Bermuda  Islands,  right  of  conquest 
reserved  to  United  States,  72. 

Bonvouloir,  instructions,  16  ;  sails 
for  America,  17  ;  meets  the  Com 
mittee  of  Secret  Correspondence, 
1 8  ;  report  reaches  France,  21. 


British  Ministry,  measures  dis 
please  American  Colonists,  5  ; 
distrusted  by  Vergennes,  14  ; 
protest  against  prohibited  trade, 
20  ;  may  desire  foreign  war,  23  ; 
to  be  cajoled,  23  ;  learn  secrets 
of  French  Cabinet,  51-52  ;  pro 
test  against  tolerance  of  Ameri 
can  privateers,  55  ;  demand  re 
versal  of  policy,  57  ;  conduct,  a 
cause  of  satisfaction  to  Vergen 
nes,  64  ;  change  of  policy  feared, 
73  ;  throw  doubt  on  French 
treaty,  73. 

Burgoyne's  capitulation,  59  ;  effect 
on  French  Ministry,  60. 

CANADA,  effect  of  cession  to  En 
gland,  1,2;  mentioned  in  Bon- 
vouloir's  instructions,  16 ;  de 
mand  for  retrocession  consid 
ered,  52,  54  ;  King  will  not  aid 
Americans  to  conquer,  69. 

Chase,  of  Maryland,  moves  to  send 
ambassadors  to  France,  17. 

Chatelet,  du,  discusses  American 
affairs  with  Choiseul,  8,  9  ;  plans 
informal  commercial  agreement 
with  Americans,  10. 

Chatham,  Lord,  63,  68. 

Choiseul,  enmity  toward  England, 
3,  4,  ii  ;  alliances  with  Austria 
and  Spain,  4  ;  sends  agents  to 
America,  5,7;  hints  at  new  plans 
with  reference  to  America,  6 ; 
predicts  American  Revolution, 
7  ;  receives  de  Kalb  coldly,  9  ; 
recommends  commercial  rela 
tions  with  Americans,  11  ;  goes 
into  exile,  1 1  ;  opposes  Vergen 
nes,  41  ;  policy,  52. 

Colonies,  Turgot's  views  of,  23-24. 

Commercial  intercourse  between 
French  and  American  citizens 
proposed  by  Frances  and  du 
Chatelet,  10  ;  approved  by  Coun 
cil,  ii  ;  opposed  by  Spain,  11  ; 
existence  of,  known,  19;  British 
protests  against,  25. 

Commissioners  to  France,  appoint 
ed,  44  ;  audience  with  Vergennes, 
46  ;  dissensions,  46  ;  popularity, 


82  Index. 

47  ;    submit   proposed   treat}'  to        ment,   44  ;    influence  on  public 
Vergennes,    47  ;    additional    in-  i      opinion  in  France,  44. 
structions,   48  ;  urge   France   to    Deputies.     See  Commissioners, 
declare  war,  49  ;  personal  pledge    Dubourg,  obtains  aid  for  America, 
of,  49  ;  expect  war,  51  ;  Vergen-        26. 

nes  complains  of,  57  ;  ask  loan,  Dumas,  instructed  by  Committee 
58  ;  congratulated  by  King,  60  ;  of  Secret  Correspondence,  18  ; 
request  answer  to  their  proposals,  requests  mediation  of  France,  30. 
6r,  64  ;  important  conferences  Durand,  discusses  effect  of  a  revo- 
with  Gerard,  65,  69  ;  answer  lution  in  America,  5  ;  cultivates 
question  about  Congress,  70;  Franklin's  acquaintance,  6; 
deliberate  on  the  treaties,  70.  thinks  revolution  will  be  grad- 

Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  65.        ual,  6. 

Committee  of  Secret  Correspond 
ence,  formation  of,  17  ;  instruc-  j  FAMILY  COMPACT,  Third,  4,  22,  74. 
tions    to    Arthur    Lee,     17  ;    to    Farmers  General,   approached  by 
Charles  Dumas,  18 ;  appoint  Silas        Dubourg,     27;     contract    with 
Deane  commercial  and  political        American  Commissioners,  51. 
agent,  30.  j  Florida,  Vergennes  tempts  Spain 

Committee   to   draw    up    plan    of       with,  62;  suspicion  that  France 
treaties,    43.  wished  Spain  to  possess,  72  ;  evi- 

Congress,    Continental,    delegates  j      dence,  73. 

elected,  14  ;  debates  on  inde-  Florida  Blanca,  plan  of  interven- 
pendence  and  foreign  alliances,  j  tion  in  American  quarrel,  53  ; 
17  ;  Beaumarchais  writes  to,  32;  !  suggests  recovery  of  territory, 
said  to  be  treating  with  Howe,  54  ;  anger  at  French  policy,  67  ; 
33  ;  Resolution  of  May  15,  37  ;  thinks  peace  between  England 
debates  on  alliance,  43  ;  relieved  and  America  unlikely,  67. 
by  French  loan,  49  ;  offers  alii-  Franklin,  Benjamin,  suspicious  of 
ance  to  France,  49  ;  inducements  France,  6  ;  receives  friendly  hint 
to  France  and  Spain,  50  ;  author-  \  from  Gamier,  15;  member  of 
izes  capture  of  British  vessels,  Committee  on  plan  of  treaty,  43  ; 
54  ;  measures  necessary  to  pre-  i  joint  Commissioner  to  France, 
vent  from  making  peace,  69-70.  44  ;  arrives  in  Paris,  46  ;  popu- 
See  Committee.  larity,  47  ;  negotiates  with  the 

Contraband,  defined  in  Treaty  of        Ministry,  66.  See  Commissioners. 
1778,  72. 

i  GARNIER,  14,  15. 

DEANE,  SII,AS,  sent  to  France  by  Gerard,  endorses  Beaumarchais, 
Committee  of  Secret  Correspond-  31  ;  receives  explanation  from 
ence,  30  ;  instructions,  31  ;  audi-  ;  Vergennes,  36  ;  gives  informa- 
ence  with  Vergennes,  31  ;  agree-  tion  about  Beaumarchais,  37  ;  re- 
ment  with  Beaumarchais,  32  ;  ports  King's  decision  to  Corn- 
announces  Resolution  of  May  missioners,  65  ;  statement  about 
15,  37  ;  memorial  on  American  I  separate  peace,  65  ;  draws  up 
trade,  37  ;  asks  recognition  for  plan  of  treaty,  66  ;  important 
United  States,  41  ;  joint  Com-  conference  with  Commissioners, 
missioner  to  France,  44  ;  notifies  i  69  ;  instructions,  on  Florida,  73. 
France  of  Declaration  of  Inde-  Germaine,  Lord,  63. 
pendence,  44  ;  interviews  with  j  Germantown,  Battle  of,  impresses 
British  agent,  64.  See  Commis-  Vergennes,  62. 
sioners.  Gibraltar,  desired  by  Spain,  56. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  de-  j  Grand,  statement   about   supplies 
sired  by  John  and  Samuel  Adams,        sent  by  Beaumarchais,  35. 
17  ;  delay  in  receiving  news  of,    Grimaldi,  suggests  attack  on  En- 
33,41  ;  Resolution  of  May  15,37  \       gland,  22  ;  objects  to  American 
feared  by  cautious  members  of       alliance,  48. 
Congress,  43  ;  official  announce-    Guaranties  in  Treaty  of  1778,  73. 


Index. 


Guaranty  of   American  rights  by  | 
France  and  Spain,  suggested  by 
Vergennes,    56 ;     approved     by 
Spain,  56;  no  hope  of,  through 
Commissioners,  57  ;  Holker'sin-  [ 
structions   on,   59  ;  proposed  as  i 
part  of  treaty,  63  ;  offer  of,  with 
out  treaty,  useless,  68. 

Guines,  de,  15,  16. 

Gulf  of  Mexico,  islands  near,  right 
of  conquest  reserved  to  France,  < 
72. 

HENRY,  PATRICK,  predicts  alli 
ance  with  France,  Spain,  and 
Holland,  17. 

Holker,  instructions  of,  59-61. 

INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  UNITED  : 
STATES,  foreseen,  i,  2,  5,  6,  9; 
interest  of  France  in,  5,  7,  TO,  11, 
20  ;  mentioned  in  Bonvouloir's 
instructions,  16 ;  advantage  of 
recognizing,  61  ;  King  ready  to 
acknowledge,  65  ;  Vergennes  as 
serts,  68  ;  France  anxious  to  se 
cure,  69  ;  object  of  alliance  of 
1778,  72;  guaranteed,  73.  See 
Declaration. 

JAMAICA,  40. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  declines  ap 
pointment  as  joint  Commissioner 
to  France,  44. 

Jerseys,  retreat  through,  effect  on 
Congress,  49. 

KAI.B,  DE,  secret  mission  to  Ameri 
ca,  7  ;  reports,  7-8  ;  cold  recep 
tion  on  return,  9. 

LAFAYETTE,  comment  on  Choi- 
seul's  treatment  of  de  Kalb,  9  ; 
goes  to  America,  42  ;  criticizes 
Vergennes,  53. 

Lee,  Arthur,  instructed  by  Com 
mittee  of  Secret  Correspondence, 
17  ;  interviews  with  French  am 
bassador,  30 ;  statements  bearing 
on  Beaumarchais  claim,  35,  36  ; 
joint  Commissioner  to  France, 
44  ;  arrives  in  Paris,  46  ;  goes  to 
Spain,  53.  See  Commissioners. 

Loan,  by  France,  49  ;  requested  and 
refused,  50  ;  obtained  from  Farm 
ers  General,  51  ;  requested  by 
Congress,  58.  See  Subsidy. 


Long  Island,  Battle  of,  effect  on 
French  Ministry,  33,  40,  41. 

Louis XVI,  character, .13  ;  Council, 
13  ;  opposes  plans  of  Beaumar 
chais,  19  ;  approves  Vergennes' 
memoire  on  America,  24  ;  influ 
enced  by  public  opinion,  42-43  ; 
advised  by  Grimaldi,  48  ;  author 
izes  overtures  to  Commissioners, 
60  ;  resolved  to  recognize  Ameri 
can  independence,  65 ;  intentions 
as  to  separate  peace,  65 ;  personal 
letter  to  King  of  Spain,  68  ;  in 
tentions  reported  to  Commis 
sioners,  69. 

MAUREPAS,  character,  13  ;  replies 
to  British  complaint,  20  ;  urged 
to  attack  England,  39  ;  remark 
on  influence  of  public  opinion, 
42  ;  conversation  with  Lord  Stor- 
mont,  58  ;  congratulates  Com 
missioners,  60. 

Mediation  between  England  and 
America,  requested  of  France  by 
Dumas,  and  refused,  30 ;  sug 
gested  by  Florida  Blanca,  53  ; 
idea  rejected  by  Vergennes,  53, 
68  ;  Spain  willing  to  offer,  67. 

Merchants,  interested  in  American 
success,  42. 

Military  class,  republican  theories, 
enthusiasm  for  America,  42. 

Minorca,  40. 

Montmorin,  63,  67,  71. 

NEUTRALITY,  advised  by  Turgot, 
24  ;  considered  by  French  Min 
istry,  52. 

Neutrals,  rights  of,  38  ;  under 
Treaty  of  1778,  72. 

Newfoundland  fishery,  in  Treaty 
of  1778,  71  ;  suspicion  that  France 
wished  to  exclude  United  States 
from,  72. 

North,  Lord,  63  ;  announces  plan 
of  reconciliation,  65  ;  likely  to 
cause  war  with  France,  68  ;  terms 
rejected  by  Congress,  75. 

OFFICERS,  French,  sent  to  America 
by  advice  of  Beaumarchais,  32. 
Ossun,  d',  47,  48. 

PAPER  MONEY,  49. 
Personal  pledge  of  Commissioners, 
49- 


84 


Index. 


Philosophers,  sympathize  with 
Americans,  42. 

Pontleroy,  mission  to  America,  5. 

Portugal,  French  co-operation  in 
conquest  of,  desired  by  Spain, 
22,  39  ;  Congress  offers  to  declare 
war  against,  50. 

Privateering,  American,  54  ;  British 
demands  for  its  repression,  57  ; 
these  demands  not  official,  58. 

Public  opinion  in  favor  of  Ameri 
cans,  41  ;  effect  on  French  Min 
istry,  42,  52. 

QUEEN,  sympathizes  with  Ameri 
cans,  42. 

RATIFICATION  OF  TREATY  OF  1 778, 

74- 

Rayneval,  Memorial  on  the  Ameri 
can  question,  20. 

Reconciliation  between  England 
and  America,  fear  of,  8,  23,  33, 
40,  5i,  55,  58,  61-65,  68,  73,  75. 

Rochford,  Lord,  15,  19,  25. 

Rodrique  Hortalez  and  Company, 
26. 

SECRET  AGENTS  sent  to  America, 
unknown  officer,  i  ;  Pontleroy, 
5  ;  de  Kalb,  7  ;  Bonvouloir,  16  ; 
Holker,  59. 

Secret  Cabinet  of  Louis  XV,  plans 
invasion  of  England,  5. 

Secret  proposals  of  peace  from 
England,  51,  64. 

Separate  Article,  Treaty  of  1778,  73. 

Separate  peace,  Commissioners  re 
solve  to  stipulate  against,  49  ; 
King's  intentions,  65  ;  forbidden 
by  treaty,  73. 

Spain,  enters  Family  Compact,  4  ; 
warlike  spirit  aroused,  4  ;  objects 
to  trade  relations  with  English 
Colonies,  n  ;  desires  aid  of 
France  against  Portugal,  and 
war  with  England,  22  ;  willing 
to  aid  Americans,  24 ;  fear  of 
England,  28  ;  desires  territory, 
28,  54,  70 ;  entrusts  money  to 
Beaumarchais,  34  ;  wishes  war 
with  England,  39  ;  objects  to 
American  alliance,  39,  48,  67  ; 
postpones  war,  40  ;  rejects  ad 
vances  of  Congress,  50  ;  proposes 
offer  of  mediation,  53  ;  wishes  to 
guarantee  American  rights,  56  ; 
refuses  to  declare  war,  56;  wishes 


Gibraltar,  56  ;  irritation  at  priva 
teers,  58  ;  sends  agent  to  America, 
59  ;  refuses  to  fix  amount  of  sub 
sidy,  59  ;  criticism  of  France,  70- 
71  ;  right  to  accede  to  Treaty  of 
J778,  73  ;  requests  concealment 
of  Treaty,  74  ;  reason  for  de 
mands,  74. 

Stamp  Act,  5,  6. 

Stormont,  Lord,  persuaded  that 
France  wishes  peace,  20  ;  pro 
tests  against  Beaumarchais'  ship 
ments,  33  ;  threatens  to  leave, 
46  ;  discovers  secrets  of  French 
Cabinet,  52  ;  avoids  an  ultima 
tum,  58. 

Subsidy  to  Americans,  59.  See 
Beaumarchais. 

i  TICONDEROGA,  abandonment  of, 
58. 

|  Treaty  of  1763,  3,  28. 

I  Treaty  of  1778,  Congressional  plan, 
43-44  ;  resolved  on  by  French 
Cabinet  and  King,  61-62  ;  wishes 
of  France  concerning,  68  ;  sub 
mitted  to  Commissioners,  de 
bated,  accepted,  70  ;  signed,  71  ; 
terms  of,  71-73  ;  announced,  74  ; 
ratified,  74 ;  consequences  to 
France,  75. 

'  Turgot,  minister  of  finance,  13  ; 
views  about  colonies,  23  ;  advises 
neutrality,  24  ;  is  dismissed,  27. 

VERGENNES,  predicts  result  of  ces 
sion  of  Canada,  2  ;  policy  of  de 
ception,  3  ;  enters  Cabinet,  12  ; 


previous  career, 


distrust  of 


England,  14  ;  foresees  American 
independence,  15  ;  advises  de 
fensive  measures  against  En 
gland  and  concessions  to  Ameri 
cans,  1 6  ;  replies  to  British  com 
plaint,  20  ;  advises  aid  for  Ameri 
cans,  22-23  ;  forbids  exportation 
of  arms  to  America,  25  ;  explains 
his  motives,  28  ;  receives  Deane, 
31  ;  letter  on  manner  of  helping 
Americans,  35  ;  statements  about 
supplies  for  America,  36-37  ;  re 
fuses  information  to  United 
States  government,  37  ;  justifies 
reception  of  Deane,  38  ;  proposes 
war  as  auxiliary  of  Spain,  39  ; 
guards  against  continental  war, 
40  ;  motives,  43  ;  outlines  policy 
of  France,  45  ;  audience  to  Com- 


Index. 


missioners,  46  ;  opinion  of  their 
proposals,  47  ;  replies  to  them, 
48  ;  objection  to  American  alli 
ance,  48  ;  fears  effect  of  British 
proposals,  51  ;  expects  war,  51  ; 
memorial  on  Canada  and  Louisi 
ana,  52  ;  policy  of  compromise, 
53  opposes  Spanish  proposals, 
checks  American  privateers, 
wishes  early  date  for  war, 
desires  American  alliance, 
56,  62  ;  suggests  and  plans  for 
guaranty  of  American  rights,  56  ; 
criticizes  Deputies,  57  ;  prepares 
to  refuse  British  demands,  and 
expects  war,  57  ;  advises  subsidy 


to  Americans,  58;  discusses  terms 
of  treaty,  62  ;  glad  that  British 
Ministry  cannot  grant  independ 
ence,  64 ;  informs  Commissioners 
that  the  King  will  treat,  65  ;  re 
monstrates  with  Spain,  67-68  ; 
states  wishes  of  France  concern 
ing  treaty,  68  ;  annoyed  at  Ameri 
can  demands,  70  ;  reasons  for  an 
nouncing  treaty,  73. 

WENTWORTH,  64. 

West  Indies,  King  will  not  help 
Americans  conquer,  69  ;  discus 
sion  of  duties  on  products,  71. 


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